Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
779 detections
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Detects DCSync attacks by monitoring for EventID 4662 where Active Directory replication extended rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) are requested. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized replication attempts used to extract sensitive data, such as password hashes, directly from a Domain Controller.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to copy the NTDS.dit file from the shadow copy device path. This sequence is a common technique used by attackers to bypass file locks and extract Active Directory credential databases.
Detects Active Directory replication requests (GetNCChanges) directed at a Domain Controller. This is identified by monitoring Windows Event ID 4662 for specific Directory Service Object GUIDs associated with replication rights. The rule attempts to filter out legitimate traffic from other Domain Controllers by excluding machine accounts ending in the '$' character.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious actions indicative of credential theft, including LSASS memory access for dumping, followed by the acquisition of browser or cryptocurrency wallet files, and the subsequent staging of data in temporary directories, all correlated by the same process and device within a 15-minute window.
Detects suspicious post-compromise activity associated with ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates. This rule monitors for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (e.g., weak encryption types or TGS requests) closely followed by access to sensitive credential stores or tools on the same host, which is indicative of credential harvesting after a session hijacking or initial access event.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects execution of Mimikatz or usage of its specific command-line arguments (such as sekurlsa or lsadump modules) which indicate attempted credential dumping from system memory.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects the use of the ntdsutil.exe utility to create an Install From Media (IFM) backup. This technique is often used by adversaries to create a copy of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) for offline credential extraction.
Detects the execution of pypykatz or Python scripts invoking pypykatz commands to perform credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS memory or minidump files.
Detects a process initiating a memory dump of lsass.exe (using --dump arguments) followed within 15 minutes by the creation of a hexadecimal-named .tmp file in the Windows\Temp directory. This behavioral pattern is characteristic of credential dumping using reflected cloning or similar techniques, followed by the staging of obfuscated or encrypted minidump data for exfiltration.
Detects the pidclone-style LSASS credential dumper that clones the target process into a suspended state, mirrors its memory, generates a minidump, and writes an XOR-encrypted copy of the dump to a randomized filename under Windows\Temp
Detects a sequence of events indicative of LSASS memory dumping where a process opens a handle to lsass.exe and subsequently creates a uniquely named temporary file (16-character hexadecimal filename) in the Windows Temp directory within a short timeframe. This behavior is often associated with the obfuscated flushing of a stolen memory dump to disk to evade signature-based detection.
Detects compiled LSASS credential-dumper binaries that clone the target process in a suspended state, patch ntdll/amsi/win32kbase hooking regions, and write an in-memory minidump, even when debug/console strings and process ancestry have been scrubbed to evade static and lineage detections
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to perform a DCSync attack by monitoring for Active Directory Event ID 4662. It triggers when an account that is not a recognized domain controller (which typically end with a '$' sign) successfully requests replication data using the Directory Replication Service (DRS) GetNCChanges rights. This behavior is a common indicator of credential dumping via tools like Mimikatz.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for two distinct techniques: non-standard processes opening handles to lsass.exe with sensitive access rights (credential-dumping) and the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function within comsvcs.dll against lsass.exe.
Detects attempts to create a memory dump of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process using well-known utilities such as procdump, rundll32 with comsvcs.dll, and taskmgr, which are frequently used by adversaries to perform credential dumping.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a single process loads high-risk cryptography and system-level modules (e.g., sqlite3, win32crypt, win32api) followed within 30 minutes by credential harvesting actions such as dumping Wi-Fi keys using 'netsh' or establishing persistence via 'schtasks'. This behavior is indicative of a 'lazy-import' stealer or malicious loader attempting to evade simple signature-based detection.
Detects sensitive access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, commonly associated with credential dumping attempts. This rule monitors Windows Security Event 4663, specifically flagging processes attempting to gain specific access levels (e.g., Read, Query, or Full Control) to the lsass.exe process.
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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