Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
779 detections
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This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
Detects unauthorized attempts to exercise Active Directory replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes). This occurs when non-machine accounts access specific control access rights (GUIDs 1131f6aa, 1131f6ad, or 89e95b76) on a domain controller, a common indicator of a DCSync attack used to extract password hashes from Active Directory.
This rule detects potential credential theft activity by monitoring for unauthorized access to sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, cookies.sqlite) or direct access to the LSASS process memory by non-standard browser processes. It further correlates these events with user sign-ins on previously unknown or unassociated devices within a short timeframe to identify potential account compromise.
Detects offreg.dll (Windows Offline Registry Library) being loaded by a process running outside the standard System32/SysWOW64 directories and that is not a known Windows registry-management host process, excluding Malwarebytes' own bundled private copy of the DLL. PrettyPrague uses this library to read the SAM/LSA hive and derive boot-key material outside normal registry API paths. Scoped to the loading process's directory and identity rather than any specific PoC binary name.
Detects direct file access attempts to critical Windows registry hive files (SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM, SOFTWARE) on disk. These files contain sensitive system and credential information, and direct access is frequently used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects access to the SAM registry hive or SAM-related LSA control keys initiated by a process associated with the Avast Sandbox component rather than LSASS or an administrative security tool. The PrettyPrague PoC abuses a vulnerability in Avast Sandbox to dump the SAM database and spawn a SYSTEM shell, so SAM hive reads originating from the sandbox component itself are anomalous.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
This rule detects instances where a process loads 'offreg.dll' (Offline Registry Library) and concurrently accesses the SAM (Security Account Manager) file. This is a common technique used by attackers to offline-extract local account hashes without using standard registry tools, potentially bypassing basic monitoring of 'reg.exe'.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects anomalous access to specific registry keys under SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa that are associated with LSA secrets. The rule monitors for multiple registry operations (set, create, delete) performed by processes other than standard Windows system processes (lsass.exe, svchost.exe, winlogon.exe, services.exe), which is often indicative of credential dumping attempts.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility 'wbadmin.exe' to initiate a backup procedure targeting the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) and associated registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY). This technique is utilized by adversaries for offline credential harvesting by extracting the directory database file. This behavior has been observed in intrusion campaigns involving ransomware actors like Akira.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump export function of comsvcs.dll to create a memory dump of the LSASS process. This technique is often associated with post-exploitation credential access tools like lsassy or manual execution via remote management tools (e.g., WMI, MMC) by threat actors such as those in the Bumblebee/Akira ransomware intrusion chain.
This rule detects the use of the 'security' command-line utility on macOS to access or dump contents from the login keychain, specifically targeting the 'login.keychain-db' file or attempting to retrieve generic passwords. This behavior is indicative of credential access attempts where an adversary is trying to extract sensitive information, such as passwords or keys, stored within the macOS Keychain.
This rule detects the use of the 'security' command-line utility on macOS to access or dump contents from the login keychain, specifically targeting the 'login.keychain-db' file or attempting to retrieve generic passwords. This behavior is indicative of credential access attempts where an adversary is trying to extract sensitive information, such as passwords or keys, stored within the macOS Keychain.
Detects processes attempting to open a handle to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process with read-capable access rights (0x1010 or 0x1410). These access rights are commonly associated with credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, which read LSASS process memory to extract credentials. Legitimate system processes such as wininit.exe and services.exe are excluded to reduce noise.
This is about the article "Attacking SAM and Extracting Hashes With 7z" from Hackers Arise: https://hackers-arise.com/digital-forensics-attacking-sam-and-extracting-hashes-with-7z/
This query detects instances of 7-Zip executing with elevated administrator privileges on Windows endpoints while filtering out routine background noise. It begins by capturing both live and backfilled process creation telemetry (ProcessRollup2 and SyntheticProcessRollup2) and uses a case-insensitive regular expression to identify any standard 7-Zip executable, including the command-line, GUI, and file manager binaries (7z.exe, 7za.exe, 7zg.exe, or 7zFM.exe). To pinpoint administrative activity, it filters exclusively for processes with a high integrity level decimal of 12288, indicating the binary was elevated via UAC ("Run as administrator"). It then reduces false positives by excluding automated service accounts ending in svc, Active Directory machine accounts ending in $, and the built-in SYSTEM identity. Finally, it formats the remaining high-fidelity events into a structured table displaying the timestamp, executable path, username, integrity level, and full command-line arguments for quick triage.
This query detects instances of 7-Zip executing with elevated administrator privileges on Windows endpoints while filtering out routine background noise. It begins by capturing both live and backfilled process creation telemetry (ProcessRollup2 and SyntheticProcessRollup2) and uses a case-insensitive regular expression to identify any standard 7-Zip executable, including the command-line, GUI, and file manager binaries (7z.exe, 7za.exe, 7zg.exe, or 7zFM.exe). To pinpoint administrative activity, it filters exclusively for processes with a high integrity level decimal of 12288, indicating the binary was elevated via UAC ("Run as administrator"). It then reduces false positives by excluding automated service accounts ending in svc, Active Directory machine accounts ending in $, and the built-in SYSTEM identity. Finally, it formats the remaining high-fidelity events into a structured table displaying the timestamp, executable path, username, integrity level, and full command-line arguments for quick triage.
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