Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for credential dumping activities by identifying the execution of Mimikatz, the use of command-line arguments specific to Mimikatz (e.g., 'sekurlsa'), or unauthorized processes attempting to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process.
This rule detects potential DCSync replication abuse by monitoring Security Event ID 4662, specifically looking for access to 'domainDNS' or user objects with the GUID '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', which is associated with Directory Replication Service (DRS) permissions. It filters out machine accounts to reduce false positives.
Detects inbound RPC calls to the Windows Remote Registry interface using operation numbers associated with registry save/backup operations, which may indicate credential dumping via remote registry access. This rule specifically looks for RPC UUID '338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003' and operation numbers 20 or 31, which correspond to registry save/backup functions.
This rule detects the execution of processes with command-line arguments indicative of Mimikatz usage. It specifically looks for the strings 'mimikatz', 'sekurlsa', or 'privilege::debug' in the command line of newly created processes (EventID 4688). This activity is commonly associated with credential dumping.
Detects instances where the Active Directory domain database file (ntds.dit) is accessed by processes other than known legitimate tools such as lsass.exe or ntdsutil.exe. This activity is a strong indicator of credential dumping attempts to extract Active Directory hashes.
This rule detects techniques commonly used by attackers to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for the execution of known Mimikatz binaries or the use of specific Mimikatz command-line arguments, the execution of legitimate tools like Procdump to dump LSASS memory, the misuse of rundll32 with comsvcs.dll to perform a memory dump, and the creation of files named lsass.dmp, which are common artifacts of credential dumping activities.
Detects execution of Mimikatz or usage of common tools like Procdump to dump LSASS memory. The rule monitors for characteristic command-line arguments, renamed binary names associated with Mimikatz, and the extraction of sensitive credentials to output files.
This rule detects various methods used to dump the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process to extract credentials. It monitors for suspicious Process Access (EventCode 10) with sensitive access masks, as well as Process Creation (EventCode 1) and Image Load (EventCode 7) events associated with known credential dumping tools like Mimikatz and legitimate system tools misused for dumping memory such as Procdump and comsvcs.dll.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a network logon (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) followed by a successful Directory Replication Service (DRS) request (Event ID 4662, Access Mask 0x100) on a Domain Controller within a one-hour window. This pattern is indicative of potential lateral movement followed by credential dumping via DCSync, often associated with tools like Mimikatz.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system utilities (ntdsutil.exe, vssadmin.exe, esentutl.exe) to interact with the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit). This behavior is commonly associated with offline credential harvesting, where an attacker attempts to create a copy of the database to extract hashes offline.
This rule detects various methods used to copy or access the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit), a common technique used by attackers to dump domain credentials. The rule monitors for the use of ntdsutil with 'ifm' (install from media) arguments, vssadmin to create volume shadow copies of the NTDS file, esentutl directly interacting with the NTDS database path, and common file copy utilities attempting to copy the NTDS.dit file.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the Mimikatz 'lsadump' module performing a DCSync attack. The rule monitors for DRSUAPI (Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol) RPC requests, specifically the DsGetNCChanges operation, which is abused to synchronize Active Directory data including sensitive password hashes.
Detects the execution of mimikatz.exe or the usage of the sekurlsa::logonpasswords command, both of which are indicative of attempts to extract sensitive credentials from LSASS memory.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious attempts to access the memory space of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The detection logic looks for specific access masks typically used by Mimikatz (0x1010 and 0x1fffff) or execution attempts from binaries renamed to mimic common Mimikatz naming conventions (g.com, hs.com, dump.com). This is intended to identify credential dumping activities.
Detects potential credential harvesting attempts by monitoring for the usage of Windows credential management tools (cmdkey.exe and vaultcmd.exe) and the loading of sensitive DLLs (vaultcli.dll, dpapi.dll) by non-Microsoft signed processes, which is commonly used to access stored credentials in the Windows Vault or by DPAPI-protected stores.
This rule detects various methods used to extract credentials protected by the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI). It covers multiple vectors, including Mimikatz DPAPI module usage, unauthorized loading of the dpapi.dll library, suspicious access to browser or WiFi credential stores, and cross-process memory access to the LSASS process to extract DPAPI master keys.
Detects the use of the Windows Backup utility (wbadmin.exe) to initiate a backup targeting critical Active Directory or system configuration files (ntds.dit, SYSTEM, or SECURITY registry hives). This behavior is often associated with credential dumping, where adversaries attempt to extract the AD database by utilizing built-in Windows backup tools to create a copy that can then be exfiltrated or processed offline.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows rundll32.exe utility to call the MiniDump function within comsvcs.dll, a known technique for dumping the memory contents of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). The rule specifically flags executions that write to the Windows\Temp directory, which is a common indicator of unauthorized credential harvesting attempts.
Detects the execution of wbadmin.exe to initiate a backup that specifically targets the NTDS.dit database and registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY), then stages them to a path on C:\ProgramData. This pattern is characteristic of credential dumping activities associated with the Akira ransomware, enabling offline extraction of domain credentials.
Detects unauthorized access to the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) or registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY) using native Windows utilities like wbadmin.exe and ntdsutil.exe. This activity is indicative of credential dumping and staging efforts for exfiltration, as observed in Akira ransomware campaigns.
Detects attempts to access or exfiltrate the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) or SYSTEM registry hives, which are primary targets for extracting credential hashes. This rule identifies common attack vectors including native Windows registry utilities (reg.exe), PowerShell-based volume shadow copy techniques (Invoke-NinjaCopy), and known credential dumping tools like secretsdump (from the Impacket suite) executed via command line or interpreted through Python.
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