Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
Detects HTTP PUT requests directed at Wasabi Cloud Storage domains that originate from an Rclone user agent. This pattern is commonly indicative of data exfiltration activities where an attacker uses the Rclone utility to synchronize or upload sensitive data to unauthorized cloud storage.
This rule detects the execution of the NUKESPED backdoor component 'zlrenu8.exe' and its subsequent outbound HTTP/HTTPS network connections to specific IP addresses associated with Fastly CDN. This behavior is highly characteristic of sensitive data exfiltration activities performed by the Kimsuky threat group.
This rule detects processes frequently creating image files (bmp, png, jpg, jpeg) in temporary directories and subsequently initiating external network connections. The logic identifies suspicious patterns where a non-whitelisted process generates files at consistent, short intervals and performs network activity, which is a common indicator of automated screen capture and exfiltration.
Detects network connections from suspicious or unexpected processes to common public webhook and automation services, which may indicate data exfiltration or automated C2 communication.
Detects outbound proxy traffic originating from identified AI and automation agent user-agents (e.g., ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude, etc.) attempting to access sensitive URI paths, such as credential files, SSH keys, configuration files, or cloud-hosted secrets. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data to or through AI platforms.
Detects network activity associated with the BadBlocker for YouTube browser extension (ID: cmedhionkhpnakcndndgjdbohmhepckk). The rule identifies DNS queries and outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains (api.adblock-for-youtube.com, get.adblock-for-youtube.com) used by the extension to exfiltrate session cookies and other sensitive browser data.
Detects outbound network traffic from browser processes to known BadBlocker extension command-and-control infrastructure (api.adblock-for-youtube.com or get.adblock-for-youtube.com), followed by subsequent outbound HTTPS connections to arbitrary external domains. This sequence is indicative of malicious browser extension activity involving the exfiltration of session cookies or authentication tokens from the victim's browser.
Detects the use of legitimate command-line utilities such as rclone, AWS CLI, AzCopy, curl, and wget to upload data to cloud storage endpoints, which is a common technique used for data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns consistent with data exfiltration to major cloud storage providers (AWS S3, Azure Blob Storage, Google Cloud Storage) using common command-line interface tools like rclone, aws-cli, and AzCopy.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a data transfer of 5MB or greater. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized data exfiltration over the web protocol.
This rule detects potentially malicious DNS traffic where queries contain exceptionally long, encoded, or randomized subdomains. Attackers often use these patterns to exfiltrate data from a target network, bypassing traditional security controls by encapsulating information within DNS requests (DNS tunneling). The detection looks for DNS queries exceeding 100 bytes in length with specific character patterns indicative of Base64 or similar encoding.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a transfer size exceeding 10MB to external (non-HOME_NET) addresses. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration via HTTP.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
Detects repeated use of the FTP 'STOR' command to transmit data to an external host within a short timeframe. The STOR command is used in the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to upload a file to the server. An unusual frequency of this command toward external destinations may indicate data exfiltration.
Detects large HTTP POST requests (over 5MB) directed at external hosts that utilize multipart or chunked encoding, which are commonly used to obfuscate or stream large volumes of data during an exfiltration event.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
Detects encrypted WebSocket sessions over non-standard ports or TLS traffic patterns indicative of Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) session token exfiltration to unauthorized command and control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects programmatic file downloads from SharePoint and OneDrive using automation tools like PowerShell, PnP, Graph SDK, Python, Node.js, or generic CLI tools (curl, wget) rather than typical browser access. This can indicate data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for FTP 'STOR' commands followed by large data transfers (exceeding 64KB) initiated from internal hosts to external destinations. This pattern is often indicative of data exfiltration using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
This rule detects potential DNS exfiltration attempts by identifying DNS queries containing high-entropy subdomains of 51 characters or more, encoded in Base64. Adversaries may use long, encoded subdomains to tunnel data out of a network through the DNS protocol, bypassing traditional security controls.
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