Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects incoming EXTERNAL emails containing subject lines indicative of meeting invitations or call records, which include external URLs pointing to non-standard or unverified cloud storage providers, combined with explicit remote-access/support solicitation language. Requiring the remote-access/support signal and excluding internal-to-internal mail narrows this to callback-phishing style lures rather than routine meeting correspondence.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
Detects malicious HTML pages commonly used in ClickFix-style phishing campaigns that intercept keyboard events (specifically blocking devtools and view-source shortcuts) and display fraudulent verification prompts to lure users into executing malicious actions.
Detects interaction with known infrastructure associated with the PREY-0058 campaign, which utilizes Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing lures mimicking passkey or MFA registration pages to target Microsoft 365 and other SaaS applications.
This rule detects potential OAuth token theft resulting from device code phishing (e.g., N0va phishkit). It monitors for a successful OAuth device-code authentication followed within 5 minutes by a secondary successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, different browser client, or different user agent, which is a common indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt.
Detects anomalous activity associated with OAuth 2.0 device code phishing campaigns. The rule identifies accounts showing frequent device code authentication attempts, including successful logins from potentially unmanaged or unrecognized devices, which is consistent with the behavior of phishing kits targeting OAuth device grant flows.
This rule detects potential credential or token theft attempts from the N0va phishing kit. It monitors for emails lacking attachments that contain specific URL patterns associated with verification or session initialization, coupled with social engineering tactics such as spoofing legitimate service display names or subjects (e.g., Microsoft Teams, DocuSign, etc.) while originating from non-legitimate domains.
This rule detects phishing emails where the sender's display name impersonates well-known brands (e.g., Microsoft, DocuSign, Zoom) while using a non-official domain. It further correlates these suspicious senders with embedded URLs that either match the targeted brands' domains or contain patterns commonly associated with device code phishing or API verification workflows.
This rule detects potential phishing or email spoofing attempts that impersonate ServiceNow or utilize suspicious reply-to domains. It looks for emails sent from service-nowinc.com or specific accounts, and correlates them with email headers containing unusual ReplyToDomain fields such as 'domainlify.net'.
Detection of specific indicators associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, including scripts utilizing PBKDF2/AES-GCM for redirection decryption and a characteristic URL path pattern (/scanna/).
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects phishing emails associated with the 'GhostCode' campaign, which uses an NDA or Supplier NDA Agreement pretext combined with WeTransfer links. The rule identifies suspicious emails by correlating the lure content with additional indicators such as specific lookalike sender domains, VoIP contact numbers, hardcoded ZIP passwords, or HTML attachments.
This rule detects successful authentication events using the Microsoft OAuth device code flow, which is often abused in phishing campaigns to hijack user sessions. It flags authentication attempts that match specific device authorization URLs, include signs of bypassing security warnings, or indicate a lack of direct user authentication interaction.
This rule detects high-volume, burst-pattern email distribution associated with a 'New VM Received' subject line, originating from non-authorized or non-corporate domains. This behavior is indicative of potential mass phishing or spam campaigns mimicking automated voicemail notifications.
This rule monitors for a multi-stage attack pattern involving two potential indicators: first, it identifies phishing emails containing a 'Google Docs' link combined with an attachment named 'API Logic Flaw'. Second, it detects browser activity involving the paste of JavaScript code or suspicious browser clipboard activity, which may indicate an attacker attempting to execute malicious scripts directly in the user's browser context.
Detects incoming EXTERNAL emails containing subject lines indicative of meeting invitations or call records, which include external URLs pointing to non-standard or unverified cloud storage providers, combined with explicit remote-access/support solicitation language. Requiring the remote-access/support signal and excluding internal-to-internal mail narrows this to callback-phishing style lures rather than routine meeting correspondence.
Detects phishing emails containing URLs with IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g., [::ffff:192.168.0.1]). Adversaries use this obfuscation technique to bypass security filters that may not correctly parse or normalize IPv6-mapped addresses within URLs.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
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