Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,545 detections

This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms on Linux systems by identifying the creation of new systemd service files, modifications to init.d scripts, or the use of systemctl to enable or start services. The rule specifically excludes standard package management activities (apt, yum, dnf, dpkg) and flags if the triggered service operation involves suspicious file paths.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects unauthorized write, modification, or creation events on critical SSH binary files (sshd, ssh, scp) on Linux systems. It excludes legitimate package management tools (e.g., apt, yum, dpkg, rpm) from triggering alerts to reduce noise from system updates.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the deployment and execution of GS-Netcat (gsocket), a tool often used for creating persistent reverse shells or backdoors. The rule identifies processes associated with gsocket, instances where the 'uptime' command is masqueraded with suspicious command-line arguments, and unauthorized creation or modification of systemd service files designed for persistence.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects potential credential harvesting activities targeting the SSH and PAM authentication stacks. The rule identifies suspicious file operations (creation/modification/read) by authentication-related processes (sshd, login, su, sudo) involving sensitive files like /etc/shadow or non-standard file paths in temporary directories, as well as the spawning of interpreters that write to these suspicious locations.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects two suspicious behaviors related to OpenSSH. The first scenario identifies unauthorized modifications, creations, or renames of core OpenSSH binaries (/usr/sbin/sshd, /usr/bin/ssh, /usr/bin/scp) that are not initiated by common package managers, which could indicate persistence mechanisms or backdooring. The second scenario monitors ssh/sshd/scp processes creating or modifying files in common temporary or world-writable directories (/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, etc.), which is often indicative of credential harvesting or data staging.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects potential tampering with Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) or configuration files on Linux systems. This includes the loading of non-standard shared libraries by authentication-related processes (sshd, sudo, login), modification of core PAM modules (e.g., pam_unix.so) by non-package manager processes, and unauthorized modifications to files within /etc/pam.d/. It also monitors for credential-related activity where authentication processes write data into temporary or hidden directories.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects Linux processes running from non-standard directories that exhibit network beaconing behavior, correlated with the concurrent creation or modification of systemd unit files on the same host. This pattern is indicative of a remote access trojan (RAT) or backdoor establishing persistent command-and-control.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the Kimsuky threat group using a JSE-based loader to write decoded binary payloads to the C:\ProgramData directory. The files are written using randomized filenames with specific non-standard extensions (.a9oc, .lpXD, .lpxQ, .lpXO) initiated by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, a technique observed in their January 2026 campaign.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the execution of fltMC.exe originating from a temporary folder, which is indicative of potential malicious activity. The rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by this binary, outbound network connections, and file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) associated with this execution context.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects scenarios where an application located in Program Files or Program Files (x86) loads an unsigned DLL from its own installation directory. It further correlates this activity by checking if the DLL was recently created (within 48 hours) to identify potentially suspicious new files, which may indicate DLL hijacking or side-loading attempts.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects processes frequently creating image files (bmp, png, jpg, jpeg) in temporary directories and subsequently initiating external network connections. The logic identifies suspicious patterns where a non-whitelisted process generates files at consistent, short intervals and performs network activity, which is a common indicator of automated screen capture and exfiltration.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects execution of fltMC.exe from a location other than the standard Windows System32 directory, correlated with recent file creation or modification events in sensitive directories like ProgramData or User Public folders. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to load malicious kernel-mode drivers or perform system-level operations using a renamed or moved system utility.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects unauthorized file operations (Creation, Modification, Rename, Deletion) on sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) by potentially unauthorized or suspicious processes identified by name.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects unauthorized file operations (Creation, Modification, Rename, Deletion) on sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) by potentially unauthorized or suspicious processes identified by name.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects file operations (creation, modification, deletion, renaming) involving common SSH key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519) or files located within .ssh directories, initiated by processes typically associated with AI/LLM tools (chatgpt, perplexity, etc.) or generic process names. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate or manipulate authentication credentials by unauthorized applications.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects attempts to extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, either by using the 'reg save' utility to export registry hives containing the SAM or by directly creating/modifying the SAM file on disk outside of known legitimate system processes.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
Detects a sequence of events where PowerShell is used to download files from 'nvidiadriver.net' or with filenames containing 'winPatch', followed by a suspicious file drop (specifically 'winPatch.zip' or 'update.vbs') in a temporary directory within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential initial staging for a RAT or malicious script deployment.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
101
Detects network activity characteristic of the PsExec tool performing lateral movement. The rule monitors for SMB traffic directed at the ADMIN$ share, specifically looking for the creation or access of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, combined with the use of the 'svcctl' named pipe, which is used by PsExec to remotely control services.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects network activity characteristic of the PsExec tool performing lateral movement. The rule monitors for SMB traffic directed at the ADMIN$ share, specifically looking for the creation or access of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, combined with the use of the 'svcctl' named pipe, which is used by PsExec to remotely control services.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the creation of ZIP/RAR/7z archives by processes residing within the Turla STOCKSTAY installation directory (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\SMN\) or by known STOCKSTAY malicious components. This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY 'Get' command, which gathers files and archives them in-memory for base64-encoded exfiltration.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
105
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
1011
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