Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP requests to the SaaS platforms 'holabrief.com' or 'loopedin.io' that contain common URL redirection parameters, characteristic of an open-redirect abuse tactic used in phishing campaigns. These platforms are leveraged as intermediate hops to obfuscate the final destination of phishing links. The rule identifies the initial request and suggests correlation with subsequent traffic to unknown destinations to confirm a two-hop redirection chain.
Detects phishing emails that spoof specific healthcare domains (nhs.uk, mayoclinic.org, clevelandclinic.org) using invoice or payment-related subjects, characterized by DMARC/DKIM/SPF authentication failures. The detection correlates these emails with a subsequent user network request to known open-redirect or intermediary SaaS platforms (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) within a 10-minute window, indicating a likely credential harvesting or malware delivery sequence.
Detects potential invoice-themed phishing campaigns by identifying inbound emails that simultaneously target multiple recipients from senders with whom the organization has no prior communication history. The detection specifically flags emails with authentication failures (DKIM, SPF, or ARC) in the subject line, which is a common pattern for phishing attacks attempting to bypass reputation filters using aged domains.
Detects DNS resolution to attacker-controlled AWS S3 buckets masquerading as Outlook/OneDrive service pages used by UNC6692 for phishing delivery, SNOWBELT C2, and credential exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for DNS queries to S3 domains with patterns indicative of spoofed Outlook/OneDrive service pages or specific known malicious S3 bucket names.
Detects EvilTokens phishing HTML page with AES-GCM encrypted payload by file hash and characteristic code patterns
Correlates a spoofed internal email delivering an attachment that subsequently launches PowerShell on the endpoint. Specifically, it looks for emails where the sender's domain is 'yourcompany.com' but SPF authentication fails, and then links this to a device where 'powershell.exe' is executed with specific command-line arguments indicative of web requests or encoded commands.
Detects a user who interacted with a code-of-conduct lure subsequently authenticating through an anonymous proxy or anonymisation service. This rule correlates URL click events or sign-in events with subjects related to 'code of conduct' or 'policy acknowledgement' and then checks if the subsequent authentication occurred via an anonymous proxy.
Detects internal phishing emails with subject lines mimicking IT service notifications, such as from ServiceNow. This is a tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539) for lateral movement within a compromised organization.
Detects the execution of a local, polymorphic HTML file that contains AI-obfuscated JavaScript, followed by an HTTP POST request to an external server within a 5-minute window, indicating potential credential exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of VBScript files (.vbs or .vbe) by wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the filename contains keywords commonly associated with phishing lures (e.g., 'Invoice', 'Bill', 'Statement', 'Report', 'Debit', 'Credit', 'Notice', 'Alert', 'Urgent', 'Payment'). The rule triggers if three or more such executions are observed within a one-hour window on a single device, indicating potential malicious activity often associated with phishing campaigns.
Detects emails successfully delivered to the inbox that exhibit authentication failures for SPF, DKIM, or DMARC, or where a mismatch between the 'SenderFromDomain' and 'SenderMailFromDomain' is observed, indicating potential email spoofing or unauthorized sender impersonation.
Generates a macro-level alert identifying a rapid influx of emails containing links routing through known AiTM reverse proxy architectures, specifically targeting domains like onrender.com, web.app, and workers.dev. The rule triggers if more than 100 such threats are observed within a one-hour window for a given URL domain.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
Detects email-based phishing attempts impersonating Scotiabank where the sender display name contains 'Scotiabank' but the actual sending domain is not 'scotiabank.com'. The rule specifically looks for emails with SPF and DMARC pass but missing DKIM pass, combined with suspicious subject lines (e.g., 'interac', 'e-transfer', 'unauthorized') or specific IP addresses/GoDaddy infrastructure indicators, and targeting high-value recipients (CFO, finance, etc.). This pattern is consistent with compromised legitimate small-business domain abuse.
This rule detects emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'paypal', 'amazon', or 'apple' but does not originate from their official domains (e.g., '@paypal.com'). This pattern is indicative of lookalike domain phishing attempts, where attackers try to impersonate legitimate brands to trick recipients.
This rule detects potential mass emailing or spam activity by identifying instances where a single email account sends more than 100 emails within a one-minute window. This behavior is often characteristic of compromised accounts performing phishing campaigns or bulk unauthorized communication.
Detects application consent by a user shortly after the same account clicked a code-of-conduct or compliance-themed message. This behavior can indicate a multi-stage phishing campaign where a user is lured into clicking a malicious link (e.g., a fake policy document) and subsequently grants OAuth permissions to a malicious application.
Detects phishing emails leveraging Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD). These emails impersonate Scotiabank and use urgent themes regarding unauthorized $3,000 Interac e-Transfers to lure victims into calling an attacker-controlled toll-free number. The rule monitors for specific email subjects and attachments masquerading as voicemail audio files (v-mail*.mp3.eml or v-mail*.html).
Detects modern phishing tradecraft where malicious JavaScript is embedded inside SVG image files. The browser evaluates the SVG, decodes a Base64 payload, and drops a secondary archive or executable directly to disk via Blob/Data URIs. This rule specifically looks for file creation events in the Downloads folder for common executable or archive file types, correlated with browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) accessing local SVG files.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious archive files (.zip, .iso, .img, .cab) in the Downloads folder, initiated by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox), where the initiating process's command line indicates a local file access (file:///), suggesting a Blob-to-Disk dropper technique often associated with AI-obfuscated phishing campaigns.
Detects phishing attempts leveraging legitimate service redirectors such as Calendly and Google share URLs to deliver malicious photo-themed ZIP archives. The rule identifies suspicious redirect chains to Cloudflare-hosted (.cfd) domains and monitors for specific ZIP filename patterns commonly used in these campaigns to target the hospitality sector.
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