Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects multiple HTTP POST requests to a specific credential-related API path (/api/credentials) directed at an external IP address (95.163.153.80) on a non-standard port (8133). This pattern is indicative of potential automated credential exfiltration or brute-force activity.
Detects a pattern of frequent (6 or more per minute) small HTTP POST requests (up to 16KB) targeting specific sensitive API or internal URI paths. The detection logic also filters for traffic originating from a specific Microsoft Edge browser user agent string on Windows 64-bit systems, which may indicate automated data exfiltration, beaconing, or communication with a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' over a non-standard port (8133) typical of AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) command and control traffic. The rule specifically looks for established network connections originating from the local network and targeting external hosts, flagging multiple occurrences within a 30-second window.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' over a non-standard port (8133) typical of AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) command and control traffic. The rule specifically looks for established network connections originating from the local network and targeting external hosts, flagging multiple occurrences within a 30-second window.
Detects activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware, specifically monitoring for the execution of rnpkeys.exe or loading of tdwp.dll, followed by a high volume of HTTPS POST requests to the same destination host, which is characteristic of chunked screenshot exfiltration.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' which is indicative of the AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer malware exfiltrating stolen credentials. The rule uses a threshold to identify multiple exfiltration attempts from the same source within a short time window.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' which is indicative of the AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer malware exfiltrating stolen credentials. The rule uses a threshold to identify multiple exfiltration attempts from the same source within a short time window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects instances where browser extensions, potentially AI-assisted (e.g., Claude, Gemini), trigger automated mail actions (send, forward, summarize) to non-standard, external domains. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized agent attempting to exfiltrate or manipulate email content.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business originating from a 'python-httpx' user agent. This pattern often indicates automated data collection or exfiltration attempts using programmatic tools.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or preview activity in OneDrive or SharePoint from non-browser user agents. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration where adversaries use scripted clients or APIs to mass-read or preview files, bypassing traditional download-based alerts.
Detects anomalous bursts of cloud secret or parameter retrieval API calls followed shortly by administrative actions that expose data or credentials (such as bucket policy changes or new key creation). This behavior is consistent with an adversary staging compromised credentials to exfiltrate data or maintain persistence.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where a Python-based process or a PyInstaller-compiled executable invokes a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or command execution via 'os.popen', followed by a network connection to 'api.telegram.org' within a 60-second window. This behavior is often characteristic of malware or tools using Telegram's API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to the URI path '/api/credentials' over the non-standard TCP port 8133, which is indicative of AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer exfiltrating stolen credentials to a C2 server.
This rule set detects network communication patterns associated with the AnonyMousKIT phishing kit, specifically targeting the exfiltration of captured user credentials to the Telegram Bot API and communication with known phishing panel infrastructure. It monitors for DNS lookups of 'anomkit.shop', established TCP connections to the associated backend relay, and HTTP requests containing specific credential-related keywords directed towards the Telegram API.
This rule detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the JWR phishing framework. It identifies live, operator-driven exfiltration where an attacker issues specific instruction sequences (e.g., to_card, to_sms, to_2fa) via HTTP polling or WebSockets to facilitate the character-by-character capture of sensitive information like payment card details and OTPs from a victim.
Detects a suspected malicious sequence associated with RatHat activity. The rule identifies a device fetching an injection template configuration from a remote URL, followed by the exfiltration of credentials or form data to specific API endpoints on the same device within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects unauthorized screen surveillance on Android devices by correlating the execution of the minicap binary with subsequent network activity indicative of screen data exfiltration to a command-and-control (C2) server. It specifically looks for connections to known exfiltration paths associated with screen monitoring or video uploads within 30 minutes of minicap process activity, effectively identifying surveillance that bypasses Android's MediaProjection consent mechanism.
This rule detects unauthorized screen surveillance on Android devices by correlating the execution of the minicap binary with subsequent network activity indicative of screen data exfiltration to a command-and-control (C2) server. It specifically looks for connections to known exfiltration paths associated with screen monitoring or video uploads within 30 minutes of minicap process activity, effectively identifying surveillance that bypasses Android's MediaProjection consent mechanism.
Detects network requests related to the RatHat Android malware, specifically focusing on the retrieval of the 'minicap' tool used for screen capture and the subsequent exfiltration of captured screen data or video chunks.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kit exfiltration behavior. It correlates the initial victim geolocation lookup via 'api.ipgeolocation.io' with subsequent data exfiltration to the Telegram Bot API ('api.telegram.org') originating from the same host, indicating an automated sequence where victim context is gathered and then exfiltrated by the phishing kit.
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