Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Dev-0530 actors.
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
'Provides the Engine version and total count of up to date devices, not up to date devices and count of devices whose status is not available relevant to the Engine version.'
Microsoft has observed threat actors exploiting vulnerabilities associated with Log4J.
Determines DeviceId from internal IP address and outputs all alerts in events table associated to the DeviceId.
Example use case is Firewall determines Internal IP with suspicious network activity. Query WDATP based on date/time and Internal IP and see associated alerts for the endpoint.
Example use case is Firewall determines Internal IP with suspicious network activity. Query WDATP based on date/time and Internal IP and see associated alerts for the endpoint.
'Surfaces any Defender Alert for Solorigate Events. In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as
Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This way, the Microsoft Sentinel user can have all the pertinent device info in one view for all the the Solarigate Defender alerts.'
Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This way, the Microsoft Sentinel user can have all the pertinent device info in one view for all the the Solarigate Defender alerts.'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ransomware continues to hit healthcare, critical services. There is also a related blog.
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query returns alerts raised when backup files were deleted.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query returns alerts raised when backup files were deleted.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
This query checks alerts related to file backup deletion and enriches with additional alert evidence information
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
Get stats on ASR audit events - count events and machines per rule.
Endpoint Health with AV information
Find endpoints ASR Rules blocking
This analytic aggregates and summarizes alerts from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. It extracts details such as source, file name, severity, process command line, IP address, registry key, signature, description, and unique ID. The detection is not intended to identify new activity from raw data but rather to leverage existing Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts for correlation and risk-based alerting. It filters out alerts with a 'clean' verdict and dynamically maps MITRE techniques and assigns risk scores based on the alert's severity.
The following analytic detects CrowdStrike alerts for weak password policy violations, identifying instances where passwords do not meet the required security standards. These alerts highlight potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers, emphasizing the need for stronger password practices. Addressing these alerts promptly helps to enhance overall security and protect sensitive information from unauthorized access.
The analytic detects multiple CrowdStrike LOW severity alerts originating from the same endpoint, indicating a series of minor suspicious activities or policy violations. Specifically, it triggers when an endpoint generates three or more distinct types of LOW severity alerts. These alerts are not immediately critical but should be reviewed to prevent potential threats. They often highlight unusual behavior or low-level risks that, if left unchecked, could escalate into more significant security issues. Regular monitoring and analysis of these alerts are essential for maintaining robust security, as a cluster of different low-severity events can be an early indicator of a more significant compromise or an adversary's reconnaissance activities.
This analytic detects CrowdStrike alerts specifically categorized with a 'MEDIUM' severity. These alerts indicate suspicious activity that warrants prompt attention but is not immediately critical. Such activities might include unusual behavior or attempted policy violations. The rule processes CrowdStrike stream data, renames relevant fields for consistency, and then filters for events where the 'severity' field contains 'MEDIUM'. The primary goal is to identify and flag these medium-severity incidents for further investigation and mitigation to prevent potential escalation of attacks.
This analytic leverages alerts from Microsoft Defender O365 Incidents. It aggregates and summarizes these alerts, extracting details such as destination, file name, severity, process command line, IP address, registry key, signature, description, and timestamps. The detection filters out alerts with a verdict of 'Clean' from Microsoft. It dynamically maps MITRE techniques from the alert data and assigns a risk score based on the alert's severity. This rule is designed to correlate Microsoft-provided alerts with other data for risk-based alerting, rather than detecting new activity from raw data.
The following analytic detects CrowdStrike alerts for Medium Identity Risk Severity with a risk score of 55% or higher. These alerts indicate significant vulnerabilities in user identities, such as suspicious behavior or compromised credentials. Promptly investigating and addressing these alerts is crucial to prevent potential security breaches and ensure the integrity and protection of sensitive information and systems.
This analytic detects CrowdStrike alerts indicating privilege escalation attempts by non-admin users. These alerts signify unauthorized efforts by regular users to gain elevated permissions, which poses a significant security risk. Detecting and addressing these attempts promptly helps prevent potential breaches and ensures that user privileges remain properly managed, maintaining the integrity of the organization's security protocols. The rule specifically filters for alerts containing "Privilege escalation" in the incident type and excludes users identified as administrators or service accounts.
The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Windows Exchange servers via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities, followed by post-exploitation activities such as running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and adding new users. It leverages data from multiple analytic stories, requiring at least five distinct sources to trigger, thus reducing noise. This activity is significant as it indicates a high likelihood of an active compromise, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and persistent threats within the environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the Exchange server, exfiltrate data, and maintain long-term access.
Alerts when an authorization token originating from GKE activity is subsequently used within a command line on an endpoint system, suggesting potential credential exfiltration and reuse.
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