Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects behavior where the ERAAgent process writes a file to disk and executes that same file shortly after (within 5 minutes). This pattern is consistent with staged payload delivery, decompression, or assembly often observed in malicious activity, specifically referencing SLEEPWALKER malware patterns.
This rule detects attempts to perform process injection techniques (such as creating remote threads or opening processes) targeting the 'ctfmon.exe' process, where the initiating process is not 'ctfmon.exe' itself. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity such as reflective code loading or the execution of malware like SparkRAT, which may use this legitimate Windows process to mask its activity.
This rule detects attempts to perform process injection techniques (such as creating remote threads or opening processes) targeting the 'ctfmon.exe' process, where the initiating process is not 'ctfmon.exe' itself. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity such as reflective code loading or the execution of malware like SparkRAT, which may use this legitimate Windows process to mask its activity.
This rule detects attempts to perform process injection techniques (such as creating remote threads or opening processes) targeting the 'ctfmon.exe' process, where the initiating process is not 'ctfmon.exe' itself. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity such as reflective code loading or the execution of malware like SparkRAT, which may use this legitimate Windows process to mask its activity.
Detects a suspicious pattern associated with the SLEEPWALKER technique, involving multiple memory write operations followed by a memory protection change within an ERAAgent.exe process. This behavior suggests code injection or dynamic code loading within a process.
Detects anomalous, frequent, or repetitive device crash events (including BSODs) on a single device, which may indicate system instability, hardware failure, or an attempt to induce a Denial of Service (DoS) condition on the endpoint.
Detects anomalous, frequent, or repetitive device crash events (including BSODs) on a single device, which may indicate system instability, hardware failure, or an attempt to induce a Denial of Service (DoS) condition on the endpoint.
Detects high-risk or uncategorized events involving the 'Isolate' action or Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) as logged by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
Detects high-risk or uncategorized events involving the 'Isolate' action or Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) as logged by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
Detects process self-deletion (executable, scheduled task, or install directory) correlated within 60 minutes to a matching prior creation event, indicating post-execution cleanup behavior consistent with loader/RAT install-then-delete patterns such as those used by DOUBLECUP-delivered payloads.
Detects a sequence where a host performs process enumeration for EDR/AV security tools (CrowdStrike, Sophos) followed within 5 minutes by the execution of Microsoft Edge with specific flags (--headless=new or --no-startup-window, --load-extension, --disable-sync). This pattern is consistent with the UNC6692 'Edgecution' malware tradecraft used to check for security presence before sideloading a malicious browser extension.
Detects coordinated EDR-blinding techniques where a process performs in-memory patching of AMSI (AmsiScanBuffer) or ETW (EtwEventWrite) while simultaneously executing direct syscalls to bypass standard ntdll.dll hooked exports. This combination is highly indicative of malicious activity attempting to evade endpoint security instrumentation.
Detects endpoint activity indicative of the TELEPUZ malware interacting with the Telegram API to resolve its fallback Command and Control (C2) server. The rule monitors for DNS queries, network connections, and security log entries related to the specific channel 'chanadarkpart' and common Telegram API endpoints used for retrieving message data or user profiles.
This rule is designed to reconstruct an investigative timeline around a specific device and timestamp identified by an initial network event. It aggregates process execution, file activity, network connections, and alert evidence from the affected device within a specified time window before and after the triggered pivot event, facilitating incident investigation and root cause analysis.
Detects a specific exploit pattern where a malicious process triggers Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng.exe) to write a quarantine artifact to a user-controlled directory (such as a TEMP subdirectory), which is then immediately overwritten by an unprivileged process. This behavior indicates an attempt to exploit the Defender quarantine pipeline for unauthorized file manipulation or potential privilege escalation.
Detects an infostealer-style remote injection chain where a non-browser process allocates memory, writes a DLL path, and creates a remote thread pointing at kernel32!LoadLibraryW inside chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe, or firefox.exe. This suspend-inject-resume pattern is used by WEES Stealer to load its payload DLL into a browser process before intercepting App-Bound key material.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities characteristic of information-stealing malware (e.g., Vidar/SnappyClient). The rule correlates browser credential access (Login Data/Cookies), screen capturing (GDI API calls), and keylogging (SetWindowsHookEx) with subsequent archive staging activities (compression of sensitive data in temp folders) within a one-hour window.
This rule detects network communication (DNS, connection, or traffic) with known infrastructure and specific URI paths associated with the SpectralViper threat actor. It enriches these findings by identifying if the communication originated from processes commonly associated with SpectralViper, such as OneDrive Sync services or specific Intel audio service files.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory injection activity by correlating remote virtual memory allocation (VirtualAllocEx or MapViewOfSection) followed by the creation of a remote thread (CreateRemoteThread) targeting established legitimate Windows processes. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders such as Payouts King and RomulusLoader for facilitating code injection.
This rule detects the presence of a known malicious Chromium extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) that hijacks browser search functionality. The detection monitors for three distinct indicators: the creation of specific extension files within the Chromium directory, network communication with attacker-controlled domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws), and registry modifications that override default search settings.
Detects modifications to Chrome or Chromium browser preference files that indicate either the installation of a specific malicious extension or the overriding of the default search provider to a known suspicious domain (perplexity-ai.online). This indicates potential browser-based persistence or search hijacking.
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