Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the Kali365 framework automatically establishing mailbox rules to delete or hide security alerts, finance emails, or replies from the phished user. The rule specifically looks for the creation or modification of inbox rules that involve actions like 'MoveToFolder', 'DeleteMessage', or 'MarkAsRead' and are applied to emails containing keywords such as 'phish', 'security', 'alert', 'finance', or 'invoice'.
This rule detects potentially malicious invoice-themed emails by monitoring email gateway telemetry for a combination of failing email authentication checks (DKIM, SPF, DMARC) and domain mismatches, which are indicative of spoofing attempts.
Detects network activity and DNS lookups associated with the domain 'loopedin.io', which has been identified as a second-hop open-redirect service used in forged healthcare-themed phishing campaigns. The rule specifically monitors connections from common web browsers to facilitate the identification of redirected user traffic.
This rule detects potential engagement with known phishing infrastructure by monitoring common email clients and browsers for DNS resolutions to specific malicious domains (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) or network connections to suspicious IP addresses associated with a healthcare-themed phishing campaign.
Detects inbound invoice-themed phishing emails where the sender domain authentication (SPF/DKIM) fails, combined with healthcare-related display name impersonation. The rule specifically targets the abuse of aged, high-reputation domains used as a vector to bypass standard reputation-based email filtering while masquerading as healthcare organizations.
Detects HTTP requests directed at known MexicanMafia Operation Escaneo phishing infrastructure, specifically targeting tax authority and SeedDMS document management users. The rule alerts on access to identified artifact filenames used in the campaign, such as phishing poc and spoofed document management pages.
Detects successful device code authentication via the Microsoft Office App (FOCI), which could indicate potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. The rule specifically looks for successful sign-ins using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol and the AppId associated with Microsoft Office.
Detects Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) phishing attacks, such as Bluekit, that utilize the rrweb library for real-time DOM serialization and WebSocket streaming to capture user sessions. The rule correlates the presence of the rrweb library in HTTP traffic with WebSocket communication patterns containing session handshakes and serialized DOM payloads.
Detects browser processes exhibiting a pattern consistent with 'Browser-in-the-Middle' attacks, specifically the streaming of DOM content (e.g., using rrweb) over persistent WebSocket connections to external IP addresses. The rule identifies high-density connection events to the same remote IP on port 443 lasting for more than 120 seconds and correlates these events with a preceding phishing email click on the same device.
Detects internal phishing emails with subject lines mimicking IT service notifications, such as from ServiceNow. This is a tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539) for lateral movement within a compromised organization.
This rule detects instances where the WhatsApp Desktop application (WhatsApp.exe) spawns suspicious child processes commonly used for scripting or command execution, such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or rundll32.exe. It specifically excludes known legitimate update and service-related command lines to reduce false positives. This behavior could indicate a phishing attempt or malware execution originating from a compromised WhatsApp session.
Detects the execution of VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with a command line containing common obfuscation techniques such as 'chr(', 'asc(', 'Replace(', 'Split(', 'Join(', or 'char_code_at', and a command line length greater than 500 characters. This pattern is often used in phishing campaigns to hide malicious code.
Identifies emails where SenderFromDomain matches an internal legitimate domain, but the SenderIPv4 originates from an unassociated external network exploiting permissive SPF records or dangling DNS. This rule specifically looks for emails with a sender domain matching 'yourcompany.com' (which should be replaced with the actual tenant domain), where the sender's IPv4 address is not from internal networks (excluding 10.0.0.0/8 and 192.168.0.0/16), and the SPF authentication passed. It further ensures that the originating IP address is not known to internal devices via network connection events, helping to filter out legitimate internal mail relays or services.
Detects browser network events accessing Cloudflare Turnstile endpoints followed immediately by a connection to an anomalous, newly registered AiTM subdomain. This sequence of events is indicative of a CAPTCHA bypass technique used by the Tycoon2FA phishing kit.
Tracks AAD/Exchange logs showing mail routed through an external tenant specifically to bypass internal domain spoofing filters via trusted connectors. This rule identifies emails where the sender's domain matches the internal company domain, but the email was routed through an external Office 365 connector and did not originate from a trusted internal IP address, indicating a potential cross-tenant spoofing attempt.
Identifies emails where the From header spoofing a government entity mismatches the envelope sender in MailEvents. This indicates a potential email spoofing attempt, often used in phishing campaigns.
Detects the initial phishing delivery vector: Microsoft Teams spawning a process which downloads from AWS S3 buckets.
Identifies users accessing Cloudflare Turnstile or reCAPTCHA gateways immediately preceding the AiTM proxy domain resolution. This behavior is indicative of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attack attempting to bypass CAPTCHA challenges.
Detects incoming phishing emails leveraging Scotiabank and Interac branding for Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD). These emails utilize HTML attachments or body content containing specific toll-free numbers (1-800-472-6) and financial lures related to unauthorized Interac e-Transfers, aiming to deceive recipients into initiating a callback.
This rule detects network communication with infrastructure associated with the 'EvilTokens' phishing kit, specifically targeting Microsoft OAuth device code API endpoints (/api/device/*) hosted on workers.dev. This behavior is indicative of an adversary conducting device code phishing (a form of AitM attack) to obtain unauthorized access tokens.
Detects a spear-phishing email masquerading as AWS Support services originating from a specific compromised university account (awsservices@presby.edu). This rule identifies malicious emails associated with the PoisonSeeds AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaign, which uses support ticket lures to harvest credentials.
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