Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a device making an unusually high number of unique outbound network connections to different remote IP addresses within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can indicate various malicious activities such as network scanning, botnet activity, or data exfiltration to multiple external hosts.
This rule detects the use of Azure Managed Identity tokens originating from non-Azure IP spaces. This scenario is indicative of token theft, likely via the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254), followed by an external replay of the stolen token from an attacker's infrastructure. Legitimate Managed Identity calls are expected to originate from Azure infrastructure IPs. The rule filters out legitimate Microsoft/Azure ASNs and RFC1918 private IP ranges to reduce false positives. It also categorizes the potential attack stage based on the operation name, including Key Vault access, Storage access, VM Code Execution, Privilege Escalation, and Directory Enumeration.
Box SaaS Suspicious File Upload
Cortex XDR
Detects suspicious file uploads to Box indicating potential data staging, tool upload, or exfiltration via shared folders. This rule specifically looks for the 'UPLOAD' operation within Box SaaS audit logs and extracts various file and user-related details.
This rule detects a high volume of Azure resource deletions by a single user within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is indicative of a destructive attack or wiper activity, where an adversary attempts to delete critical cloud infrastructure to disrupt operations or cause data loss. The rule specifically looks for 'delete' operations that were successful and counts them per caller and IP address, triggering an alert if the count exceeds a defined threshold.
Detects outbound web requests or GitHub API interactions containing the specific description string "Miasma: The Spreading Blight". This string is used as a signature by the Miasma malware (a Shai-Hulud variant involved in the @redhat-cloud-services npm supply chain attack) when creating malicious GitHub repositories to exfiltrate stolen credentials.
Box SaaS Suspicious File Download
Cortex XDR
Detects file downloads from Box which could indicate potential data exfiltration by insiders or compromised accounts. This rule specifically looks for 'DOWNLOAD' operations within Box SaaS audit logs.
KQL Query
Detects network connections to the URI path '/employment/documents-and-resources', which is used by FrostyNeighbor's PicassoLoader to exfiltrate host fingerprinting data and assess compromised hosts for further payload delivery.
Detects file access patterns in the Downloads directory matching cryptocurrency wallet seeds, phrases, and private keys targeted by file grabbers like Amatera. The rule identifies bulk access (more than 3 sensitive files within 5 minutes) to files with specific keywords or extensions commonly associated with crypto wallets.
High Email Volume to Personal Accounts
Cortex XDR
Detects potential data exfiltration or policy violation by identifying users sending a high volume of emails, large emails, or emails to many unique personal email addresses (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook.com) from an Office 365 Exchange Online mailbox. This rule aggregates email activity by sender and flags if any of the defined thresholds are met: total sent data to personal addresses exceeds 25 MB, total messages sent to personal addresses exceeds 10, emails sent to more than 5 unique personal addresses, or any single message sent to a personal address exceeds 25 MB. This is designed to be ran as a scheduled correlation for a day time frame. Thresholds can also be configured to fit your environment. Each user will have a different line that contains all of the matching emails they sent to, the attachments, and subjects of the emails.
Detects suspicious sharing activity in Box, including the creation of open links, external collaboration invites, role escalation, and weakening of sharing policies. This rule identifies high-risk activities such as making files publicly visible without password protection, inviting external users with co-owner or editor roles, and changes that reduce security like removing expiration dates on shared links.
Detects Microsoft 365 access attempts where the ClientAppId masquerades as Microsoft Office (d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) to bypass conditional access policies, but the UserAgent string reveals the use of a programmatic script (e.g., Python, PowerShell). This mismatch is a known tactic utilized by UNC6671 (BlackFile) during automated data exfiltration operations.
SharePoint Online Sensitive Data Search
Cortex XDR
This rule detects when users perform search queries in SharePoint Online that contain keywords indicative of sensitive data. The rule categorizes these searches into several types: credentials, personnel/HR information, infrastructure reconnaissance, financial/PII, and confidential business information.
Detects programmatic file access in Microsoft 365/SharePoint environments where the operation is logged as 'FileAccessed' but the UserAgent indicates a scripting library like python-requests or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration techniques used by actors like UNC6671 (BlackFile) who stream file content directly to bypass traditional 'FileDownloaded' monitoring.
Detects Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain malware (router_init.js / router_runtime.js / tanstack_runner.js)
Detects the creation or modification of GitHub Actions workflow files designed to dump and exfiltrate repository secrets, a technique observed in the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. This rule specifically looks for file events in GitHub Actions workflow directories combined with command-line patterns indicative of secret exfiltration or the creation of a specific malicious workflow file ('codeql_analysis.yml') by scripting interpreters.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, used to exfiltrate stolen credentials from developer machines and CI/CD pipelines.
This suite of rules detects various activities associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, including the execution of its payload via bun, network connections to its exfiltration domain, attempts by Node.js or Bun processes to access AWS IMDS for credential theft, access to local HashiCorp Vault instances, identification of known malicious script file hashes, and the installation of its specific malicious GitHub dependency.
Detects multiple threat behaviors associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm campaign. This includes memory scraping for secrets, execution of malicious Node/Bun payloads, connection to known C2 domains, and file operations related to persistence.
Detects the execution of the Windows Bluetooth File Transfer Wizard (fsquirt.exe), which may be abused for data exfiltration or payload delivery over Bluetooth. The rule identifies execution of fsquirt.exe and flags potentially suspicious indicators like specific transfer arguments or execution from non-standard paths.
Detects network connections to known REF6598 staging and command-and-control infrastructure, including a hardcoded staging IP and PHANTOMPULSE panel domains. This provides a high-fidelity signal of active PHANTOMPULSE infections and potential data exfiltration attempts.
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