Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage attack chain originating with a healthcare-themed phishing email (e.g., billing or patient coordination lures) that leads to a link click, followed by a subsequent suspicious user sign-in from a non-managed/non-compliant device for the same recipient. This correlates email threat data, URL click telemetry, and sign-in logs to identify potential credential harvesting.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain originating with a healthcare-themed phishing email (e.g., billing or patient coordination lures) that leads to a link click, followed by a subsequent suspicious user sign-in from a non-managed/non-compliant device for the same recipient. This correlates email threat data, URL click telemetry, and sign-in logs to identify potential credential harvesting.
Detects external email or chat messages containing markers typical of Large Language Models (LLMs) combined with urgent language soliciting sensitive information, such as credentials or financial details. The rule correlates these findings with messages from domains that have been recently observed in the environment, indicating potential automated, personalized social engineering campaigns.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack correlation where a user receives multiple inbound emails flagged for high likelihood of being LLM-generated (and containing urgency/credential-harvesting language) and subsequently performs a voice or video authentication attempt that is flagged by deepfake detection systems with a low confidence score, indicating a potential impersonation attempt.
Detects incoming spearphishing emails that contain a ZIP archive attachment. The rule alerts if the archive contains an LNK file with a double extension (e.g., .pdf.lnk) or if the email subject contains specific social engineering lures related to food pricing or peace negotiations.
Detects network activity associated with ORAX Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), specifically identifying fake Cloudflare security-verification pages and emoji-based CAPTCHA gates used as anti-analysis techniques to frustrate automated sandboxing.
Detects potential vishing or account takeover precursor activity where an external or guest Microsoft Teams user, impersonating IT or Help Desk support, communicates with a user who subsequently modifies their credentials or MFA configuration within the same 24-hour period.
Detects phishing emails that utilize document-themed subjects (e.g., invoices, shared documents) containing Windows Internet Shortcut (.url) attachments that redirect users to Cloudflare Workers-based 'docviewer' pages, often linked in conjunction with suspicious SharePoint file shares.
Detects phishing emails that use common voicemail notification subject lines combined with Mailchimp click-tracking or redirect infrastructure. This combination is often used to bypass traditional email gateway filters by utilizing legitimate marketing service domains to obfuscate final malicious destinations.
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
Detects a specific phishing pattern where a legitimate, authenticated DocuSign notification is followed by a user clicking a link within that document that redirects to known malicious infrastructure or OAuth-abuse sites (e.g., .vu domains, credential harvesting proxies). This heuristic identifies the link as being embedded in the shared document rather than the email body.
This rule detects a multi-stage phishing attack sequence: it correlates the receipt of an invoice-themed email containing an anonymous SharePoint link with the subsequent local creation of a Windows Internet Shortcut (.url) file, followed by a Microsoft OAuth device-code authentication sign-in attempt by the user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary tricking a user into downloading a malicious shortcut that facilitates OAuth device code phishing.
This rule detects access to known malicious domains used in vishing-themed Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns. Attackers use these domains to deceive users into providing MFA credentials or session tokens, often following a voice phishing interaction where victims are directed to these sites to register or set passkeys.
This rule detects potential MFA phishing attempts by identifying access to known malicious domains used for MFA credential harvesting within email communications and network traffic. It flags instances where users interact with domains masquerading as legitimate multi-factor authentication setup or registration services.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects the delivery of a fake 'slide-to-verify' CAPTCHA page commonly used by Mirage2FA phishing kits. These pages are designed to trick users or automated analysis tools into interacting with the site before the final AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing proxy is served.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects credential-phishing attempts originating from Proton Mail addresses that result in a user clicking on a link. The rule correlates email delivery from known Proton Mail domains with subsequent URL click events to identify potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, often associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) threat group.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
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