Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a specific multi-stage exfiltration pattern characterized by initial reconnaissance/fingerprinting probes against sensitive service endpoints (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) followed by unauthorized access to artifact storage endpoints (/files or /file?name=) from the same device against the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects high-volume outbound network connections over port 443 with significant duration, which is indicative of staged data exfiltration activity. The rule identifies sustained transfers exceeding 50MB that last longer than 5 minutes, targeting non-local network destinations.
Detects Salesforce Experience Cloud guest user sessions performing queries or reads on objects not within the authorized allowlist. This behavior, characterized by an abnormal volume of records retrieved or anomalous query patterns, is consistent with attempts to exploit misconfigured guest profile permissions to access internal sensitive data.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by correlating access to files labeled as sensitive (confidential, restricted, etc.) with a subsequent upload to a personal cloud storage provider or transmission via email to a personal domain within a two-hour window.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency outbound network connections to port 443 initiated by the binary 'rnpkeys.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of the Sauron Loader, which uses this masqueraded process to exfiltrate collected data, such as screenshots, via an encrypted C2 channel.
Detects the execution of rclone, a command-line tool for synchronizing files to and from cloud storage services. The rule identifies suspicious command-line usage patterns, specifically looking for common transfer operations (copy, sync, copyto), usage of configuration files, transfer tuning flags, or direct remote cloud storage identifiers, which are characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of rclone.exe or renamed binaries with command-line flags indicative of data exfiltration to cloud storage providers such as S3, Mega, OneDrive, or Google Drive. This behavior is frequently associated with ransomware actors, including Akira, Qilin, and Storm-2570, who use Rclone to perform mass exfiltration of sensitive file share data prior to encryption (double extortion).
Detects anomalous access to AWS Bedrock Knowledge Bases, identifying a pattern of initial reconnaissance (enumerating bases and data sources) followed by high-volume querying (Retrieve/RetrieveAndGenerate). This sequence is indicative of an attacker attempting to map out backend storage configurations and subsequently exfiltrate indexed document content.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or preview activity in OneDrive or SharePoint from non-browser user agents. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration where adversaries use scripted clients or APIs to mass-read or preview files, bypassing traditional download-based alerts.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or preview activity in OneDrive or SharePoint from non-browser user agents. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration where adversaries use scripted clients or APIs to mass-read or preview files, bypassing traditional download-based alerts.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects the 'Credential Guard.exe' process (associated with AgtaBackup RAT) accessing sensitive browser files (Login Data, Cookies, History, Bookmarks) and subsequently exfiltrating data to a specific C2 endpoint.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects high-volume network activity from a single device/process to public IP addresses over common ports (80, 443) or UDP protocol. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control communication, automated data exfiltration, or a scanning attempt.
The following analytic identifies when an O365 email account sends and then hard deletes an email to an external recipient within a short period (within 1 hour).
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to remove forensic artifacts or evidence of exfiltration activity.
This behavior is often seen when threat actors want to reduce the probability of detection by the compromised account owner.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to remove forensic artifacts or evidence of exfiltration activity.
This behavior is often seen when threat actors want to reduce the probability of detection by the compromised account owner.
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