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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects spearphishing attempts using SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) which involves delivering malicious Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise search URLs. These URLs utilize prompt injection via the query parameter to target high-value users, aiming to exfiltrate sensitive data such as MFA codes, email contents, or meeting details through the Copilot interface.
This rule detects potential phishing activity by monitoring for the creation of specific PDF files matching common financial-themed lures and network connections to a known malicious domain 'facture-in.pages.dev'. It tracks file-based lure indicators on local devices and network requests to identify potential initial access or delivery stages of an attack.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
This rule detects potential phishing emails originating from the gasparinutrition.com domain. It identifies suspicious email delivery patterns involving the use of Google Workspace relay (gappssmtp.com) combined with DKIM misalignment and DMARC failures, indicating possible domain spoofing or unauthorized relay usage.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
Detects incoming emails where a single URL contains indicators of two or more distinct security vendor rewriting services. This technique is used by adversaries to create multi-layered redirect chains to bypass automated scanners and deliver malicious content, as seen in Tycoon2FA and Sneaky2FA campaigns.
This rule detects emails containing multiple obfuscated URLs from common URL shortening services (bit.ly, tinyurl, short.link) originating from external senders. It specifically looks for emails with 3 or more such URLs within a one-hour window from the same sender.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with URLs that originate from outside the internal company domain (@company.com). It specifically looks for emails where the subject line contains keywords like 'click', 'confirm', or 'update', and where multiple such emails (3 or more) are sent from the same external sender to the same recipient.
Detects Microsoft Device Code grant type authentications in Entra ID sign-in logs, consistent with the EvilTokens phishing kit abusing the OAuth device code flow to steal tokens without capturing passwords. Flags DeviceCode protocol sign-ins from browser-based clients, which is atypical for legitimate device code usage.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application permissions for high-privilege scopes such as 'mail.read', 'files.readwrite', or 'offline_access'. This behavior is frequently indicative of OAuth consent phishing campaigns targeting Microsoft Entra ID environments to gain unauthorized access to user data and maintain persistence via stolen access tokens.
This rule detects when users access or download suspicious file types (specifically .xlsm, .docm, or .ics) from Microsoft SharePoint, Teams, or Exchange, where the filenames contain keywords associated with common phishing lures such as credentials, invoices, payroll, or password resets. This monitors for indicators of potential spearphishing attempts involving malicious documents or calendar invites within the M365 environment.
Detects phishing emails containing specific Latin placeholder text artifacts, commonly generated by the Faker library, which are often indicative of unconfigured or template-based phishing kits embedded within email bodies or attachments.
Detects incoming phishing emails sent from personal Gmail accounts that attempt to impersonate law firms by using legal-themed subjects (e.g., lawsuits, subpoenas, cease and desist). The rule specifically identifies the use of URL shorteners commonly used to obfuscate credential-harvesting destinations. The detection relies on email metadata and subject line patterns to identify potential spearphishing attempts.
This rule detects potential bulk phishing email campaigns by identifying a high volume of emails originating from external senders (not @company.com) with suspicious subject lines containing keywords like 'action required', 'verify account', or 'confirm identity'. The rule triggers if at least 50 such emails are sent to 20 or more unique recipients within a one-hour window.
Detects messages sent within Microsoft Teams from an external tenant that contain potentially malicious indicators, such as URL shorteners, external links, or references to executable file extensions. This rule is designed to identify potential spearphishing or social engineering attempts originating from external Microsoft 365 tenants.
Detects incoming emails containing suspicious legal-themed subjects (e.g., subpoenas, copyright infringement) from Gmail domains that include shortened URLs (e.g., bit.ly, goo.gl). The rule also checks for successful SPF or DKIM authentication results, which are common in mass phishing campaigns to bypass initial spam filters.
Detects spearphishing activity involving project-related lure archives, subsequent file drops of potentially malicious DLLs and executables (sideloading indicators), and the execution of processes masquerading as the lure documents.
This rule monitors for potential spearphishing campaigns by tracking two behaviors: the delivery of emails containing known malicious URLs or lure-themed attachment names via email gateway logs, and the subsequent execution of files extracted from archives or matching lure patterns by EDR agents on endpoints.
This rule detects potentially malicious spearphishing emails containing suspicious file types (such as executables, scripts, or archives) that are sent with either a spoofed sender domain or a subject line containing common lures targeting IT/infrastructure teams. It focuses on identifying high-risk email deliveries that indicate social engineering and initial access attempts.
Detects messages sent within Microsoft Teams from an external tenant that contain potentially malicious indicators, such as URL shorteners, external links, or references to executable file extensions. This rule is designed to identify potential spearphishing or social engineering attempts originating from external Microsoft 365 tenants.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Microsoft services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, outlook.office365.com) that occur within 30 minutes of a user clicking on a URL associated with these services. The sign-in is considered suspicious if it originates from a user agent commonly used by automated tools (e.g., axios, curl, python-requests, httpclient, Go-http-client) and is flagged with a 'atRisk' or 'high' risk level by Azure AD. This combination suggests a potential credential compromise following a phishing attempt, where an attacker might be using automated tools to leverage stolen credentials.
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