Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects multiple successful RDP logons (LogonType 10) within a one-hour window by accounts containing '$' (often machine accounts) or 'admin' (privileged accounts). This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain remote access and potentially deploy ransomware or other malicious payloads, especially if multiple source IPs are observed.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Azure AD accounts by identifying users with 10 or more failed sign-in attempts due to invalid credentials within a 5-minute window. It summarizes the failure count and associated IP addresses for each user.
Detects multiple failed Kerberos pre-authentication attempts (EventID 4771 with status codes 0x18 or 0x1f) from a single IP address against a target user within a short timeframe (20 attempts in 5 minutes). This pattern is indicative of a brute-force attack against Kerberos accounts.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Active Directory accounts by identifying multiple failed login attempts (EventID 4625) from the same IP address to the same account within a short time frame (10 failed attempts within 10 minutes).
Detects anomalous network activity from browser renderer subprocesses (chrome.exe/msedge.exe) correlated with concurrent file system access to sensitive browser credential stores (Login Data/Cookies). The rule identifies high-frequency outbound connections following or occurring during access to these files, which is a common indicator of credential exfiltration performed by malicious browser extensions or injected scripts.
Detects the execution of known PetitPotam exploitation tools or the use of command line arguments related to EFS RPC functions (e.g., EfsRpcOpenFileRaw) used to coerce authentication via NTLM reflection.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows rundll32.exe utility to call the MiniDump function within comsvcs.dll, a known technique for dumping the memory contents of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). The rule specifically flags executions that write to the Windows\Temp directory, which is a common indicator of unauthorized credential harvesting attempts.
Detects the use of the PostgreSQL client utility (psql.exe) to query the 'VeeamBackup' database, a technique observed in Akira ransomware intrusions to extract sensitive credentials directly from the backup server's configuration.
Detects the execution of wbadmin.exe to initiate a backup that specifically targets the NTDS.dit database and registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY), then stages them to a path on C:\ProgramData. This pattern is characteristic of credential dumping activities associated with the Akira ransomware, enabling offline extraction of domain credentials.
This rule detects attempts to exfiltrate GCP service account credentials by performing a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack targeting the GCP metadata server or local system files. It correlates suspicious outbound request patterns with subsequent response bodies containing standard GCP credential fields, excluding known legitimate authentication traffic to cloud APIs.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying an unusual number of Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) for service principal names (SPNs) ending with '$' from a single client address within an hour. A high count (over 10) is flagged as 'High' suspicion, while a count between 5 and 10 is flagged as 'Medium'. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to obtain service ticket hashes for offline cracking.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and coercion tools (such as PetitPotam, EfsPotato, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, or Coercer) when attempting to coerce a local authentication or credential relay using the local loopback address. These tools leverage various RPC-based techniques to force the local machine to authenticate to an attacker-controlled source, facilitating NTLM relay attacks.
Detects attempts by a Chrome web browser process to create, modify, or rename files associated with sensitive user credentials or application data, such as AWS credentials, browser logins, or environment configuration files. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or staging of sensitive information.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate campaign. This rule monitors for successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxy ASN providers (IPRoyal, Bright Data, Oxylabs) or instances where a successful sign-in occurs with a suspicious browser fingerprint (Firefox 131.0/142.0) during a Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token request, indicating session-token replay.
This rule detects activities associated with AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) attacks, specifically targeting network-based credential interception. It monitors for the execution of well-known poisoning tools (e.g., Responder), ARP spoofing utilities (e.g., ettercap, arpspoof), the creation of suspicious network listeners on protocols used for NBT-NS/LLMNR poisoning, and the execution of credential relaying tools like Impacket.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
Detects attempts to access or exfiltrate the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) or SYSTEM registry hives, which are primary targets for extracting credential hashes. This rule identifies common attack vectors including native Windows registry utilities (reg.exe), PowerShell-based volume shadow copy techniques (Invoke-NinjaCopy), and known credential dumping tools like secretsdump (from the Impacket suite) executed via command line or interpreted through Python.
This rule detects suspicious SMB traffic targeting raw disk volumes (e.g., PhysicalDrive, C:) or sensitive Windows files such as NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive files. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping attempts, often performed using tools like secretsdump.py or Invoke-NinjaCopy, which bypass standard file system access controls to exfiltrate critical system credentials.
This rule detects multiple Network Level Authentication (NLA) negotiation attempts targeting port 3389 from a single source within a 60-second window, which is indicative of an RDP brute-force attack.
Detects multiple TCP connection attempts to port 22 (SSH) from the same source within a 60-second window, which is indicative of a brute-force or password guessing attack against SSH services.
This rule detects a high frequency of incoming TCP synchronization (SYN) packets on port 3389 (RDP) from a single external source within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against Remote Desktop services.
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