Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query will generate an alert for any emails that Defender AIR identifies as malicious but has taken no AIR actions.
This rule detects network connections to a predefined list of malicious domains, many of which are hosted on Vercel and appear to be associated with phishing campaigns. The domains often mimic legitimate services or financial documents, suggesting an attempt to deliver malware or steal credentials through phishing. The rule specifically looks for these domains in the 'RemoteUrl' field of 'DeviceNetworkEvents'.
There are simpler versions of this when investigating manually, this is not for manual use on your day to day activities, this is for automation.
This simple query helps detect whether a user interacted with the URL within the email message or not.
This query detects suspicious sign-in activity from a user who has recently clicked on a phishing link. It correlates email click events with sign-in logs, identifying sign-ins from new or infrequent IP addresses after a user has interacted with a suspicious email. The rule uses configurable parameters for sender email addresses, sender domains, and subject keywords to identify phishing emails.
TIFCE (Threat Intelligence Feed Content Evaluation) is a simple way to measure if a TI feed is actually useful based on four things β uniqueness, real matches, confirmed maliciousness, and activity.
π¨ TIFCE allows using one detection per IOC type (URLs, domains, file hashes) instead of dozens of rules per feed, keeping detections clean, centralized, and easy to maintain.
If you rely on threat intelligence for detection, it can be a good solution to how to evaluate current or new TI feeds.
π¨ TIFCE allows using one detection per IOC type (URLs, domains, file hashes) instead of dozens of rules per feed, keeping detections clean, centralized, and easy to maintain.
If you rely on threat intelligence for detection, it can be a good solution to how to evaluate current or new TI feeds.
TIFCE (Threat Intelligence Feed Content Evaluation) is a simple way to measure if a TI feed is actually useful based on four things β uniqueness, real matches, confirmed maliciousness, and activity.
π¨ TIFCE allows using one detection per IOC type (URLs, domains, file hashes) instead of dozens of rules per feed, keeping detections clean, centralized, and easy to maintain.
If you rely on threat intelligence for detection, it can be a good solution to how to evaluate current or new TI feeds.
π¨ TIFCE allows using one detection per IOC type (URLs, domains, file hashes) instead of dozens of rules per feed, keeping detections clean, centralized, and easy to maintain.
If you rely on threat intelligence for detection, it can be a good solution to how to evaluate current or new TI feeds.
This rule detects inbound emails classified as phishing or malware by the email security system. It summarizes the total number of such messages, provides sample subjects, and counts how many were blocked, delivered to mailboxes, junked, or had other actions. The rule specifically focuses on emails that were delivered to a mailbox, indicating a potential bypass of initial security measures or a need for further investigation.
Detects phishing emails containing QR codes rendered using HTML tables. This technique is used to evade image-based scanning and OCR security controls by representing the QR code as a grid of small, colored table cells (<td>) instead of a traditional image file.
Detects a ClickFix attack chain involving an email client opening a browser to a suspicious domain, followed by a file download, and subsequent execution via cmd.exe from explorer within a short timeframe. This chain of events is indicative of a social engineering attack designed to trick users into executing malicious files.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This rule detects patterns indicative of an Evilginx-style Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to hostnames ending in suspicious top-level domains (TLDs) such as .click, .online, .cloud, or .shop, combined with specific URI paths like /wlc/, /load/, or /success/. These patterns are commonly used by AiTM redirectors to capture credentials and session tokens.
This rule detects inbound emails that appear to be Microsoft Teams invitations but contain suspicious keywords in the subject line related to financial transactions (invoice, billing, payment, renewal, charge). This could indicate a phishing attempt where adversaries leverage legitimate-looking Microsoft invitation emails to deliver financially themed lures.
Try tio find out phishing domain based on mail history
This rule detects potential malicious email campaigns by identifying when multiple users submit email reports (e.g., phishing or spam) that share common entities such as sender IP, primary sender address/domain, secondary sender address/domain, or subject line. A configurable threshold determines the minimum number of distinct reports required to flag an entity as suspicious.
This detection identifies network connections to known first-stage Microsoft 365 phishing domains associated with an active Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) campaign.
This Query is oriented to identify Malicious URL sent via Microsoft Teams and detect possible hits based on online Malware sites reported by the TI Feed URL Haus.
Detects anomalous Okta sign-on policy evaluations originating from Cloudflare, which could indicate an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attempt. The associated campaign uses Cloudflare to host its phishing infrastructure.
This KQL Query helps to understand all the URL Redirections from URLs received by Email using the UrlChainId identifier on KQL that groups together all URLs that belong to the same βclick/redirect chainβ. When an message contains a URL, that URL may redirect through several intermediate URLs (trackers, shorteners, phishing, etc.) before land on the final site. KQL builds a URL chain from the original URL in the email through each redirect hop. All URLs that are part of a single chain share the same UrlChainId and for each hop. On the other hand, UrlChainPosition register the position of every URL, the original one = value 0 and the other redirections tagged with next numbers(1, 2, etc. ) The following query includes different options to classify the insights into four categories:
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
This detection identifies emails linked to a recent widespread phishing campaign that abuses trusted Microsoft SharePoint links to bypass traditional security controls. Attackers use convincing business emails containing SharePoint URLs that lead to multi-step validation pages, mimicking legitimate Microsoft authentication flows. These techniques make the attacks highly deceptive and harder to detect, as the initial links appear legitimate.
This campaign has been active and prevalent over the past two weeks, targeting multiple organizations and leveraging user trust in Microsoft services to harvest credentials.
Use this query to find potential malicious SharePoint links in email messages and investigate them further by detonating the URLs in a sandbox environment to analyze their behavior.
This campaign has been active and prevalent over the past two weeks, targeting multiple organizations and leveraging user trust in Microsoft services to harvest credentials.
Use this query to find potential malicious SharePoint links in email messages and investigate them further by detonating the URLs in a sandbox environment to analyze their behavior.
Detects network traffic to domains associated with the TAG-160 cluster's phishing campaigns, which primarily target the logistics sector.
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