Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential APT10 (Stone Panda) activity by identifying the execution of known remote access tools (RATs) and suspicious use of utilities like WinRAR for password-protected archiving. The rule focuses on processes launched from non-standard directories and unusual parent processes, which may indicate malware execution, lateral movement, or data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS traffic where the User-Agent string is explicitly set to 'MicroStealer/1.0', which is used by the malware when communicating with Discord webhooks or its C2.
This rule detects network connections to a specific Discord webhook URL and another suspicious domain (78smp.com/m/). This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to exfiltrate data or establish command and control (C2) via Discord webhooks, or other suspicious domains.
This rule detects network connections to specific IP addresses and ports (1259, 1269) via UDP, or the presence of a file with a specific SHA256 hash. This combination could indicate command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration using a custom UDP protocol.
Detects access to the Zimbra mailbox export endpoint (/home/~/?fmt=tgz). This native Zimbra feature is actively abused by APT actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently export emails without deploying custom collection tools.
Detects DNS resolution requests to the Operation GhostMail exfiltration subdomains (*.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua) and main domain. DNS exfiltration is the primary channel used by this APT to steal credentials and 2FA codes even when HTTPS is blocked.
Storm-2561 Network IOC Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects outbound network connections from Windows endpoints to known Storm-2561 Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, including a specific C2 IP address and various domains used for credential exfiltration and initial access via spoofed VPN services.
Detects network connections to a specific suspicious IP address (94.156.181.89) or to domains associated with Cloudflare Tunnel (.trycloudflare.com). This could indicate command and control activity, data exfiltration, or other malicious network communication.
Detects specific log messages written to the iOS Unified Log by the DarkSword implant (GHOSTBLADE). These messages, which include tags like '[DarkSword-WIFI-DUMP]' and '[MAIN]', are unique to the malware and indicate that the data exfiltration modules are running. The GHOSTBLADE implant, used by UNC6353 in the DarkSword campaign, leaves distinct and high-confidence log messages in iOS Unified Logs during its operation. These logs are a clear indicator of a successful compromise.
Detects potential data exfiltration by the BlackBeard backdoor, associated with Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater). The malware abuses the HTTP 'Expires' header in client requests to exfiltrate encrypted system data to its command and control server. The 'Expires' header is a standard response header, so its presence in a request is highly anomalous.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
Detects process command lines containing strings characteristic of the GHOSTBLADE dataminer, a payload deployed by UNC6353 via the DarkSword exploit. These strings are hardcoded file paths used for data collection and exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections from devices that exhibit a consistent timing pattern (low standard deviation relative to the average time delta between connections) to public IP addresses. It specifically looks for connections that are not initiated by common browsers unless they are running in headless mode, or connections initiated by processes with low global prevalence or identified as Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This pattern can indicate automated activity, command and control communication, or data exfiltration.
Detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains used by malicious AI browser extensions for data exfiltration.
Detects a FortiGate configuration file download occurring within 10 minutes of a successful administrative login from the same user and source IP address. This rapid sequence of events can indicate an attacker who has gained administrative access and is proceeding to exfiltrate sensitive configuration data, which may contain credentials for other systems.
Detects BigQuery queries using CONCAT with CHR functions to dynamically build cross-project paths, bypassing dot filters. High-fidelity indicator of LeakyLooker-style SQL injection.
This rule detects artifacts associated with the APT36 CreepDropper malware, specifically focusing on scheduled task names and staging file markers. It looks for specific strings related to scheduled tasks like 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-Task' and 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-1234-87hy', as well as a staging file named 'ds.png' and other related strings such as 'msedge.exe', 'Task10', and 'System.Reflection.Assembly'. The rule requires at least four of these strings to be present, along with the MZ header, indicating a Windows executable.
Large Azure Blob Downloads
Cortex XDR
Detects an identity downloading an unusually high number of blobs (more than 100) from Azure Storage within a one-hour window. This could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized bulk access to cloud storage.
This rule detects network connections initiated by specific executables (clawdbot, node, moltbot, openclaw) from a local port (18789, 3000, or 8080) to a remote IP address that is not localhost, not within private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12), and not within the 17.0.0.0/8 CIDR block. This could indicate command and control (C2) communication or unauthorized data exfiltration by potentially malicious bots or applications.
Detects a web server process spawning tools commonly used for data staging and exfiltration, such as rar.exe, certutil.exe, and type.exe. This behavior is characteristic of the CL-UNK-1068 actor's exfiltration TTP, often performed via a web shell.
This rule detects outbound network connections to a predefined list of suspicious cloud storage and file-sharing services. These services are often used by adversaries for exfiltration of collected data, providing a covert channel due to their common use and potential for SSL/TLS encryption. The rule specifically looks for `RemoteUrl` containing any of the domains listed in `suspiciousexfildomains`.
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