Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a potential web shell deployment by identifying a web server process creating or modifying a file in common web directory locations, followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by the execution of that same file.
This rule performs a retrospective search across device file and network events for indicators of compromise associated with the UNC6240/ShinyHunters actor's activity against PeopleSoft, specifically linked to CVE-2026-35273. It monitors for known malicious file hashes (JSP webshells and executables), connections to known C2 infrastructure, and DNS lookups for specific malicious domains.
Hunting query, not intended as a scheduled alert.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
Detects suspicious behavior by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) indicative of web shell deployment, specifically the spawning of command interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or the writing of .aspx files. This activity is consistent with exploitation campaigns targeting MOVEit Transfer, such as those conducted by the Lace Tempest (Cl0p) group.
The following analytic identifies the creation of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) with a known history of exploitation in atypical locations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate DLL search order hijacking or sideloading, techniques used by attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to blend in with legitimate operations, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
Detects Impacket-style lateral movement patterns where system processes such as services.exe or wmiprvse.exe spawn command shells to copy files from a network share (UNC path) and execute them. This rule specifically looks for evidence of staging binaries or DLLs from remote shares, which is a common behavior of post-compromise frameworks like Impacket when performing 'hands-on-keyboard' actions.
Detects the creation of files with potentially executable extensions (e.g., .php, .jsp, .pl, .cgi, .sh, .py) within NetScaler web-accessible directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to deploy a web shell for persistence or command execution following a successful exploit of the web application.
Detects attempts to redirect Python package resolution away from the default PyPI index. This is achieved by monitoring pip CLI arguments (--index-url, --extra-index-url), environment variables (PIP_INDEX_URL, PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL, PIP_CONFIG_FILE), or the creation/modification of pip configuration files (pip.conf, pip.ini). Such activity is often associated with software supply chain attacks where an adversary attempts to force the installation of malicious packages from a controlled repository.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects various methods used by adversaries to perform credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for direct process access with suspicious handle permissions, the use of comsvcs.dll via rundll32.exe for MiniDump creation, the execution of memory dumping tools like procdump, and the creation of LSASS memory dump files by Task Manager.
This rule detects potential exploitation of the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB component vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273). It identifies suspicious POST requests to the PSEMHUB HttpListeningConnector servlet, including obfuscated URL paths, followed by the creation of suspiciously named .jsp or .jspx files in the PSEMHUB.war application directory, which is indicative of a web shell deployment.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) backup of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) to a non-standard location, followed closely by the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe or 7za.exe) to archive that specific backup directory, which is a common indicator of credential dumping and exfiltration staging.
Detects the creation of an ASPX file within a member file upload directory, followed immediately by the execution of 'cmd.exe' by the 'w3wp.exe' web server process. This behavior is indicative of a web shell being uploaded and used to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
Detects the creation of web scripts (aspx, php, jsp) in typical web server directories followed by suspicious shell activity (cmd, powershell, or shell execution) originating from web server processes within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a web shell being dropped and subsequently utilized for command execution.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
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