Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
Detects anomalous volumes of incoming emails to support aliases that contain keywords related to customer service complaints and include URLs pointing to suspicious '.shop' domains, characteristic of 'DoppelCart' or similar fake-shop impersonation phishing campaigns.
Detects anomalous volumes of incoming emails to support aliases that contain keywords related to customer service complaints and include URLs pointing to suspicious '.shop' domains, characteristic of 'DoppelCart' or similar fake-shop impersonation phishing campaigns.
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and email activity to identify communication or references to a set of known malicious domains associated with threat activity. It consolidates logs from device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry (URLs and sender domains) to detect potential compromise or phishing attempts.
Detects incoming emails from specific suspicious domains that pass authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) but contain subject lines commonly associated with phishing campaigns, such as invoices, payment requests, or urgent notifications. The rule includes associated URL and attachment information for further analysis.
Detects inbound emails masquerading as reputable advisory firms (PwC or KPMG) using lookalike sender domains, combined with wire-transfer fraud phrases in the subject line. Correlates with identity logon telemetry for the same fraudulent WhatsApp Business phone number, enabling detection across both email and authentication channels. Note: message body content is not available in the EmailEvents schema, so fraud-phrase matching is subject-only.
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
Detects inbound emails originating from external, non-corporate domains that impersonate an internal executive's display name. The rule flags messages containing common Business Email Compromise (BEC) urgency or confidentiality triggers such as 'wire transfer', 'urgent', 'NDA', or 'private email'.
Detects inbound emails originating from external, non-corporate domains that impersonate an internal executive's display name. The rule flags messages containing common Business Email Compromise (BEC) urgency or confidentiality triggers such as 'wire transfer', 'urgent', 'NDA', or 'private email'.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
This rule identifies suspicious emails containing password-protected attachments or files often used to bypass email security gateways. It monitors for emails where the subject line includes password hints or keywords like 'protected' or 'secure', combined with the presence of attachments and URL-based links, which are common tactics in phishing campaigns to distribute malicious payloads.
This rule detects potential phishing activity by identifying bulk email campaigns (5 or more recipients) where either the email subject contains known suspicious keywords (e.g., 'password', 'urgent', 'invoice') or the Reply-To address domain differs from the sender domain. The rule specifically excludes emails with attachments or URLs, focusing on social engineering pretexts that aim to initiate a conversation or gather information without external payloads.
Detects high-volume internal email campaigns that exhibit characteristics of phishing, specifically utilizing sender display name impersonation of executive or IT support roles, urgent subject lines, and URLs identified as malicious by threat intelligence. The rule tracks common attributes like SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures and rapid delivery to multiple recipients.
This rule detects sophisticated phishing lure pages impersonating DocuSign or NFe documentation. It specifically identifies pages that implement multi-layered anti-bot gating techniques, including detection of browser automation (navigator.webdriver), identification of headless browser artifacts (headless/HeadlessChrome), and the presence of interaction-wait fallback timers using addEventListener, all tied to specific malicious content indicators.
Detects emails delivering links to IronToll government-impersonation traffic-fine/payment portals (Egyptian and Moroccan justice-ministry lures), correlated with Safe Links click-through telemetry for the same URLs.
This rule detects high-volume email bursts sent through third-party bulk email providers where the sender domain exhibits SPF, DKIM, or DMARC alignment failures. This behavior is indicative of mass phishing campaigns, such as those associated with 'Operation DoppelBrand', attempting to bypass email authentication defenses using compromised or unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects coordinated email phishing campaigns by normalizing email subjects to identify recurring templates and flagging those sent to a high volume of recipients across multiple organizations within a short timeframe. The rule specifically targets financial and urgent pretexts from external senders, similar to observed techniques in impersonation campaigns.
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