Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,735 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,216
144
98
80
59
Contributors
496
324
298
171
55
Categories
20,438
11,829
5,873
5,150
4,864
1,735
Platforms
1,163
328
260
244
163
Products / Services
1,244
200
166
146
138
MITRE Techniques
983
923
765
247
245
CVEs
2
1
IDS Classtypes
68
33
19
10
8
IDS Protocols
90
24
15
15
Detects credential-phishing attempts originating from Proton Mail addresses that result in a user clicking on a link. The rule correlates email delivery from known Proton Mail domains with subsequent URL click events to identify potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, often associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) threat group.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule monitors inbound emails for sender domains or embedded URLs that contain strings related to popular AI service brands (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude). It flags these occurrences when the domain does not match the official, legitimate domains for those services, indicating potential phishing or brand impersonation attempts.
This rule detects incoming phishing emails that use specific financial or payment-related lures (e.g., 'eft wire transfer', 'invoice receipt') in the subject line or body to entice users into clicking a link that points directly to an executable file, often disguised as a document.
Detects spoofed emails carrying a .patch attachment sent to a GitLab incoming-email merge-request address. Requires Microsoft's composite authentication verdict (CompAuth: fail) -- a lower-noise spoofing signal than raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC -- and excludes sender/recipient pairs already seen corresponding with that token address in the prior 30 days to suppress recurring legitimate contributors.
Detects a suspicious two-stage browser activity sequence where a user accesses a Maze survey-builder lure (t.maze.co) followed by a navigation to a Cloudflare Workers subdomain hosting a spoofed Microsoft Authentication device-code phishing page. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage phishing attack aimed at credential or device token theft.
Detects network requests to the domain 'cloud-ack.workers.dev', which is known to be used as a redirector for hosting Microsoft authentication lookalike pages to conduct phishing attacks.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects network traffic associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits that impersonate Microsoft and Google login pages. The rules identify the presence of specific HTML elements (like Cloudflare Turnstile anti-bot gates) and authentication session cookie headers served from non-authorized/non-official domains, indicating a reverse-proxy phishing attack.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
Detects a multi-stage phishing attack targeting cryptocurrency users, specifically Ledger wallet holders. The detection identifies an initial request to a Vercel-hosted domain for a BIP-39 wordlist (a common recovery phrase standard) followed by a POST request to a similar Vercel-hosted endpoint, suggesting the exfiltration of a secret recovery phrase.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; a weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, high-confidence phishing vocabulary=2, threshold=6) means no two of the three signal categories can reach the threshold alone — all three must co-occur before the rule fires.
Detects phishing messages that mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as one corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts where the sender's display name is formatted as an email address and the sender's domain uses a capital 'I' character to mimic a well-known service provider (typosquatting/homoglyph attack), such as 'gmaiI.com'. It identifies discrepancies between the actual sender domain and the normalized domain name after character replacement.
Page 6 of 83