Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates a user passing a CAPTCHA gate (Cloudflare Turnstile, reCAPTCHA) with an immediate subsequent connection to an unknown, low-prevalence domain hosting the actual phishing landing page.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails containing financial keywords sent to sensitive finance/accounting roles from domains that have not been observed in the last 180 days. It then correlates this email event with subsequent device-level network activity involving banking or financial URLs initiated by the recipient user, which may indicate follow-up reconnaissance or unauthorized access.
Detects emails containing attachments that mimic voicemail files (e.g., .mp3.eml) with an HTML content type, often used in phishing campaigns. The rule specifically looks for dual extensions, HTML content type, a specific file size range, and subject line keywords related to financial institutions or unauthorized activity, indicating a potential Scotiabank impersonation or similar financial lure.
Detects messages sent or chats created by external/guest users in Microsoft Teams where the sender's name or user ID impersonates IT or support personnel, indicating a potential phishing attempt.
This rule detects a specific typosquatting pattern used by the EvilTokens phishing kit. It looks for HTTP traffic where the host contains 'workers.dev' and matches a regular expression for 'viewdoc[a-z0-9\-]+\.workers\.dev'. This indicates an attempt to mimic legitimate Cloudflare Workers domains for phishing purposes, specifically targeting the 'viewdoc' pattern often seen in document-sharing lures.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the 'EvilTokens' phishing kit, specifically targeting Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. It looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/api/device/start' URI on domains hosted on Cloudflare Workers ('.workers.dev'). This pattern suggests an attempt to initiate a device code phishing attack, where adversaries trick users into entering credentials or codes to grant access to malicious applications.
Detects a browser session that contacts an EvilTokens Device Code phishing endpoint (/api/device/status/) and then immediately navigates to onedrive.live.com, indicating the attacker backend returned status:completed and the kit executed window.location.replace to redirect the victim to OneDrive after token capture. This sequence suggests a successful device code phishing attack where the victim's credentials or tokens have been captured, and they are then redirected to a legitimate service to avoid suspicion.
Detects a browser session that contacts an EvilTokens Device Code phishing endpoint (/api/device/status/) and then immediately navigates to onedrive.live.com, indicating the attacker backend returned status:completed and the kit executed window.location.replace to redirect the victim to OneDrive after token capture. This sequence suggests a successful device code phishing attack where the victim's credentials or tokens have been captured, and they are then redirected to a legitimate service to avoid suspicion.
This rule detects successful user sign-ins from anomalous IP addresses, indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) reverse proxy attack. It correlates successful logins with the receipt of a phishing email containing specific subject keywords ('Code of Conduct') within a two-hour window, suggesting that the login was a direct result of the phishing lure.
Identifies network connections to algorithmically generated Cloudflare Workers domains used by Kali365, specifically targeting the `-s-account.workers.dev` format. This pattern is indicative of phishing campaigns, potentially for credential harvesting or token replay.
Detects messages sent or chats created by external/guest users in Microsoft Teams where the sender's name or user ID impersonates IT or support personnel, indicating a potential phishing attempt.
This rule detects AI-generated phishing campaigns characterized by a high degree of attachment polymorphism. It identifies instances where a single campaign (based on sender domain or subject schema) delivers HTML attachments with a unique SHA256 hash to each recipient, indicating an attempt to evade traditional signature-based detection.
Detects phishing emails utilizing Kali365's hardcoded subject line templates impersonating file sharing services like SharePoint and DocuSign. The rule specifically looks for emails with subjects starting with "SharePoint - Document Shared:" or "DocuSign - Signature Required:" where the sender's domain is not microsoft.com or docusign.com, indicating a potential spoofing attempt.
This rule detects potential business email compromise (BEC) activity where a compromised mailbox is used to send internal phishing emails or fraudulent invoices to financial departments. It identifies emails sent internally with subjects containing keywords like 'Invoice', 'Payment', 'Wire Transfer', or 'Updated Account', and correlates them with email sending events from cloud applications.
Detects network activity associated with Bluekit phishing infrastructure, which utilizes WebSocket connections for real-time browser session exfiltration. The rule monitors for characteristic HTTP upgrade requests to WebSockets containing 'rrweb' or 'session' query parameters, or connections to known Bluekit phishing domains, which allow attackers to stream DOM, keystrokes, and mouse movements from a victim's browser to an attacker-controlled dashboard.
This rule monitors network and email gateway logs to detect activity related to the Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. It identifies traffic to known Bluekit command-and-control or phishing domains, detects the presence of rrweb scripts often associated with session recording on phishing pages, alerts on brand-impersonation phishing pages using specific keyword combinations, and flags the presence of FortiBleed campaign lures.
This rule detects highly suspicious email attachments that mimic voicemail notifications, specifically targeting Scotiabank users. It identifies emails with attachments named like 'v-mail_*.mp3.eml' or ending with '.mp3.eml' where the attachment's MIME type is 'application/html'. The rule also looks for specific subject line keywords related to Scotiabank, Interac, e-Transfer, unauthorized activity, or a specific monetary value ('3,000'), and checks for an approximate file size of 6000-9000 bytes, consistent with known phishing lures.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
This rule detects email-based phishing attempts that utilize a two-hop open-redirect mechanism by abusing legitimate SaaS platforms (holabrief.com and loopedin.io). It flags emails containing specific redirect links, often used to bypass traditional security filters by redirecting users through trusted domains before reaching a malicious destination.
This rule monitors inbound emails that exhibit signs of phishing, specifically looking for failures in email authentication protocols (DKIM, DMARC), the use of specific invoice-themed subject lines, and the inclusion of redirection links pointing to known third-party collaboration platforms (HolaBrief, LoopedIn). It also identifies cases where the sender's envelope domain differs from the header's 'From' domain, which is a common indicator of email spoofing used in identity-based attacks.
Detects inbound phishing emails that fail both DKIM and DMARC checks, contain invoice-themed subject lines, and include links pointing to known open-redirect infrastructure (holabrief.com or loopedin.io). This pattern is consistent with credential harvesting campaigns using multi-hop SaaS redirects.
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