Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of potentially malicious executable or script files (.exe, .lnk, .vbs, .ps1, .hta) or autorun.inf files on removable drives (D-Z) initiated by common script interpreters or suspicious processes. This activity is then correlated with prior detections of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM/Primitive Bear) implant activity, such as Ptero-family malware, specific obfuscated PowerShell patterns, or HTML smuggling delivery via mail/Office clients on the same host within a 24-hour window.
Detects the creation of a file named 'bootTel.dat' directly in the root of the C: drive. This file name is historically associated with various malware families and potentially unwanted programs, and its creation in a system-protected directory root is often indicative of persistence mechanisms or suspicious stage-one dropper activity.
Detects suspicious execution of Node.js processes initiated by VS Code (or Cursor) that appear to be running JavaScript payloads disguised as font files (.woff2) or other suspicious assets. It also monitors for the creation or modification of '.vscode/tasks.json' files by package managers or source control tools, which could indicate the configuration of malicious 'folderOpen' tasks used for persistence or automated execution upon workspace opening.
Detects DLL sideloading behavior associated with Operation DragonReturn, where the malicious executable COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe launches or drops malicious components (nvdaHelperRemote.dll or Mixed Reality.exe) within the Windows Media Player directory.
Detects DcRAT malware creating or modifying a specific file (c:\debug.txt) used for staging keylogging or screenshot data. This rule monitors for file creation followed by modification events, a pattern associated with the adversary's method of log consolidation and potential obfuscation.
This rule detects various Linux persistence mechanisms, including the use of LD_PRELOAD to hijack dynamic linker execution, the creation or modification of malicious cron jobs, and tampering with shell startup scripts. These techniques allow an adversary to maintain access to a compromised host by ensuring malicious code is executed automatically or injected into legitimate processes.
This rule detects screen capture activities associated with DcRAT, Millenium RAT, and Operation DragonReturn. It identifies the creation of specific staging files (e.g., debug.txt, background.jpg) at sensitive paths and monitors for non-standard or masquerading processes (such as svchost.exe running outside System32) that create image files in user-writable or temporary directories. The rule uses tiered logic, assigning a higher risk score to known IOC patterns and periodic capture behavior.
Detects instances where WinRAR.exe is observed writing potentially malicious script or link files (.hta, .vbs, .js, .ps1, .lnk) into the Windows Startup folder. This pattern is indicative of exploitation of CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR often leveraged by the Gamaredon group to establish persistence.
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior involving the creation of autorun.inf files on removable drives combined with the execution of VBScripts from removable media using wscript.exe, indicative of a worm propagating via USB devices.
This rule detects file creation, modification, or module loading events involving specific DLL files ('msvcr90.dll' or '7z.dll') from a suspicious directory path ('Traiolx Custom Utils'). This behavior is commonly associated with DLL side-loading, where an adversary places malicious or renamed legitimate DLLs into a specific directory to hijack execution flow.
This rule detects two common persistence techniques: the modification of Windows Registry Run keys with paths referencing temporary or application data directories, and the creation of autorun.inf files on removable or non-system drives to facilitate potential code execution upon media insertion.
This rule detects potential LegionLoader activity by monitoring for specific file staging in AppData/Roaming directories and suspicious registry queries related to security settings and Internet Explorer/Windows configuration values. The rule correlates process execution via msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or dllhost.exe with the creation of known staging artifacts and security-weakening registry modifications.
Detects evidence of active exploitation targeting the libarchive ZIP entry declared-vs-actual size boundary vulnerability. The rule identifies the execution of known proof-of-concept (PoC) scripts (make_debuginfod_zip.py, run_stock_marker.py) as well as the creation of specific marker files or CLI output from bsdunzip/bsdtar that confirm successful boundary exploitation.
Detects the presence of specific file artifacts ('VULNERABILITY_CONFIRMED.marker', 'smtp-crlf-injection.curlrc') associated with the 'curl-smtp-expn-recipient-crlf-injection' proof-of-concept repository. The rule also correlates this with the execution of the associated 'run_demo.py' script from directories containing 'curl-smtp', helping identify active use of this testing framework.
Detects the installation or presence of a specific malicious Chromium browser extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) associated with Perplexity AI-themed phishing or malicious activity. The rule monitors file system events, process command lines, and registry modifications related to the Chrome Extensions directory.
Detects the presence of known malicious Chrome extension IDs, suspicious configuration files (e.g., perplexity-rules.json, bing-rules.json), or extensions utilizing invasive declarativeNetRequest permissions, which are often used for browser-based exfiltration or credential interception.
This rule correlates suspicious process initiation originating from common web browsers or document handlers (e.g., encoded PowerShell, obfuscated CMD) with subsequent high-impact activities such as QEMU emulator launch, local account creation, DLL side-loading, volume shadow copy deletion, or creation of ransom-related files. This detection follows a multi-stage logic to identify potentially advanced threats or ransomware precursors within a 4-hour window.
Detects the presence of specific file artifacts (extension ID 'flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd' and associated traffic routing configuration files) belonging to a malicious Chrome extension that leverages declarativeNetRequest permissions to redirect browser traffic through an attacker-controlled relay domain.
Detects the creation of Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration files (e.g., mcp.json) in workspace directories triggered by process executions typically associated with package installation tools such as npm, npx, pip, or python. This behavior can indicate the installation of a malicious or typosquatted package designed to register a malicious MCP server and facilitate credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects a multi-stage attack where an adversary uses a fake job interview theme to lure a user into cloning a malicious repository. The repository contains a Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration file that, when opened in an IDE like VS Code, Cursor, or Windsurf, leads to the execution of unauthorized or suspicious child processes.
Detects the creation of Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration files (such as .mcp.json or those in .vscode/ and .amazonq/ directories) shortly after a Git operation (pull, fetch, merge, or clone). This pattern is indicative of a supply chain attack where a contributor introduces malicious MCP configurations into a workspace, which are subsequently loaded by development tools like VS Code, Cursor, or language servers to execute arbitrary code or exfiltrate data.
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