Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects spoofed emails carrying a .patch attachment sent to a GitLab incoming-email merge-request address. Requires Microsoft's composite authentication verdict (CompAuth: fail) -- a lower-noise spoofing signal than raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC -- and excludes sender/recipient pairs already seen corresponding with that token address in the prior 30 days to suppress recurring legitimate contributors.
Detects spoofed emails carrying a .patch attachment sent to a GitLab incoming-email merge-request address. Requires Microsoft's composite authentication verdict (CompAuth: fail) -- a lower-noise spoofing signal than raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC -- and excludes sender/recipient pairs already seen corresponding with that token address in the prior 30 days to suppress recurring legitimate contributors.
Detects inbound .ics calendar invite attachments that contain URLs, originating from sender domains not previously seen within the organization over the last 90 days, and distributed to 10 or more recipients. This pattern is indicative of a mass-distributed phishing campaign using calendar invites as a lure.
Detects inbound .ics calendar invite attachments that contain URLs, originating from sender domains not previously seen within the organization over the last 90 days, and distributed to 10 or more recipients. This pattern is indicative of a mass-distributed phishing campaign using calendar invites as a lure.
This rule detects mass phishing campaigns by identifying HTML/HTM email attachments that contain embedded URLs. It monitors for a pattern where the same sender distributes these attachments to multiple recipients, a common behavior for HTML smuggling delivery vectors where malicious payloads are constructed client-side to bypass static email gateway inspection.
Detects newly consented OAuth applications that immediately perform mass access or exfiltration of mail and file data across multiple mailboxes or drives within a short period, potentially indicating an attacker utilizing a malicious OAuth application.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
Detects incoming phishing emails that contain both a shortened URL and references to a password-protected RAR archive, often used to deliver malware while bypassing email security content inspection.
This rule detects a multi-stage phishing campaign where an attacker uses legitimate Notion infrastructure to host PDF invitation lures. The detection correlates email delivery of a Notion-themed invitation with a subsequent user click on a URL containing device code authorization keywords (such as 'device', 'devicelogin', or 'code') within a 60-minute window, which is indicative of a device-code harvesting attack.
This rule detects inbound email messages containing HTML or related file types (htm, mhtml, shtml) that passed all standard authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, DMARC). This combination is often indicative of malicious phishing campaigns (such as those using LinXcoded or Mirage2FA techniques) sent from compromised, yet properly authenticated, Microsoft 365 or similar cloud-hosted email accounts, which bypass traditional sender reputation filters.
Detects incoming emails that use 'Apple' or 'Find My' related strings in the sender display name while originating from common consumer email relay domains like Gmail or iCloud, which is indicative of a social engineering or phishing attempt attempting to impersonate Apple support.
Detects high-risk administrative actions in Microsoft 365, such as new MFA method registration, OAuth app consent grants, or email forwarding rule creation, occurring in sessions that lack fresh authentication (often indicative of a session-cookie replay attack).
Detects indicators associated with the exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow. The rule identifies anomalous web requests targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, subsequent suspicious process creation (base64 encoded payloads in Python/shell), and network communication with identified command and control (C2) or data exfiltration IP addresses. It also includes alerts for observed contact with known extortion email addresses.
Detects indicators associated with the exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow. The rule identifies anomalous web requests targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, subsequent suspicious process creation (base64 encoded payloads in Python/shell), and network communication with identified command and control (C2) or data exfiltration IP addresses. It also includes alerts for observed contact with known extortion email addresses.
Detects inbound email messages containing keywords and phrases consistent with extortion attempts, specifically referencing stolen data, unauthorized access, and demands for cryptocurrency payment.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
This rule monitors for suspicious network traffic to SMTP services and specific external email addresses, as well as process command lines containing these indicators. Additionally, it tracks email events involving specific sender, recipient, and subject indicators which may be indicative of unauthorized communication or data exfiltration attempts.
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