Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,308 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,033
733
398
298
243
Contributors
1,048
740
503
372
239
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
4,308
Platforms
2,570
792
615
382
319
Products / Services
767
739
659
512
348
MITRE Techniques
2,347
917
847
814
635
CVEs
9
6
6
6
5
IDS Classtypes
81
66
44
14
14
IDS Protocols
136
79
11
7
4
Detects Microsoft-branded phishing pages served from non-Microsoft domains, the subsequent credential submission, and the establishment of a WebSocket relay connection characteristic of the Mirage2FA Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) toolkit. This rule correlates multiple stages of the phishing flow to identify active proxy-based credential and MFA bypass attempts.
Detects read access to the Windows Registry keys associated with Outlook profile SMTP passwords. Attackers may attempt to extract these credentials to gain unauthorized access to email accounts.
Detects Active Directory replication events (Event ID 4662) targeting sensitive objects related to replication (e.g., Replication-Get-Changes-All). The rule filters out known Domain Controllers and designated replication service accounts to identify potential DCSync attacks or unauthorized directory replication attempts.
Detects an AI agent disclosing system-prompt or safety-policy content, or returning sandbox re-encrypted ciphertext-only output, immediately following a cryptographic-injection-style probe request in the same session — the safety-policy-bypass stage of Cryptographic Context Injection.
Detects the temporary enablement of the UseLogonCredential registry value by setting it to 1, followed by a subsequent reversion to 0 on the same host. This pattern is indicative of a deliberate 'hit-and-run' attempt to force the WDigest security package to store plaintext credentials in memory for harvesting.
Detects the enabling of the WDigest UseLogonCredential registry value, which forces the storage of plaintext credentials in memory by the LSASS process, followed by a privileged interactive or remote interactive logon on the same host within 72 hours. This sequence suggests an attacker is positioning the system to harvest credentials.
The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome "Local State" file, which contains critical settings and information. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior.
This activity is significant because threat actors can exploit this file to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting saved passwords in Chrome.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.
Monitoring this anomaly helps identify potential threats and safeguard browser-stored data.
This activity is significant because threat actors can exploit this file to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting saved passwords in Chrome.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.
Monitoring this anomaly helps identify potential threats and safeguard browser-stored data.
Detects instances where the ESET Remote Administrator Agent (ERAAgent.exe) terminates shortly after loading the Data Protection API service (dpapisvc.dll). This pattern may indicate an attempt to interact with or disrupt DPAPI services, potentially to facilitate credential dumping or sensitive data access.
Detects instances where the ESET Remote Administrator Agent (ERAAgent.exe) terminates shortly after loading the Data Protection API service (dpapisvc.dll). This pattern may indicate an attempt to interact with or disrupt DPAPI services, potentially to facilitate credential dumping or sensitive data access.
Detects an Exchange server initiating outbound SMB (port 445) connections to non-private (external) IP addresses. This behavior is highly characteristic of PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) coercion, where an attacker forces the server to authenticate to an external, attacker-controlled UNC path to capture NTLM authentication credentials or relay them to other network resources.
This rule monitors for successful certificate enrollments (Event ID 4886 and 4887) using sensitive certificate templates typically reserved for domain controllers or Kerberos authentication. It specifically alerts when these requests are made by user accounts that do not end in '$' (machine accounts) and are not known service accounts like 'CAService', which may indicate unauthorized attempts to obtain high-privilege credentials via AD Certificate Services (AD CS).
Detects Active Directory replication events (Event ID 4662) targeting sensitive objects related to replication (e.g., Replication-Get-Changes-All). The rule filters out known Domain Controllers and designated replication service accounts to identify potential DCSync attacks or unauthorized directory replication attempts.
This rule monitors for successful certificate enrollments (Event ID 4886 and 4887) using sensitive certificate templates typically reserved for domain controllers or Kerberos authentication. It specifically alerts when these requests are made by user accounts that do not end in '$' (machine accounts) and are not known service accounts like 'CAService', which may indicate unauthorized attempts to obtain high-privilege credentials via AD Certificate Services (AD CS).
The following analytic detects a non-Chrome process accessing files in the Chrome user default folder. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant because the Chrome default folder contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information, often associated with RATs, trojans, and advanced persistent threats like FIN7. Such access could lead to data theft and further compromise of the affected system.
Detects multiple Kerberos pre-authentication failures (Event ID 4771) with failure code 0x18, indicating incorrect passwords, originating from the same source address for a specific user account within a ten-minute window, which may suggest brute-force or credential-stuffing activity.
This rule detects potential password spraying activity by monitoring Microsoft Entra sign-in logs for multiple failed authentication attempts originating from the same source IP address targeting ten or more distinct user accounts within a ten-minute time window.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to execute the MiniDump command against comsvcs.dll, a known technique used to dump process memory (such as LSASS) to a file for credential harvesting.
Detects modifications to Windows user accounts where the 'Password Never Expires' flag is enabled. This modification, often represented by the DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD userAccountControl flag (Event ID 4738), may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or weaken credential lifecycle security by bypassing password rotation requirements.
Detects instances where a user account requests or enrolls a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) that is associated with a computer account (SID). This behavior, specifically when the requester is not the computer account itself, is a known indicator of potential AD CS abuse, such as certificate theft or impersonation techniques.
Detects instances where 'ERAAgent.exe', part of the ESET Remote Administrator agent, loads the 'dpapi.dll' library from a location outside of standard Windows System directories (System32 or SysWOW64). Furthermore, the rule flags this behavior if the loaded 'dpapi.dll' file is either unsigned or contains an untrusted digital signature, which may indicate a malicious DLL side-loading or masquerading attempt to access protected system credentials.
Detects instances where the ESET Remote Administrator Agent (ERAAgent.exe) terminates shortly after loading the Data Protection API service (dpapisvc.dll). This pattern may indicate an attempt to interact with or disrupt DPAPI services, potentially to facilitate credential dumping or sensitive data access.
Page 62 of 206