Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,735 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,216
144
98
80
59
Contributors
496
324
298
171
55
Categories
20,432
11,818
5,871
5,150
4,864
1,735
Platforms
1,163
328
260
244
163
Products / Services
1,244
200
166
146
138
MITRE Techniques
983
923
765
247
245
CVEs
2
1
IDS Classtypes
68
33
19
10
8
IDS Protocols
90
24
15
15
Detects inbound emails containing keywords associated with known ransomware extortion tactics (e.g., mention of specific ransomware names, data leaks, and payment demands). The rule filters for inbound traffic to identify external threats while excluding potential internal-generated traffic.
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
Detects inbound emails originating from external, non-corporate domains that impersonate an internal executive's display name. The rule flags messages containing common Business Email Compromise (BEC) urgency or confidentiality triggers such as 'wire transfer', 'urgent', 'NDA', or 'private email'.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects inbound emails that spoof ServiceNow branding or impersonate high-level organizational roles (e.g., CEO, VP, President) in the display name while using common reply/forward subject headers. The rule specifically flags these if the sender domain does not originate from a legitimate service-now.com domain and contains PDF or HTML attachments, which are common vectors for credential harvesting or malware delivery.
Detects successful post-delivery email remediation actions (such as ZAP, manual deletion, or moving to junk) performed on emails associated with the Operation DoppelBrand campaign, identified by specific sender domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) or suspicious invoice-fraud subject lines.
This rule detects high volumes of inbound emails from a single domain that contain attachments and URLs, specifically filtering for finance-related subjects such as invoices, payments, or balance inquiries. Such patterns are commonly associated with large-scale phishing or business email compromise (BEC) campaigns.
This rule detects incoming emails containing suspicious lures, specifically those soliciting contact via WhatsApp, SMS, or phone calls. By analyzing the email body for keywords associated with off-platform communication (e.g., 'WhatsApp', 'call me', 'reach me at') alongside indicators that a message attachment was present, this detection identifies potential phishing attempts aiming to move targets to a less monitored or more trusted communication channel to facilitate credential harvesting or social engineering.
This rule detects incoming emails that contain common phishing lure keywords or reference ID patterns in the subject line, combined with signs of email spoofing (same sender/recipient domain) or a failure in email authentication protocols (DKIM, SPF, or DMARC).
Detects coordinated email phishing campaigns by normalizing email subjects to identify recurring templates and flagging those sent to a high volume of recipients across multiple organizations within a short timeframe. The rule specifically targets financial and urgent pretexts from external senders, similar to observed techniques in impersonation campaigns.
This rule detects high-volume email bursts sent through third-party bulk email providers where the sender domain exhibits SPF, DKIM, or DMARC alignment failures. This behavior is indicative of mass phishing campaigns, such as those associated with 'Operation DoppelBrand', attempting to bypass email authentication defenses using compromised or unauthorized infrastructure.
This rule detects high-volume email bursts sent through third-party bulk email providers where the sender domain exhibits SPF, DKIM, or DMARC alignment failures. This behavior is indicative of mass phishing campaigns, such as those associated with 'Operation DoppelBrand', attempting to bypass email authentication defenses using compromised or unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects successful post-delivery email remediation actions (such as ZAP, manual deletion, or moving to junk) performed on emails associated with the Operation DoppelBrand campaign, identified by specific sender domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) or suspicious invoice-fraud subject lines.
Detects SMTP MAIL FROM/Reply-To headers, DNS queries, or TLS SNI matches for known Business Email Compromise (BEC) lookalike domains (e.g., service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) used for phishing or spoofing organizational identities.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects spoofed ServiceNow invoice attachments/HTML used in Operation DoppelBrand BEC campaign with attacker-controlled GO2BANK ACH details
Detects spoofed ServiceNow invoice attachments/HTML used in Operation DoppelBrand BEC campaign with attacker-controlled GO2BANK ACH details
Detects spoofed ServiceNow invoice attachments/HTML used in Operation DoppelBrand BEC campaign with attacker-controlled GO2BANK ACH details
This rule detects sophisticated phishing lure pages impersonating DocuSign or NFe documentation. It specifically identifies pages that implement multi-layered anti-bot gating techniques, including detection of browser automation (navigator.webdriver), identification of headless browser artifacts (headless/HeadlessChrome), and the presence of interaction-wait fallback timers using addEventListener, all tied to specific malicious content indicators.
Detects SCL-9 (high-confidence phishing/spam) messages that still reach an inbox, indicating an allow-list or transport-rule override, and enriches with any recent tenant mail-flow admin changes. Rewritten: removed a no-op self-join on EmailEvents and a broken exact-match join against CloudAppEvents' raw audit blob (was comparing a sender address against a whole JSON record and would never match); now excludes messages later auto-remediated (e.g. ZAP-quarantined) via the native LatestDeliveryLocation field, and correlates admin rule/allow-list changes via substring match over a cross join.
Page 38 of 83