Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

779 detections

Detects potential DCSync attacks by monitoring for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where a non-domain controller account exercises directory replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) against Active Directory domain objects. This identifies unauthorized attempts to pull sensitive credential data directly from a Domain Controller.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects a non-system process that allocates executable memory (consistent with custom syscall stub staging) and subsequently opens a handle to the LSASS process. This behavior correlates the preparation of custom syscall stubs (often used to bypass user-mode API hooking) with the direct interaction with LSASS, which is a high-confidence indicator of credential dumping activity.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
001
Detects execution of the macOS 'security' utility to harvest generic or internet passwords from the Keychain, a technique commonly associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) infostealer for credential theft.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
206
Detects modifications to the WDigest UseLogonCredential registry key, which enables the caching of plaintext credentials in LSASS memory. This is a common post-exploitation technique used to facilitate credential theft.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects the modification of the WDigest 'UseLogonCredential' registry value to 1 (enabling plaintext credential storage in memory) followed by subsequent access to the LSASS process, a common sequence in credential dumping attacks.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects unauthorized access to the LSASS process memory, a common technique for credential harvesting. The rule monitors for the execution of 'procdump.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with parameters specifically aimed at creating a memory dump of 'lsass.exe', behaviors commonly associated with the SystemBC post-exploitation framework.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the threat actor abusing ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) dump of the Active Directory database for offline credential cracking.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
009
Detects the execution of Mimikatz or its common command-line arguments used for credential dumping. This rule identifies attempts to extract sensitive authentication material such as passwords, hashes, and tickets from memory (LSASS), SAM database, LSA secrets, and cached domain credentials.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
506
Detects unauthorized attempts to extract the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) for credential harvesting. The rule monitors for common administrative tools like ntdsutil.exe and vssadmin.exe being used to create shadow copies or extract the NTDS database, as well as direct file manipulation of ntds.dit. This activity is often associated with post-exploitation credential dumping techniques.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
003
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on Linux systems involving the creation of new accounts or access to sensitive files like /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow using or referencing the string 'troot'. This pattern is often associated with adversary attempts to create backdoored accounts or perform offline password cracking by manipulating or dumping authentication files.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
004
Detects the use of the native Windows Backup utility (wbadmin.exe) to initiate a backup that specifically includes the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to perform offline Active Directory credential dumping by creating a backup of the database to an accessible location.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects an unusually high number of outbound network connections originating from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process on a Windows machine. LSASS is a critical system process responsible for enforcing security policy on the system, including user authentication, and typically does not initiate a large number of outbound connections. A high count of outbound connections from LSASS could indicate credential dumping activity, where an attacker is exfiltrating harvested credentials, or other malicious activity compromising the LSASS process.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects the use of wbadmin.exe to initiate a system backup that targets sensitive Active Directory and registry files (NTDS.dit, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives) to a local SMB share on the loopback address. This technique is used by threat actors to stage critical credential material for offline extraction and cracking.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects adversary activity consistent with credential dumping tools like KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Windows Credential Manager stores using vaultcmd /list or cmdkey /list, and the direct instantiation of the Windows PasswordVault via PowerShell, excluding system accounts and known legitimate applications.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
101
Detects adversary activity consistent with credential dumping tools like KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Windows Credential Manager stores using vaultcmd /list or cmdkey /list, and the direct instantiation of the Windows PasswordVault via PowerShell, excluding system accounts and known legitimate applications.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the execution of processes containing command-line arguments associated with the Mimikatz post-exploitation tool, such as credential dumping, privilege escalation, and certificate manipulation keywords.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects the execution of processes containing command-line arguments associated with the Mimikatz post-exploitation tool, such as credential dumping, privilege escalation, and certificate manipulation keywords.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects unauthorized cross-process memory access attempts targeting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe). Such attempts are commonly associated with credential dumping techniques to extract credentials from memory.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
The rule detects potential credential dumping activities by monitoring for the execution of Mimikatz or the use of its specific command-line arguments (e.g., sekurlsa::logonpasswords, /ntlm:). It also monitors for suspicious, unauthorized processes attempting to open a handle to the LSASS process to access its memory, a common technique for dumping credentials.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects activities associated with credential dumping, specifically targeting techniques that abuse the Directory Replication Service (DRS) protocol, such as DCSync or the use of tools like secretsdump. It monitors both process execution command lines and network traffic for keywords indicative of these credential extraction behaviors, which are commonly used by attackers to obtain domain credentials.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
This rule detects cross-process memory access attempts against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Accessing LSASS memory is a common technique used by attackers to dump credentials (e.g., cleartext passwords, NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets) for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The rule filters out known legitimate processes and system-signed components to reduce false positives.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
301
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