Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,545 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,480
532
344
301
286
Contributors
1,303
815
737
215
193
Categories
20,460
11,847
5,879
5,158
4,866
4,545
Platforms
3,841
1,051
473
40
29
Products / Services
1,837
1,138
211
183
171
MITRE Techniques
1,604
1,424
1,300
750
473
CVEs
19
17
16
11
11
IDS Classtypes
23
1
IDS Protocols
16
7
1
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the cron utility, including the modification of cron-related configuration files and the execution of specific suspicious payloads (e.g., ssync.sh, blacklist). It monitors for file creation, modification, or renaming events within sensitive directories, as well as the spawning of processes by cron daemons using identified suspicious paths or command names.
This rule detects the creation of files within temporary directories that follow a specific pattern (RP_ followed by a hex-string), often associated with malware staging activities. It specifically looks for files staged in subdirectories mimicking System32 or wdtest_temp. The rule assigns a risk score based on the types of files staged, identifying potential malicious activity during the preparation phase of an attack.
Detects the simultaneous creation of specific Windows Defender quarantine artifacts (C:\Windows\Temp\tmp[16 chars]) and RP_ staging directories, which is indicative of the RoguePlanet race condition exploitation technique. This activity involves leveraging ReadDirectoryChangesW to synchronize file operations and bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of potential stealer malware (such as Yuta or Glove Stealer) packaged as a PyInstaller executable. The detection monitors for the characteristic behavior where the application unpacks its runtime environment into a _MEI* temporary directory and subsequently spawns child processes from that path, or utilizes specific naming conventions like 'winupdate.exe' within temporary or cache directories, common techniques for staging malicious payloads.
Detects the Yuta .NET WPF dropper (SLaunch.exe) writing a PyInstaller-compiled payload (winupdate.exe) to the AppData Roaming .cache directory, followed by the immediate execution of the staged payload from that same location.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with Obsidian Sandstorm activity, including scheduled task creation, registry run key modification, and startup folder file drops initiated by suspicious processes or from non-standard directories like AppData/Temp.
Detects periodic image file creation (e.g., .bmp, .png, .jpg) in user-writable temporary or application data directories by non-UI processes. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of remote access trojans (RATs) such as Atlas RAT and Gh0stRAT, which capture screenshots and stage them for exfiltration.
Detects the creation of an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) explicitly named 'WDFOO' attached to 'wermgr.exe'. This is a high-fidelity, hardcoded artifact generated by the RoguePlanet zero-day exploit to manipulate Microsoft Defender's remediation.
Detects credential harvesting behavior associated with the BQTLock (BaqiyatLock) malware, including the staging of password files in temporary directories, unauthorized access to browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, key4.db), and the use of system utilities like vaultcmd.exe to interact with the Windows Credential Manager. It also monitors the execution of PyInstaller-packed loaders (BQT.exe or start.exe) from temporary directories.
Detects suspicious modifications to .github/workflows YAML files, unauthorized git commits with backdated timestamps, usage of noreply.github.com bot author names, and git push commands initiated by node.exe. This activity is indicative of the IronWorm malware attempting to manipulate CI/CD pipelines and exfiltrate secrets.
This rule monitors Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to detect high-volume file creation activity across multiple unique directories. By filtering out common file types, it identifies potential signs of mass file modification, staging for exfiltration, or malicious encryption characteristic of ransomware or data destructive operations.
Detects Payouts King ransomware activity by identifying file rename events to the .ZWIAAW extension or the creation of the 'readme_locker.txt' ransom note on any disk path. The rule specifically accounts for file operations that might utilize techniques like SetFileInformationByHandle for evasion.
Detects adversary activity associated with Payouts King and Black Basta affiliates utilizing QEMU for malicious activity. The rule monitors for the creation of virtual machine disk image files in non-standard directories, the execution of QEMU using disk images with misleading file extensions such as .db or .dll, and outbound SSH connections originating from the QEMU process to tunnel traffic through a guest VM.
Detects potential execution of a Tox ransomware negotiation channel by monitoring for processes that exhibit a high rate of file writes (potential encryption activity) in conjunction with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as a 76-character string or the 'tox://' URI scheme, which are associated with Tox ransomware client activity.
This rule identifies potentially malicious activity where a process, which has been dormant on the system for at least 7 days since its initial start, suddenly performs a high volume (more than 50 events in 60 seconds) of file creation or modification events. This behavior pattern is often indicative of ransomware encryption activities, where malware lies dormant before initiating a rapid, destructive encryption cycle.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Miasma/MYRA infostealer campaign targeting DeFi developers. The rule monitors npm lifecycle scripts (postinstall/preinstall) for suspicious execution, C2 communication with known malicious domains, unauthorized access to browser-based credential storage, and persistence attempts via LD_PRELOAD on Linux environments.
Detects MYRA Linux RAT persistence mechanisms. The rule monitors for the creation of cron jobs scheduled to run every 13 minutes and the creation of a profile initialization script at /etc/profile.d/.sh.local, which is a common technique for ensuring code execution upon user shell session initialization.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to Node.js environments. It monitors for the execution of Node.js or NPM commands involving specific sensitive files ('sync-peer.cjs', 'peer-math.js') or suspicious packing destinations, as well as the creation of 'index.js' or 'package.json' files within a 'node_modules' directory, which can indicate software supply chain manipulation or malicious dependency installation.
Detects the creation of large archive files (.zip, .7z, .rar, .tar) exceeding 100MB within sensitive or high-risk directory paths such as Desktop, Temp, or AppData, or on non-system drives. This behavior is often associated with the staging of sensitive data for exfiltration.
This rule monitors for scenarios where a DLL is created and subsequently loaded by a process within a short time frame (60 seconds or less). The rule specifically excludes files located in 'C:\Windows\' and 'C:\Program Files\' to minimize noise, focusing on suspicious modules originating from user-writable or unexpected locations, which is a common behavior of malware or side-loading attacks.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters or scripts involving keylogging-related libraries (pynput, pyxhook, pywin32, keyboard) or direct access to Linux input devices (/dev/input/event*), correlated with the creation of temporary script files, which is a common pattern for Python-based keyloggers.
Page 110 of 217