Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the APT28 SimpleLoader malware, including malicious DLLs, steganographic image payloads, and configuration files dropped into non-standard or diagnostic directories.
Detects the opening of suspected APT28 (Fancy Bear) spearphishing lure documents by Microsoft Office or Outlook. The rule monitors for file access, creation, or renaming events where the filename matches known lure patterns associated with APT28 activities, such as naming conventions containing 'BULLETEN', 'OperInformativ', 'Courses', 'Consultation', 'Weapons', or 'Smuggling' in Word or Outlook processes.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity related to Microsoft Exchange server exploitation and persistence techniques. It detects three distinct behaviors: the creation of web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) within Exchange directories (OWA/ECP), the spawning of shell processes (cmd, powershell) by the w3wp.exe web server process, and DLL sideloading occurring through identified signed binaries (dfsvc.exe, rasautou.exe) outside of standard system directories.
Detects unauthorized access, modification, or deletion attempts against common web browser credential storage files (key4.db, logins.json, and Microsoft Edge 'Login Data'). These files store sensitive authentication information, and non-browser processes interacting with them are indicative of credential harvesting attempts.
Detects unauthorized access, modification, or deletion attempts against common web browser credential storage files (key4.db, logins.json, and Microsoft Edge 'Login Data'). These files store sensitive authentication information, and non-browser processes interacting with them are indicative of credential harvesting attempts.
This rule detects unauthorized access, creation, or modification of browser-specific sensitive credential files (such as 'Login Data' or 'cookies.sqlite') by processes that are not recognized web browsers or trusted update services. This behavior is a common indicator of information-stealer malware attempting to harvest session cookies and stored credentials.
Detects the creation of an executable file (.exe, .scr, .com, .pif) in user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) followed by the immediate execution of that same file. This is a common pattern for malware droppers where a file is dropped to disk and subsequently executed to initiate the next stage of an attack.
Detects the creation of named pipes with names frequently associated with common post-exploitation tools, such as Cobalt Strike. The rule filters out common browser processes and critical Windows system processes to reduce noise.
Detects attempts to extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, either by using the 'reg save' utility to export registry hives containing the SAM or by directly creating/modifying the SAM file on disk outside of known legitimate system processes.
Detects file creation or process execution originating from or referencing a folder named 'GentlemenCollection', which is a known staging directory used by the Gentlemen RaaS EDR killer framework prior to ransomware encryption.
Detects node.exe copying browser history files to temporary directories, associated with the protocal.cjs backdoor.
Detects the creation of a file named 'NTDS.zip', which is a common naming convention used by adversaries when compressing the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) for staging and subsequent exfiltration.
Detects the creation of files with suspicious names (e.g., .xlamb, lambsys) in the /var/tmp directory, initiated by common command-line interpreters or network transfer utilities. This behavior is often indicative of malware deployment or staging in a Linux environment.
This rule detects when the Microsoft Teams process (Teams.exe) creates an executable or installer file (.exe or .msi) in common user-writable directories such as AppData, Temp, or Users/Public. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, as legitimate Teams application updates and add-ins typically reside in specific, protected subdirectories within the Teams folder structure.
This rule monitors for the creation of .exe or .msi files within common user-writable directories (Downloads, Temp, AppData) initiated by web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This behavior is often indicative of drive-by downloads or users interacting with malicious web content that delivers installers to the host.
This rule detects the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files within the Windows Startup folder initiated by potentially suspicious processes such as WinRAR, unrar, or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to achieve persistence by ensuring the execution of a malicious file upon user login.
This rule detects the creation of a 'logs.dat' file, which is often associated with Remcos RAT for data exfiltration, in common user-related directories (AppData, Temp, Users, Documents) with a file size greater than or equal to 100KB. This pattern suggests an attempt to stage or exfiltrate collected data.
This rule detects indicators of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure, specifically targeting Evilginx2 and similar proxy frameworks. It identifies unauthorized execution of Evilginx2 binaries, the presence of specific session and configuration files (.evilginx/, phishlets, session databases), unauthorized modifications to Nginx configurations, and the dropping of suspicious HTML lure files into web document roots by scripting interpreters.
This rule detects the creation or modification of specific Launch Agent or Launch Daemon plist files on macOS, particularly those masquerading as 'com.apple.accountsd'. It also identifies the creation of a hidden directory '.com.apple.accountsd' within '/Library/Application Support'. This activity is highly suspicious as it indicates an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code by mimicking legitimate system services.
Detects the creation, reading, or execution of payloads stored within NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to hide malicious content within file metadata to evade security tools. The rule monitors process command-line arguments for ADS syntax, identifies usage of utilities like type, Get-Content, wmic, or various LOLBins (e.g., regsvr32, rundll32) interacting with ADS paths, and flags anomalous file creation/modification events that involve ADS, excluding known system-generated streams.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
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