Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to read the memory of browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera). This activity can be indicative of credential dumping or other forms of data exfiltration from web browsers.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms related to browser extensions. It looks for processes launching Chrome or Edge with the '--load-extension' command-line argument, which can be used to load unpacked extensions. Additionally, it monitors registry modifications to 'ExtensionInstallForcelist' that contain 'http' or 'crx', indicating a forced installation of an extension, potentially from a remote source or a local file.
This rule detects multiple attempts by a user account to perform a Directory Synchronization (DirSync) operation, which is a common indicator of a DCSync attack. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 4662 with properties containing 'DS-DirSync' or '131072', filters for user accounts, excludes known service accounts, and triggers if there are 5 or more attempts from the same account and computer.
This rule detects repeated access attempts (3 or more within an hour) to critical credential storage processes or files, specifically lsass.exe, the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, or the NTDS.dit file. Such activity is indicative of credential theft attempts by an adversary.
This rule detects multiple unauthorized access attempts (5 or more within an hour) to sensitive Active Directory objects such as 'Admin', 'krbtgt', or 'Domain Admins'. It leverages Windows Security Event ID 4662, which indicates an operation was performed on an object, and filters for specific sensitive object names. The rule then groups these attempts by object, IP address, and user, alerting when a threshold of attempts is met.
This rule detects potential Kerberos Golden Ticket attacks by identifying Kerberos authentication service (AS) request events (EventID 4768) where the ticket encryption type is 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) and the difference between the event generation time and the ticket's start time is greater than one day. This large time difference can indicate a forged ticket with an invalid timestamp, a common characteristic of Golden Tickets. The rule then summarizes these events by target username and computer, flagging instances where three or more such events occur.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks by looking for multiple successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM authentication for the same user from the same IP address. A count of 5 or more such events is considered suspicious.
Detects the execution of 'runas.exe' with the '/savecred' or '/netonly' parameters. The '/savecred' parameter allows the use of credentials previously stored in the credential manager, while '/netonly' allows the use of credentials for remote network resources without authenticating locally. Both flags can be abused by adversaries to persist or move laterally with compromised or cached credentials while evading local authentication monitoring. The rule excludes common system-signed processes originating from the Windows System32 directory.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands and scripts known to be used for Kerberoasting, a technique for obtaining TGS tickets that can be cracked offline to recover service account passwords. The rule matches specific tool names and command line flags associated with common offensive security tools.
Detects attempts by processes to access the Google Cloud Platform Instance Metadata Service (IMS) at 169.254.169.254 or via the 'metadata.google.internal' DNS entry. This is often an indicator of reconnaissance, SSRF exploitation, or credential theft attempts by an adversary on a compromised cloud instance.
Detects potential indicators of an SSH/PAM backdoor. This includes three behaviors: 1) SSH-related system processes writing to suspicious file paths (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm, or hidden files in user directories), 2) PAM sessions immediately followed by suspicious file writes, and 3) successful SSH authentications for usernames previously reported as 'Invalid' by the system, suggesting a tampered PAM module allowing arbitrary authentication.
Detects instances where privileged system processes such as lsass.exe or svchost.exe attempt a network connection to the local loopback address on ports other than standard SMB ports (445, 139). This pattern is indicative of potential coercion or relay attacks, specifically targeting the authentication mechanisms of these services to an attacker-controlled SMB server.
Detects the creation or modification of shared object (.so) files within critical Linux PAM library directories (/lib/security/, /lib64/security/, /usr/lib/security/) by processes other than identified system package managers. This behavior is indicative of an adversary replacing legitimate authentication modules with malicious versions to capture credentials or establish persistence, such as the activity documented in Operation Highland (Velvet Ant).
Detects NTLM-authenticated network logons (Logon Type 3) originating from loopback IP addresses (127.0.0.1, ::1, or 0.0.0.0). This behavior is often associated with NTLM relay attacks or credential reflection bypass techniques where an adversary forces a local service to authenticate to itself to gain unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of known AS-REP Roasting tools or commands (such as GetNPUsers) by suspicious processes or from suspicious paths, indicating an attempt to extract Kerberos TGTs for accounts without preauthentication.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and credential harvesting tools such as Responder, Inveigh, and PetitPotam, or suspicious command-line patterns involving the use of 'net use' or common Windows binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) to access or force SMB authentication with remote IP addresses.
Detects instances where privileged system processes such as lsass.exe or svchost.exe attempt a network connection to the local loopback address on ports other than standard SMB ports (445, 139). This pattern is indicative of potential coercion or relay attacks, specifically targeting the authentication mechanisms of these services to an attacker-controlled SMB server.
Detects instances where the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) initiates a network connection to the loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1), excluding standard SMB traffic (Port 445). Such behavior by LSASS is highly anomalous and may indicate exploitation attempts, such as memory dumping or credential harvesting techniques involving inter-process communication.
Detects command-line activity indicative of the PetitPotam exploit or general EFSRPC (Encrypting File System Remote Protocol) coercion attempts. Adversaries use these techniques to force a machine to authenticate against another system (e.g., a domain controller), typically as a precursor to NTLM relay attacks.
This rule detects the execution of the Rubeus tool or the usage of common command-line arguments associated with Kerberoasting activities (e.g., GetUserSPNs, Request-SPNTicket). Kerberoasting is a technique used to extract service account password hashes from Active Directory by requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs). These hashes can then be cracked offline to obtain cleartext credentials.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to Azure Storage Blobs following the retrieval of storage account access keys. It correlates 'ListKeys' API events with subsequent blob access activities from either unrecognized IP addresses or via Shared Access Signature (SAS) tokens, indicating potential credential misuse.
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