Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with URLs that originate from outside the internal company domain (@company.com). It specifically looks for emails where the subject line contains keywords like 'click', 'confirm', or 'update', and where multiple such emails (3 or more) are sent from the same external sender to the same recipient.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain associated with the Nimbus RAT, starting with a suspicious Microsoft Teams message (vishing) from an external sender using throwaway domains (e.g., .onmicrosoft.com, .top). This initial communication is then correlated with subsequent reconnaissance activities performed via Quick Assist, where QuickAssist.exe spawns cmd.exe to execute commands like 'net time', '/domain', 'whoami', 'ipconfig', or 'systeminfo' on the victim's device within a two-hour window. The rule aims to identify the internal victim and the external sender involved in this coordinated attack.
This rule detects emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'paypal', 'amazon', or 'apple' but does not originate from their official domains (e.g., '@paypal.com'). This pattern is indicative of lookalike domain phishing attempts, where attackers try to impersonate legitimate brands to trick recipients.
Detects DNS resolutions for domains associated with the Kali365 affiliate panel, which is heavily abused in device code phishing campaigns. This rule specifically identifies DNS queries to known malicious domains used by this PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP requests that appear to be credential phishing attempts, specifically looking for pages that might also attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). It triggers when an HTTP URI contains the keywords "token", "verify", and "auth" (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords in the URI suggests a page designed to collect credentials and potentially an MFA bypass token.
This rule detects attempts to access typosquatted domains commonly used in phishing attacks. It specifically looks for HTTP requests where the host header contains variations of popular brand names like 'microsoft', 'google', 'paypal', 'amazon', and 'linkedin' with common typos (e.g., 'micros0ft', 'g00gle', 'paypa1', 'arnazon', 'linkedln'). The rule triggers on established HTTP connections to the server.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the HTTP referer header indicates a social media platform (LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) and the HTTP URI contains the string 'login'. This combination suggests a potential social media phishing attempt, where a user is redirected from a legitimate social media site to a credential harvesting page.
KQL Query from file: Cloudflare Eviltokens: Gotta catch’em all
(Originally Authored by: Steven Lim (SlimKQL)
Expanded the original query to provide more context useful for investigation.
Original: https://systemtwosecurity.com/share/rule/Mn1XS6n9?utm_source=social&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_campaign=share&utm_content=detection
(Originally Authored by: Steven Lim (SlimKQL)
Expanded the original query to provide more context useful for investigation.
Original: https://systemtwosecurity.com/share/rule/Mn1XS6n9?utm_source=social&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_campaign=share&utm_content=detection
Detects high-confidence phishing emails that were successfully delivered to user inboxes or folders instead of being quarantined, where the message is identified as first contact and not explicitly allowed through user-level safe sender/domain overrides. The query enriches the email data with URL click telemetry from UrlClickEvents, allowing visibility into whether embedded URLs were clicked or not clicked, who clicked them, and when the click occurred. This detection is intended to identify potentially malicious phishing emails that bypassed preventive controls and provide recipient-level click insight to support triage, impact assessment, and response actions.
This rule detects potential internal phishing campaigns by identifying newly observed sender domains that send emails to a large number of internal recipients within a short period. It looks for sender domains that have been seen for the first time within the last 7 days, have sent emails to more than 10 unique recipients, and have sent more than 5 emails in total. This behavior can indicate an attacker attempting to phish internal users from a newly created or compromised domain.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts impersonating Adobe Document Cloud. It looks for emails with subjects containing keywords like "Adobe", "Document Cloud", "Sign Document", or "View Document", but where the sender's domain is NOT a legitimate Adobe domain (adobe.com or documentcloud.adobe.com). The rule then counts these occurrences per sender address and domain over a daily period.
This rule detects HTTP responses that appear to be a phishing kit landing page. It looks for specific keywords in the HTTP response body, such as 'img', 'logo', 'password', and 'Submit', indicating a page designed to collect credentials. Additionally, it checks if the HTTP host is an IP address, which is often used in phishing campaigns to bypass domain-based reputation checks or to host pages directly on compromised servers.
This rule detects potential phishing emails sent over SMTP that request sensitive information. It looks for specific keywords in the email subject and content, such as "verify", "account", and "click here", indicating an attempt to trick the recipient into revealing credentials or other sensitive data.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests where the client body contains the keywords 'company', 'role', and 'email' (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords in a POST request body is indicative of a phishing reconnaissance attempt, where an attacker is trying to collect organizational data through a form submission.
This rule detects bulk phishing campaign delivery by monitoring SMTP traffic for a high volume of emails containing the 'Subject:' header. Specifically, it triggers an alert if 20 or more emails with a 'Subject:' header are sent to the internal network (HOME_NET) on port 25 within a 60-second window from the same source.
This rule detects potential credential phishing pages served to a user over HTTP. It looks for HTTP responses containing both "Enter your password" and "Sign in" (case-insensitive) in the file data, and where the HTTP host is an IP address rather than a domain name. This combination of indicators suggests a generic phishing attempt designed to trick users into providing their credentials.
MFA OTP Phishing Page Detected
Suricata
This rule detects potential MFA OTP phishing pages by inspecting HTTP URIs for the presence of both 'verify' and 'otp' keywords, case-insensitively. This combination in a URI is indicative of a page designed to trick users into submitting their One-Time Passwords (OTPs) for multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects potential phishing landing pages by looking for HTTP responses that contain both 'login' and 'microsoft' in the URI, and where the HTTP host is an IP address. This combination suggests an attempt to mimic a Microsoft login page hosted on an IP address rather than a legitimate domain, which is a common tactic in phishing attacks.
Detects inbound emails containing Mailchimp click-tracking links that redirect to ActiveCampaign landing pages, a known ESP chaining technique used to obscure credential harvesters. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to bypass email security controls.
This rule detects inbound emails that appear to be Microsoft Teams invitations but contain suspicious keywords in the subject line related to financial transactions (invoice, billing, payment, renewal, charge). This could indicate a phishing attempt where adversaries leverage legitimate-looking Microsoft invitation emails to deliver financially themed lures.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
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