Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious emails with attachments originating from external senders, characterized by urgent or action-oriented subject lines, and sent in bulk (5 or more emails within an hour). This pattern is indicative of phishing attempts.
This rule detects emails containing multiple obfuscated URLs from common URL shortening services (bit.ly, tinyurl, short.link) originating from external senders. It specifically looks for emails with 3 or more such URLs within a one-hour window from the same sender.
This rule detects potential bulk phishing email campaigns by identifying a high volume of emails originating from external senders (not @company.com) with suspicious subject lines containing keywords like 'action required', 'verify account', or 'confirm identity'. The rule triggers if at least 50 such emails are sent to 20 or more unique recipients within a one-hour window.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'ceo', 'finance', or 'hr', and the subject contains keywords like 'wire', 'payment', or 'invoice', but the sender's domain does not match the internal company domain. This pattern suggests an attempt to impersonate a high-ranking individual or department to trick recipients into making unauthorized financial transactions.
This rule detects SMTP traffic where an email is failing SPF (Sender Policy Framework) authentication. Specifically, it looks for the 'Received-SPF: fail' header in emails sent to port 25 ($HOME_NET). This indicates that the sending server is not authorized to send email on behalf of the domain specified in the email's 'MAIL FROM' address, which is a strong indicator of a phishing attempt or spoofed email.
This rule detects HTTP traffic to 'teams.microsoft.com' with a URI containing '/messages/'. It is designed to identify potential social engineering attempts where malicious links are delivered via Microsoft Teams messages. The rule uses a threshold of 5 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP to reduce false positives.
This rule detects HTTP responses that appear to be phishing pages designed to capture credentials. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing to the client that contains both the words "password" and "submit" (case-insensitive) in the file data, and where the HTTP host is an IP address. This combination suggests a credential input form on a page served from an IP address, which is a common characteristic of phishing attempts.
This rule detects potential credential phishing attempts by identifying HTTP URIs that contain the keywords 'redirect', 'login', and 'microsoft' (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords in a URI is often indicative of a phishing link designed to trick users into providing credentials, especially targeting Microsoft accounts, by redirecting them to a fake login page.
This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attempts, specifically those leveraging tools like Evilginx. It triggers on HTTP requests where the URI contains the keywords "verify", "session", and "token" (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords in the URI is indicative of phishing pages designed to capture session tokens or verification codes.
This rule detects HTTP responses containing a PDF file that also includes the string "/URI" and "login" (case-insensitive). This combination is indicative of a malicious PDF credential phishing page being served to a client. The rule specifically looks for the PDF magic bytes at the beginning of the file data.
This rule detects suspicious HTTP traffic indicating a LinkedIn message that contains an external link. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to 'linkedin.com' with a URI containing '/messaging/' and triggers if 10 such events occur within 60 seconds from the same source IP address. This pattern is often associated with social engineering attempts where attackers use LinkedIn messaging to direct users to malicious external sites.
Detects DNS requests to domains matching known UNC3753 data leak sites or phishing domains masquerading as IT helpdesks, serving as an early warning of an ongoing vishing campaign or active extortion.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts impersonating Adobe Document Cloud. It looks for emails with subjects containing keywords like "Adobe", "Document Cloud", "Sign Document", or "View Document", but where the sender's domain is NOT a legitimate Adobe domain (adobe.com or documentcloud.adobe.com). The rule then counts these occurrences per sender address and domain over a daily period.
This rule detects potential thread hijacking phishing attempts where an email with a subject starting with 'RE:' or 'FW:' (indicating a reply or forward) contains an attachment with a suspicious file extension (.js, .hta, or .lnk). The rule specifically looks for these emails originating from domains outside of a predefined list of trusted domains and flags instances where more than one such suspicious reply/forward is sent from the same sender with the same subject and filename within a day, suggesting a coordinated attack.
This rule detects potential spearphishing attempts targeting high-value individuals (CEO, CFO, IT Admin) within an organization. It looks for emails sent to these individuals with subjects commonly associated with financial phishing or social engineering lures, such as "Invoice," "Wire Transfer," "Payment," "Urgent," or "Purchase Order." The rule also checks if these emails contain attachments, which is a common vector for delivering malware or credential harvesting documents in phishing campaigns. It summarizes the attempts by sender, recipient, and day, counting the number of attempts and listing the attachments.
Detects emails containing attachments with suspicious file extensions such as '.exe', '.scr', or '.vbs'. These file types are commonly used in phishing and malware delivery campaigns.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting attempts by identifying emails that contain keywords commonly associated with phishing (e.g., 'password', 'update', 'verify' in the subject) and URLs that suggest login or account pages (e.g., 'form', 'login', 'account'). It aggregates these events from the same sender over a one-hour period and flags senders with three or more such emails.
This rule detects potential credential phishing attempts by identifying HTTP responses (flow:to_client,established) that contain common keywords associated with login pages, specifically 'password', 'username', and 'action='. The rule looks for these keywords within the file data of the HTTP response, indicating a web page being served to the client that mimics a login form.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts delivered via WhatsApp Business by monitoring HTTP traffic for connections to 'api.whatsapp.com' with 'message' in the URI. It specifically looks for a high volume (10 times in 60 seconds) of such connections from a single source, which could indicate an automated or widespread delivery of malicious links.
Detects successful device code authentications specifically for the Microsoft Office application (AppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) that do not originate from trusted named locations. This can indicate a device code phishing attempt where an attacker has tricked a user into authenticating to a malicious application.
This rule detects the creation of a new inbox rule via Exchange Web Services (EWS) that could be used to hide phishing replies. Specifically, it looks for HTTP traffic to '/EWS/Exchange.asmx' with 'NewInboxRule' in the client body, indicating an attempt to create a new inbox rule.
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