Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) and behavioral patterns associated with the Lazarus Group's 'Operation Dream Job' campaign. It tracks known malicious hashes, domains, and IP addresses, alongside suspicious activities such as PDF viewer abuse, DLL side-loading, process injection, persistence mechanism creation (Registry/Scheduled Tasks), and recruitment-themed phishing lures.
Detects inbound emails containing keywords associated with known ransomware extortion tactics (e.g., mention of specific ransomware names, data leaks, and payment demands). The rule filters for inbound traffic to identify external threats while excluding potential internal-generated traffic.
Detects anomalous email access patterns across multiple mailboxes using specific application identifiers or access contexts often associated with automated collection tools. This rule flags when an application accesses more than 20 items across distinct mailboxes in a 15-minute window, which is indicative of potential unauthorized bulk email collection or data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects inbound emails that spoof ServiceNow branding or impersonate high-level organizational roles (e.g., CEO, VP, President) in the display name while using common reply/forward subject headers. The rule specifically flags these if the sender domain does not originate from a legitimate service-now.com domain and contains PDF or HTML attachments, which are common vectors for credential harvesting or malware delivery.
Detects successful post-delivery email remediation actions (such as ZAP, manual deletion, or moving to junk) performed on emails associated with the Operation DoppelBrand campaign, identified by specific sender domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) or suspicious invoice-fraud subject lines.
This rule detects high volumes of inbound emails from a single domain that contain attachments and URLs, specifically filtering for finance-related subjects such as invoices, payments, or balance inquiries. Such patterns are commonly associated with large-scale phishing or business email compromise (BEC) campaigns.
Detects successful post-delivery email remediation actions (such as ZAP, manual deletion, or moving to junk) performed on emails associated with the Operation DoppelBrand campaign, identified by specific sender domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) or suspicious invoice-fraud subject lines.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects inbound emails from external domains containing keywords related to financial transactions or urgency in the subject line (specifically matching forwarded or reply formats) accompanied by PDF or HTML attachments. This heuristic approach attempts to identify potential business email compromise (BEC) or phishing lures mimicking invoices or approval requests in environments where raw email body content is unavailable.
Detects SCL-9 (high-confidence phishing/spam) messages that still reach an inbox, indicating an allow-list or transport-rule override, and enriches with any recent tenant mail-flow admin changes. Rewritten: removed a no-op self-join on EmailEvents and a broken exact-match join against CloudAppEvents' raw audit blob (was comparing a sender address against a whole JSON record and would never match); now excludes messages later auto-remediated (e.g. ZAP-quarantined) via the native LatestDeliveryLocation field, and correlates admin rule/allow-list changes via substring match over a cross join.
Detects the RejectDirectSend bypass (null SMTP envelope sender + internal-domain spoof). Tightened to require Microsoft's composite auth verdict OR all of SPF/DKIM/DMARC failing (vs. any one), excludes known-approved Direct Send relay IPs, and excludes likely-legitimate bulk/newsletter traffic via BulkComplaintLevel.
This rule correlates email sender activity with network, cloud, and identity logs by matching traffic against a specific IP range (160.79.104.0/21) identified as malicious or suspicious. The rule flags instances where this range appears as an email sender IP or as a remote/source IP address across various infrastructure indices, potentially indicating adversary communication or exfiltration.
This rule monitors various logs (email, entra, device, graph, cloud) for IP addresses (source or remote) that match a specific CIDR range (160.79.104.0/21). This is typically used to identify traffic originating from or communicating with infrastructure identified as malicious or suspicious by threat intelligence.
This rule monitors various logs (email, entra, device, graph, cloud) for IP addresses (source or remote) that match a specific CIDR range (160.79.104.0/21). This is typically used to identify traffic originating from or communicating with infrastructure identified as malicious or suspicious by threat intelligence.
This rule monitors various logs (email, entra, device, graph, cloud) for IP addresses (source or remote) that match a specific CIDR range (160.79.104.0/21). This is typically used to identify traffic originating from or communicating with infrastructure identified as malicious or suspicious by threat intelligence.
Detects incoming emails where the SMTP envelope sender (MAIL FROM) is blank, but the visible 'From' header displays an internal/accepted domain. This technique is often used to bypass email authentication filters. The rule specifically alerts on cases where SPF, DKIM, or DMARC checks failed or returned 'none', yet the message was still delivered to an inbox or folder, suggesting a configuration gap or allow-list override.
Detects instances where a high-value security or transaction-related notification email is received concurrently with a burst of non-essential bulk or subscription-based emails. This pattern is indicative of an email-bombing (inbox flooding) attack, often used to bury critical alerts and mask malicious activity such as unauthorized account access or fraudulent financial transactions.
Detects SCL-9 (high-confidence phishing/spam) messages that still reach an inbox, indicating an allow-list or transport-rule override, and enriches with any recent tenant mail-flow admin changes. Rewritten: removed a no-op self-join on EmailEvents and a broken exact-match join against CloudAppEvents' raw audit blob (was comparing a sender address against a whole JSON record and would never match); now excludes messages later auto-remediated (e.g. ZAP-quarantined) via the native LatestDeliveryLocation field, and correlates admin rule/allow-list changes via substring match over a cross join.
This rule monitors email traffic for communication involving identified malicious domains and sender addresses. It cross-references sender information in the EmailEvents log with a predefined set of suspicious domains and email addresses, highlighting potential phishing or malicious outreach attempts.
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