Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized creation or modification of AI agent system prompts, guardrails, or policy configuration files. This rule monitors for changes made by processes or users other than those identified as authorized CI/CD deployment agents or service accounts, helping to prevent unauthorized tampering with AI agent behavior or safety policies.
Detects the RatHat ADB self-pairing sequence on Android devices, where an application uses shell-level access gained via ADB to stage and execute malicious binaries (such as Go Agents or FRP clients) from /data/local/tmp. The rule correlates the staging and execution of these specific binaries with subsequent network communication indicative of C2 or data exfiltration.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects evidence of potential adversarial interference with Windows Defender updates and MRT.exe (Malicious Software Removal Tool). The rule correlates high volumes of temporary file creation in user directories with unauthorized access to MRT.exe by third-party processes and repeated Windows Defender update failures, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt endpoint security operations.
Detects the presence of known SHA256 hashes associated with the 'ccrtc' planter PowerShell scripts and C2 SDK JavaScript components. These files were identified as being dropped into 'C:\Windows\Temp' during the STAC4924 webshell intrusion campaign.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
Detects the creation or renaming of files to a .aspx extension within specific web application directories (member file-upload). The rule specifically filters for file operations initiated by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) and requires a non-zero file size, identifying potential web shell deployment attempts.
This rule detects network connections initiated by unsigned executables that were recently created (within one hour) in common staging directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData. It specifically targets beacons to the Telegram Bot API or Discord webhooks, which are common patterns for command-and-control (C2) communication used by malware such as the Amadey bot.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a known web server process (e.g., IIS, Nginx, Apache) spawns a command shell process, followed shortly by the creation of a file with a web shell-like extension (.aspx, .jsp, .php) in the same environment. This pattern is indicative of an adversary exploiting a public-facing application to upload and potentially access a web shell.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the .ssh/authorized_keys file. Such changes are often performed by adversaries to establish persistence by ensuring their own public keys allow them remote access to the host. The rule filters out known configuration management and system tools to reduce noise.
Detects the deployment of the Hermes Agent AI framework by the Carbonato botnet. The rule identifies the creation or modification of a 'SOUL.md' persona file within specific directories (/root/.hermes/ or /opt/netd/) followed by an outbound network connection to a known LLM gateway IP or the Telegram API. This pattern is indicative of a post-exploitation AI agent being installed for command and control or task execution.
Detects a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis first-stage loader, which involves the loading of specific suspicious DLLs (masquerading as common software components) followed by the extraction or creation of an 'encryptbase64.ps1' second-stage loader within a short timeframe (10 minutes) on the same host.
Detects unauthorized file creation within the /root/.hermes/loot/ directory and specific path combinations associated with the CARBONATO botnet's Hermes Agent. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting, specifically the exfiltration of AI API keys for various LLM providers.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms on Windows systems by monitoring for the creation or modification of Registry 'Run' or 'RunOnce' keys, as well as the creation of files within the Windows Startup folder. These actions are commonly used by adversaries to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon user login or system startup.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of common JSP web shell filenames (x.jsp, u.jsp, u2.jsp) within known web application directories (e.g., webapps, Peoplesoft, WebLogic). This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish a web shell for persistent access or command execution on a vulnerable web server.
Detects Gamaredon (Armageddon) group activity characterized by Microsoft Office applications (winword.exe or excel.exe) writing to global template files (Normal.dotm or Personal.xlsb) to implant malicious macros, or dropping .vbs or .lnk files into startup or template directories to achieve persistence and facilitate further propagation.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
Detects evidence of potential adversarial interference with Windows Defender updates and MRT.exe (Malicious Software Removal Tool). The rule correlates high volumes of temporary file creation in user directories with unauthorized access to MRT.exe by third-party processes and repeated Windows Defender update failures, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt endpoint security operations.
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