Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects two suspicious activities within a user's mailbox: (1) An email flood, where a recipient receives more than 500 emails within a 5-minute window, potentially indicating an attempt to overwhelm or hide secondary emails; and (2) The creation or modification of inbox rules that include actions like deleting or moving messages, which is a common persistence and evasion technique used by attackers to hide C2 or phishing communications.
This rule detects a high volume (5 or more within an hour) of emails from the same sender containing compressed attachments (.zip, .rar, .7z) and subjects indicating documents, invoices, or reports. This pattern can be indicative of phishing campaigns attempting to deliver malware or gather information.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange Online inbox rules that either contain specific sensitive keywords (e.g., payroll, bank, direct deposit) or perform actions that hide, delete, or move messages. This behavior is commonly used by attackers to intercept sensitive communications or conceal evidence of their presence in a compromised mailbox.
This rule detects suspicious activity within Microsoft Graph API where an account is querying mailbox contents for sensitive payroll and HR-related keywords. This pattern is often observed following an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session compromise, where threat actors (such as those associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign) leverage stolen session tokens to exfiltrate sensitive employee information by searching for specific financial and payroll keywords across multiple mailboxes.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with subject lines and attachment names related to Income Tax or official tax filings. The detection logic correlates indicators such as specific tax-related subject phrases, common tax utility attachments, suspicious URLs (govtop.one), and sender spoofing (impersonating 'Government of India' without a valid .gov.in domain).
Detects spearphishing emails targeting high-value executive recipients (CEO, CFO, etc.) that contain PDF attachments and use subject lines related to settlement or distribution agreements. The rule specifically looks for inbound traffic routed through Google Workspace (gappssmtp.com) infrastructure, indicating potential use of compromised legitimate domains to distribute malicious lures.
Detects internal emails with subject or body content related to payroll information changes (e.g., direct deposit, bank account redirection) sent to HR or payroll-related email addresses or recipients. This behavior is indicative of internal Business Email Compromise (BEC) or an attempt by an attacker (or compromised insider) to facilitate payroll fraud.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
This rule detects emails containing macro-enabled documents (.docm, .xlsm, .pptm). It specifically looks for instances where a sender sends two or more such emails within an hour, which could indicate a targeted phishing attempt using malicious macros.
Detects suspicious emails with attachments originating from external senders, characterized by urgent or action-oriented subject lines, and sent in bulk (5 or more emails within an hour). This pattern is indicative of phishing attempts.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365/Exchange that configure email forwarding or redirection to external domains. Attackers often use these rules to exfiltrate email data or maintain persistence within an environment by redirecting communications to attacker-controlled accounts.
Detects signs of a session hijacking attack using the OAuth device code grant flow, specifically identifying the initial device code authorization followed by suspicious post-authentication activity like mass data access via Microsoft Graph API or the creation of mailbox forwarding rules.
This rule detects anomalous or risky sign-in events for user accounts that have recently configured an active out-of-office (OOF) auto-reply. An attacker may leverage a user's known absence to gain access to their email or other corporate resources using compromised credentials, as the user is less likely to notice suspicious account activity while away.
This rule detects anomalous or risky sign-in events for user accounts that have recently configured an active out-of-office (OOF) auto-reply. An attacker may leverage a user's known absence to gain access to their email or other corporate resources using compromised credentials, as the user is less likely to notice suspicious account activity while away.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a 'spam bomb' (high volume of inbound emails) followed by an external Microsoft Teams message and the subsequent execution of Windows Quick Assist (quickassist.exe or msra.exe) on the target endpoint. This behavior is highly indicative of a tech support scam or social engineering attack where an adversary floods a user's inbox to create urgency, contacts them via Teams, and convinces them to initiate a remote support session.
This rule monitors for inbound email messages containing SVG file attachments. SVG files can contain embedded scripts that may be leveraged for malicious purposes, such as SVG smuggling to deliver secondary payloads or perform credential harvesting.
Detects phishing emails associated with the TONResolver campaign that impersonate Booking.com guest complaints. The rule identifies suspicious emails containing .ics calendar file attachments or links to domains matching the pattern 'photo-[0-9]+.cfd', primarily targeting hospitality staff with subject lines related to hotel inquiries or issues.
Detects spearphishing emails delivered through Google Workspace infrastructure that fail DMARC strict alignment check. Specifically, this monitors instances where the DKIM signing domain is a gappssmtp.com subdomain that fails alignment with the envelope sender domain, while concurrently carrying a PDF attachment, consistent with known phishing campaign patterns.
This rule detects potential email spoofing or relay abuse by identifying emails that claim to be from the 'gasparinutrition.com' domain but fail DMARC authentication, despite showing a DKIM pass status specifically associated with 'gappssmtp.com' subdomains. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass email authentication mechanisms by leveraging legitimate third-party mail relay infrastructure to send spoofed messages.
This rule monitors incoming email events for a specific domain or sender address, detecting instances where emails pass DKIM validation but fail DMARC and SPF checks while simultaneously being flagged as spam by the email security solution. This pattern is indicative of potential spoofing or unauthorized email activity.
Detects incoming emails purportedly from a specific domain ('gasparinutrition.com') that exhibit signs of spoofing or malicious activity. The rule looks for DMARC failures, DKIM misalignment, and presence of specific document attachments or subject lines (e.g., 'Distribution Settlement Agreement') that mimic business correspondence often used in social engineering or phishing campaigns.
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