Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized file access to common developer credential storage locations on Linux workstations, including SSH keys, cloud provider configuration files, and browser session artifacts. This behavior is associated with the InvisibleFerret payload used in the Lazarus Contagious Interview campaign to exfiltrate identity and access tokens from developer machines.
Detects browser network events matching Tycoon2FA WebSocket interactions used to silently stream stolen session cookies back to the AiTM proxy backend. The rule specifically looks for WebSocket connections (wss:// or ws://) with a path containing '/socket.io/?EIO=' initiated by 'chrome.exe' or 'msedge.exe'.
Detects Meow RAT (ClickFix campaign) copying Chromium browser extension data directories associated with cryptocurrency wallets, including MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), via osascript on macOS.
This rule detects potential session token replay attacks against Okta by identifying a single Okta session (externalSessionId) being used from multiple distinct origins. It specifically looks for divergence in device identity (dtHash), operating system (OS), or client country within the same session, rather than just multiple IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of a stolen post-MFA cookie being replayed by an attacker.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
Detects high-risk activity where a user session, characterized by specific suspicious browser user agents and non-interactive authentication (indicative of token replay/session hijacking), is followed by changes to Workday payroll information (direct deposit, banking details) or unauthorized access to HR-related email content.
Detects the use of the native Windows wbadmin.exe utility to initiate a backup that targets sensitive system files, such as the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) or registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to stage sensitive credentials or system configuration data for offline analysis or exfiltration, often performed as part of a credential dumping effort.
Detects attempts to perform credential dumping from the LSASS process memory using the built-in Windows binary rundll32.exe to execute comsvcs.dll. The rule monitors for specific command-line arguments and common output file paths associated with manual dumping or automated tools like lsassy.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function of comsvcs.dll to create a memory dump of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This technique is a common method for dumping LSASS memory to harvest credentials, often used by tools like lsassy and various post-exploitation frameworks. The rule monitors for the specific command line patterns used in this attack, including referencing comsvcs.dll and the 'full' dump argument, initiated by suspicious parent processes frequently seen in lateral movement scenarios.
This rule detects potential DCSync replication abuse by monitoring Security Event ID 4662, specifically looking for access to 'domainDNS' or user objects with the GUID '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', which is associated with Directory Replication Service (DRS) permissions. It filters out machine accounts to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potential brute force or credential stuffing attacks against Azure AD by identifying multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from the same user and IP address within a short time frame (1 minute). It specifically looks for scenarios where the successful sign-in occurs after the failed attempts and involves different applications, excluding common Office 365 services to reduce noise.
This rule detects interactive logons (LogonType 10) where a single account from the same domain logs into multiple distinct devices. This could indicate an attacker using compromised credentials to move laterally within the network or access multiple systems.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms related to browser extensions. It looks for processes launching Chrome or Edge with the '--load-extension' command-line argument, which can be used to load unpacked extensions. Additionally, it monitors registry modifications to 'ExtensionInstallForcelist' that contain 'http' or 'crx', indicating a forced installation of an extension, potentially from a remote source or a local file.
This rule monitors for unauthorized access to the Google Chrome 'Login Data' database file by processes other than standard browser executables. It also detects the creation of known file artifacts associated with credential-stealing malware or RATs (e.g., 'chrome_logins_dump.txt' or 'gather.tar.gz'), which are indicative of credential harvesting activities.
Detects the transmission of potential sensitive information, such as passwords, tokens, API keys, or private keys, within Microsoft Teams chat messages by matching message content against a regular expression pattern for common credential formats.
This rule detects activities associated with the MiniBrowse tool, specifically targeting unauthorized access to browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies) and staging files for exfiltration. Additionally, it monitors for process injection events where MiniBrowse components are injected into legitimate browser processes such as Chrome or Edge.
This rule detects unauthorized read access to sensitive credential stores (KeePass .kdbx) and VPN configuration files (OpenVPN, Cisco AnyConnect, WireGuard) by processes that are not recognized credential or VPN management software. It specifically monitors for processes exhibiting suspicious lineage, such as those spawned by PowerShell or running from the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common technique used by attackers to hide malicious activity.
Cloud extortion group exploiting exposed credentials and storage
Detects the execution of command-line tools associated with Kerberoasting and Kerberos ticket manipulation techniques, such as requesting TGS tickets or targeting specific user accounts for ticket extraction.
This rule detects common Kerberoasting activities by monitoring for the execution of 'Rubeus' or 'GetUserSPNs' (often associated with Impacket) in process command lines. These tools are commonly used by attackers to request service tickets for service accounts, which can then be cracked offline to recover passwords.
This rule detects common Kerberoasting activities by monitoring for the execution of 'Rubeus' or 'GetUserSPNs' (often associated with Impacket) in process command lines. These tools are commonly used by attackers to request service tickets for service accounts, which can then be cracked offline to recover passwords.
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