Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities: the creation or modification of an executable file (.exe or .dll) within a directory path containing update-related keywords, followed by the execution of a file in that same location, and culminating in an outbound network connection from that process. This pattern is characteristic of a software supply chain compromise or an adversary deploying a malicious payload via a fake or compromised update mechanism.
This rule detects the creation of .lnk files in common suspicious directories (such as startup folders, Temp, or Downloads) followed by the execution of common scripting or command interpreters (powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe) with long command lines within a 10-minute window. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to achieve persistence or execute malicious payloads via user interaction.
Detects the creation of plist files within macOS /Library/LaunchAgents/ or /Library/LaunchDaemons/ directories by the osascript utility. This behavior is indicative of Meow RAT establishing persistence by masquerading as a legitimate system service.
Detects the unauthorized access of sensitive files (browser data, SSH keys, AWS credentials) followed by the creation of archives using common utilities (7zip, tar, zip) by processes spawned within npm/node.exe/powershell/wscript/chost.exe postinstall execution chains. This behavior is associated with credential theft and data staging for exfiltration, notably seen in campaigns like Operation Friday Harvest.
Detects the creation of an executable in the user's AppData\Roaming directory followed by the modification of a Windows Registry 'Run' key to point to that executable. This behavior is associated with the TuglaInsaatci loader, which uses this pattern for persistence.
Identifies file, registry, network, and process indicators associated with the @mastra/* npm supply chain compromise. This rule detects the presence of specific malicious files, registry modifications for persistence, outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure, and the execution of malicious scripts related to the attack.
Detects signs of Grixba malware activity, including process execution of Gt_net.exe from the Public/Music directory, associated WMI/WinRM remote network connections, and the creation of staging artifacts such as data.zip or ExportData.db.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity linked to files or processes within the Windows temporary directory. It identifies three distinct malicious patterns: (1) sensitive privilege usage (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege) by processes running from temp; (2) presence of known malicious file names associated with a specific campaign (vile_*.ico, vile_*.lnk, etc.); and (3) PowerShell execution of a specific decryptor shortcut file from the temp directory.
This rule detects the creation of image files (bmp, png, jpg, jpeg) within temporary or application data directories, while simultaneously monitoring for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure (IP 223.26.63.40 or port 2671). The rule calculates a risk score based on the correlation of these events within a 30-second window, excluding common benign screenshot utility processes.
Detects potential unauthorized cryptocurrency mining activity by correlating process execution, network connections to known mining pools or C2 IPs, and the presence of known miner binaries in temporary directories. The rule calculates a confidence score based on the overlap of these behavioral indicators.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain where a WinRAR or UnRAR process, spawned by an email client (Outlook or Thunderbird), extracts files directly into the Windows startup directory. It then correlates this with the execution of common scripting or command-line tools (such as mshta, wscript, powershell, or cmd) from that same startup location within 30 seconds of the extraction event.
Detects execution chains where Outlook launches a VBScript file that subsequently invokes PowerShell with encoded commands, characteristic of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM) threat activity. Additionally, it identifies the creation of VBScript/VBE files in temporary directories, which is consistent with the deployment of PteroVDoor or PteroPSDoor loaders.
Detects the download, staging, and execution of SoftEther VPN components associated with CL-STA-1062. The rule monitors for the creation of specific SoftEther files, network downloads from known actor staging infrastructure, and the execution of SoftEther binaries masquerading as VMware tools (vmtools.exe).
Detects the obfuscated 'setup.cjs' dropper associated with the easy-day-js npm supply chain attack. The rule identifies unique obfuscated variable names, XOR-encoded marker bytes, and specific campaign-related strings, including postinstall commands, package names, second-stage payload filenames, self-deletion patterns, and TLS bypass indicators.
Detects the creation of an Amazon Q Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration file. This file is used to define tools and resources for Amazon Q, and its creation could indicate a user configuring external tool access for the AI assistant or an adversary attempting to influence its capabilities.
Detects the creation of GitHub Actions workflow files within the .github/workflows/ directory that mimic Dependabot naming conventions while containing suspicious indicators associated with the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. Indicators include hardcoded secret references, specific operational markers like 'RevokeAndItGoesKaboom', and unauthorized OIDC token permissions.
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Photo-themed ZIP phishing campaign dropping a Node.js implant
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Detects the creation or modification of suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon plist files on macOS. Specifically looks for files named 'com.apple.accountsd.plist' or files within a hidden directory '.com.apple.accountsd' in common LaunchAgent/Daemon paths. This pattern is often used by malware for persistence.
Detects suspicious execution of .scr (screensaver) files, execution of 'SecureMessage' named executables (potentially Pony malware), and email attachments containing .scr or .zip files, which are common vectors for malware delivery.
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