Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies email attachments with a specific naming convention ('Agreement Settlement [Target] May [Day], 2026.pdf') used in a credential harvesting campaign. This rule looks for PDF files starting with 'Agreement Settlement' and ending with '.pdf', with a specific date format for May 2026.
Detects inbound spearphishing emails impersonating Scotiabank with Interac e-Transfer financial urgency lures targeting executive/VIP mailboxes from first-time external senders, with multiple variants delivered within one hour.
This rule detects POST requests to the URI '/api/device/start' which is indicative of the EvilTokens phishing kit attempting to initiate a Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by tricking them into authenticating through a device code.
Detects emails successfully delivered to the inbox that exhibit authentication failures for SPF, DKIM, or DMARC, or where a mismatch between the 'SenderFromDomain' and 'SenderMailFromDomain' is observed, indicating potential email spoofing or unauthorized sender impersonation.
Detects inbound email events that impersonate Scotiabank, contain financial urgency lures related to Interac e-Transfers, and include suspicious HTML attachments or .eml files. The rule specifically looks for HTML attachments or .eml files with specific naming conventions ('v-mail_' prefix or '.mp3.eml' suffix) and a file size between 7KB and 8KB, or any HTML attachment. It also checks for sender display name impersonation of Scotiabank while the sender's actual domain is not scotiabank.com.
Detects inbound emails containing links to the Upflow.io billing portal that include an embedded token parameter. This technique is actively abused by attackers to grant unauthorized viewing access to fraudulent invoices without requiring login credentials.
Detects inbound messages whose subject closely matches the campaign's reported stolen client data extortion wording. The rule looks for specific keywords like 'lost', 'confidential', 'data', 'clients' (all present) and 'very important', 'important', 'client data' (any present) in the email subject, specifically for inbound emails that are either the first contact or have no threat types identified.
Detects a click originating from a legitimate email or marketing redirection service and ending on a page that requests enterprise credentials. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt where an adversary leverages trusted email services to redirect users to a credential harvesting site.
Identifies successful device code authentication flows where the client application is masquerading as a Microsoft Office client. This technique is commonly used by Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) kits like EvilTokens for account takeover, by tricking users into authenticating a malicious application through a device code flow.
Detects the execution of VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with a command line containing common obfuscation techniques such as 'chr(', 'asc(', 'Replace(', 'Split(', 'Join(', or 'char_code_at', and a command line length greater than 500 characters. This pattern is often used in phishing campaigns to hide malicious code.
This rule detects the execution of VBScript files (.vbs or .vbe) by wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the filename contains keywords commonly associated with phishing lures (e.g., 'Invoice', 'Bill', 'Statement', 'Report', 'Debit', 'Credit', 'Notice', 'Alert', 'Urgent', 'Payment'). The rule triggers if three or more such executions are observed within a one-hour window on a single device, indicating potential malicious activity often associated with phishing campaigns.
This rule detects emails containing URLs associated with known phishing kits or malicious domains. It specifically looks for a predefined list of domains commonly used in phishing campaigns targeting various services like Office 365, Teams, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, PayPal, Google, Adobe, DocuSign, and Zoom.
Detects phishing links delivered through URL shortening services
This rule detects emails containing URLs associated with known phishing kits or malicious domains. It specifically looks for a predefined list of domains commonly used in phishing campaigns targeting various services like Office 365, Teams, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, PayPal, Google, Adobe, DocuSign, and Zoom.
Identifies HTTP requests containing the custom 'X-Antibot-Token' header used by the EvilTokens phishing kit to validate interactions and evade automated scanners. This header is highly specific to the EvilTokens PhaaS and its presence indicates malicious activity.
Detects high-volume email campaigns that exhibit characteristics of sophisticated phishing, including spoofed sender domains, urgent subject lines, and multiple URLs in the email body, indicative of credential harvesting attempts. The rule specifically looks for emails delivered to 'Deleted' or 'Junk' folders, from non-company domains that resemble company domains, and containing keywords often used in phishing lures.
Detects phishing links delivered through URL shortening services
Detects users interacting with Tax-themed phishing lures (e.g., W2, 1099, Tax Return) where Microsoft Word executes a macro that drops an executable to disk.
Detects inbound emails that are fully authenticated (SPF, DKIM, DMARC pass) and contain keywords related to 'code of conduct', 'employee handbook', 'policy acknowledgement', or 'compliance update' in the subject line, originating from a sender domain that has not been observed by the recipient organization within the last 24 hours. This rule aims to identify potential phishing attempts leveraging social engineering themes from newly registered or previously unseen domains.
Detects EvilTokens phishing HTML page with AES-GCM encrypted payload by file hash and characteristic code patterns
Identifies emails where the sender claims to be internal, but the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs header is not set to 'Internal', indicating a potential Ghost-Sender exploit. This rule focuses on delivered emails to reduce noise and filters out expected external mail gateways and trusted automated senders.
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