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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential spearphishing attempts by identifying emails with ZIP attachments that contain filenames or subjects masquerading as specific organizations or job opportunities (e.g., 'Lockheed Martin', 'Enveil'). It triggers on incoming emails containing suspicious job-lure keywords in the subject line or file attachments, which are often used to deliver initial access payloads.
Identifies inbound email campaigns that deliver URLs to large numbers of recipients and groups activity by parent domain.
The query helps analysts uncover domains using multiple subdomains and sender identities to distribute URL-based campaigns. It also measures overall email volume, unique sending infrastructure, recipient reach, and campaign frequency for each parent domain.
This is useful for:
Phishing campaign analysis
Infrastructure clustering
Bulk sender investigations
Threat hunting
Domain reputation reviews
Email security tuning
The query helps analysts uncover domains using multiple subdomains and sender identities to distribute URL-based campaigns. It also measures overall email volume, unique sending infrastructure, recipient reach, and campaign frequency for each parent domain.
This is useful for:
Phishing campaign analysis
Infrastructure clustering
Bulk sender investigations
Threat hunting
Domain reputation reviews
Email security tuning
Detects Zscaler ZIA logs identified as Advanced Threat Protection events, specifically targeting URL categories like Phishing and WebSpam, or traffic classified as Advanced Security Risk. The rule aggregates these events by user to identify potential malicious activity, flagging sessions where threats were allowed as higher severity.
This rule detects messages sent or chats created in Microsoft Teams by external or guest users where the chat name or message content impersonates IT support, helpdesk, or other official organizational entities. It specifically looks for keywords commonly used in phishing attempts to trick users into believing the sender is a legitimate internal service.
Detects DNS queries to the broader set of UNC6671/Blackfile/Pink/Falcon passkey- and SSO-themed lookalike phishing domains used across the campaign's rebrand clusters.
Detects inbound voice calls that spoof corporate helpdesk numbers. The rule triggers when an incoming call from an external/PSTN trunk matches a known helpdesk number and exhibits signs of spoofing, specifically either a mismatch between the current call's carrier and historical baseline carrier for that number, or a report by the recipient that the call was suspicious.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration via email by identifying mass near-identical background-image URLs in the body of an email. The rule looks for a high volume (8+) of distinct URLs that contain short parameters (indicative of encoded or smuggled data) within a single email. It further refines the detection by checking for the presence of specific CSS-like syntax often used in CSS-injection keylogging techniques to force the browser or email client to send background-image requests.
This rule monitors web browser URL click events for specific patterns (createssopasskey, addssopasskey) often used in vishing-lure campaigns. It identifies potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential harvesting attempts by cross-referencing clicked URLs against an organization's approved SSO domain allowlist and verifying the presence of an internal referrer in the redirect chain. If a user clicks a suspect link that does not originate from a known internal source and points to an unauthorized external domain, the event is flagged.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration via email by identifying mass near-identical background-image URLs in the body of an email. The rule looks for a high volume (8+) of distinct URLs that contain short parameters (indicative of encoded or smuggled data) within a single email. It further refines the detection by checking for the presence of specific CSS-like syntax often used in CSS-injection keylogging techniques to force the browser or email client to send background-image requests.
Detects network and DNS traffic targeting known infrastructure used by the Forg365 adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kit. This kit clones Microsoft login pages to intercept credentials and session cookies via reverse proxy.
Detects inbound emails originating from a gmail.com sender that have not previously communicated with the recipient in the last 90 days. The rule identifies emails containing e-card or greeting card-themed subjects, which are often used as social engineering lures to masquerade as automated branded notifications for malicious activity or credential theft.
Detects inbound emails masquerading as ServiceNow ticket notifications that solicit sensitive information (e.g., vendor IDs, invoice numbers, bank account details) via reply-only body content. This technique evades traditional SEG scanning by avoiding malicious URLs or attachments and leveraging the reputation of legitimate, though spoofed, ServiceNow infrastructure.
Detects potential business email compromise or phishing attempts by identifying inbound emails that pass authentication checks but involve a first-time sender-recipient pair (no correspondence in 90 days) referencing financial themes such as invoices, bank accounts, or purchase orders.
Detects phishing attempts where the sender's display name implies a sensitive role (e.g., Accounts Payable, Helpdesk, Vendor) while the authenticated header-From domain utilizes a 'support' subdomain. The rule triggers when the organizational root domain extracted from the email sender address does not match the branding present in the sender display name, indicating potential brand impersonation or business email compromise.
UNC6671 AiTM Phishing Infrastructure - Maintained IOC Dataset Match with TTL-Based Expiry (High Confidence)
This query identifies a device being added to an Entra ID account following a suspected successful device code phish attempt as evidenced by the sign in method displaying "deviceCodeFlow". Attackers have been known to register a new device shortly after compromising a user account to establish persistence in the form of Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs) generated by the attacker-controlled device.
Detects the delivery of a malicious SVG data-URI payload targeting the CVE-2026-42897 vulnerability in Outlook Web Access (OWA). This exploit uses a base64-encoded SVG image embedded in an email body, which triggers an onload JavaScript handler when rendered by OWA, leading to potential code execution within the mailbox context.
Detects HTTP GET requests to UNC6692 Edgecution phishing landing pages hosted on S3 buckets using the 'service-page-*-outlook.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com' naming pattern with an 'email=' parameter and '/update.html' URI, used to lure victims into downloading the Edgecution malware suite via fake Outlook/Mailbox Repair Utility pages.
This rule detects potential phishing emails that successfully pass through to the mailbox despite failing SPF, DKIM, or DMARC authentication checks. It specifically flags emails that claim to originate from high-value vendor domains (e.g., DocuSign, Zoom, Adobe, RingCentral) but contain links to external domains that do not match the alleged sender's domain, which is a common indicator of brand impersonation or credential harvesting campaigns.
This rule detects potential phishing emails that successfully pass through to the mailbox despite failing SPF, DKIM, or DMARC authentication checks. It specifically flags emails that claim to originate from high-value vendor domains (e.g., DocuSign, Zoom, Adobe, RingCentral) but contain links to external domains that do not match the alleged sender's domain, which is a common indicator of brand impersonation or credential harvesting campaigns.
UNC6692 fake Outlook Updates Management Console phishing page served from S3
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