Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
837 detections
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Detects M365 administrative actions related to mailbox forwarding rules or OAuth application consent that occur in the absence of a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) claim, particularly when preceded by non-interactive session events (LogonType 0) using REST client protocols. This pattern is indicative of potential session hijacking or token replay attacks, where an adversary leverages a compromised session to establish persistence or gain ongoing access to the environment without re-authenticating.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
The following analytic identifies when an O365 email recipient receives and then deletes emails related to password or banking/payroll changes within a short period.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to redirect the victims payroll to an attacker controlled bank account.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to redirect the victims payroll to an attacker controlled bank account.
This rule detects potentially malicious emails that impersonate Microsoft account security notifications or security advisories. It looks for emails with specific social engineering themes in the sender name, sender address, or subject line, accompanied by .zip attachments that contain suspicious file names related to cybersecurity warnings or OTP abuse, which are common lures for malware delivery.
This rule monitors inbound emails for sender domains or embedded URLs that contain strings related to popular AI service brands (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude). It flags these occurrences when the domain does not match the official, legitimate domains for those services, indicating potential phishing or brand impersonation attempts.
This rule monitors inbound emails for sender domains or embedded URLs that contain strings related to popular AI service brands (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude). It flags these occurrences when the domain does not match the official, legitimate domains for those services, indicating potential phishing or brand impersonation attempts.
Detects potential abuse of the Microsoft Graph API by correlating device-code authentication events with subsequent high-volume activity, such as mail or file enumeration, from the same account within a short window. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-style token proxying, where an attacker intercepts an OAuth device-code token to gain unauthorized access to an user's resources.
Detects potential persistence establishment in M365 environments following anomalous or risky sign-in events. This pattern is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks where a session cookie is stolen, followed by immediate adversary actions to secure long-term access, such as MFA method registration, OAuth app consent, or mailbox rule configuration.
Detects potential account compromise by identifying a specific sequence of behavior: reconnaissance of sensitive users (HR/Payroll) via Microsoft Graph API calls, followed by the creation of inbox rules (e.g., forwarding) by the same user account within a 12-hour window.
This rule detects high-confidence phishing emails that were delivered to either the Inbox or Junk folder. It explicitly filters out messages that have been explicitly allowed by organization-level policies, user-level actions, or specific safe-sender bypass mechanisms, ensuring the alert focuses on malicious emails that bypassed standard security filters without an authorized exception.
This rule detects high-confidence phishing emails that were delivered to either the Inbox or Junk folder. It explicitly filters out messages that have been explicitly allowed by organization-level policies, user-level actions, or specific safe-sender bypass mechanisms, ensuring the alert focuses on malicious emails that bypassed standard security filters without an authorized exception.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
This rule detects incoming email messages containing .zip attachments with filenames that mimic financial documents (e.g., NFe, DANFE, invoice-related keywords) combined with numerical strings. This naming pattern is commonly associated with phishing campaigns attempting to deliver malicious archives.
This rule detects inbound emails where the sender domain matches the recipient domain (internal-looking), but the message authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC as indicated by CompAuth status) failed or was not performed. This is indicative of abuse of Exchange Online 'Direct Send' or similar unauthenticated relay methods to spoof internal identities.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, multi-channel probing of AI agent input surfaces. The rule identifies external actors sending instruction-injection style keywords across different communication channels (e.g., email, Teams, calendar) within a short window, which may indicate an attempt to identify and manipulate an organization's autonomous agents. Covers T1595.002
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events suggesting potential technical support scam or social engineering activity: a rapid influx of emails (email bombing) followed by an external Microsoft Teams call, and subsequently the execution of a common remote access tool on the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects a sequence of events where a user is targeted by an email bombing attack, subsequently receives an external or anonymous Microsoft Teams call, and finally launches a known remote access tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host within a one-hour window. This pattern is consistent with social engineering campaigns designed to trick users into providing remote access to their systems.
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