Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the Windows process DllHost.exe creates executable or script files in suspicious user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, Public, ProgramData). This behavior is often indicative of WSL2 (Windows Subsystem for Linux) interacting with the Windows host filesystem, where a Linux-based process may attempt to stage payloads on the Windows partition via the WSL2 interop mechanism.
Correlates the user interacting with a browser in kiosk mode (potentially indicating a fake tech support page) and immediately downloading an executable file into the Downloads folder. This behavior is indicative of the Havoc Demon loader being delivered via social engineering tactics.
Detects instances where the DllHost.exe process writes new executable files (e.g., .exe, .dll) or script files (e.g., .ps1, .vbs) to common staging locations such as C:\Users\Public, C:\Windows\Temp, or C:\ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of potential malware delivery or stage-two payload execution.
Detects instances where the DllHost process (COM Surrogate) writes executable files, scripts, or library files to common temporary or user-writable directories. This behavior is often associated with fileless or masqueraded execution techniques where attackers use legitimate system binaries to drop malicious payloads.
This rule detects successful SSH sessions initiated on Linux systems that are immediately followed by the creation of new executable or script files in common temporary directories such as /tmp, /dev/shm, or /var/tmp. This behavior is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity where an attacker drops tools or malicious scripts after gaining remote access.
Identifies AstarionRAT establishing HTTP POST connections to transmit the compressed archive containing the stolen browser and keylogger data. This rule correlates network HTTP POST requests with the creation of zip files by the same process, indicating potential data exfiltration.
Detects instances where the SSH daemon (sshd) or its related components, such as PAM libraries, create or write to files located in /tmp/ or hidden files in /var/ directories, which may indicate unauthorized configuration changes, credential manipulation, or staging of malicious files.
Detects the creation or modification of files within /etc/systemd/system/ or /etc/init.d/ by non-standard management processes. Attackers often use these paths to establish persistence by creating or altering service unit files to execute malicious code automatically upon system boot or service restart. The rule specifically excludes common system management tools.
Detects instances where the sshd process or PAM-related processes create or write to files within temporary directories (/tmp/ or /var/). This behavior is often associated with the staging of malicious scripts, backdoors, or tools during an attack involving credential abuse or unauthorized access via SSH.
Detects instances where the DllHost.exe process creates or writes files with common executable or script extensions (.exe, .dll, .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, .hta, .scr, .sh) into suspicious, publicly writable, or temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious payload staging, masquerading, or post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects two suspicious behaviors associated with OpenSSH components: the direct modification or replacement of critical OpenSSH binaries (/usr/sbin/sshd, /usr/bin/ssh, /usr/bin/scp), or the use of these processes to write files to suspicious or non-standard locations (such as /tmp/ or unauthorized subdirectories within /var/log/), which may indicate credential harvesting or the presence of a backdoor.
Detects instances where the DllHost.exe process creates files with executable-like extensions (exe, dll, ps1, bat, cmd, vbs, hta, scr) within high-risk, world-writable directories such as C:\Users\Public, C:\Windows\Temp, C:\ProgramData, C:\Users\Default, or AppData\Local\Temp. This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, such as file drops for further execution or persistence, as legitimate COM surrogate activity rarely results in file creation in these specific locations.
This rule detects high-frequency file renaming or creation activities within a short timeframe (60 seconds) that involve uncommon file extensions. This behavior is highly characteristic of the encryption phase of ransomware attacks, where malicious processes quickly rename or encrypt files across the system.
Detects the use of a masquerading binary named 'uptime' for persistence or malicious activity on Linux systems. This rule monitors for unauthorized 'uptime' process activity such as network connections, spawning of shell/interpreter processes, creation of systemd service unit files, and manipulation via systemctl, as well as execution from non-standard directories.
Detects the creation of files in the 'C:\ProgramData\Windows Multimedia\' directory, specifically files named 'ROG', which is indicative of JFMBackdoor staging captured screenshots using GDI+ functions.
This rule correlates rapid file modifications (potential encryption or mass deletion) with the execution of commands known to inhibit system recovery (e.g., deleting shadow copies or modifying boot recovery settings) and significant outbound network data transfers from the same host. This pattern is characteristic of ransomware deployment.
Detects potential persistence via the creation of suspicious systemd service files. The rule monitors for new service files created by non-package manager processes, correlates these with subsequent 'systemctl enable' or 'start' operations, and identifies the execution of binaries from non-standard directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) by the systemd process.
Detects suspicious activity related to the OpenSSH server suite, including unauthorized modifications to core SSH binaries by non-package-manager processes, sshd processes writing files to temporary directories (a common indicator of credential harvesting), and sshd execution from non-standard file paths which may indicate a trojanized binary or persistence mechanism.
Detects a suspicious sequence where DllHost.exe writes an executable or script to a common public directory (such as C:\Users\Public\, C:\Windows\Temp\, or C:\ProgramData\), followed by the execution of that file within 30 minutes by a system process (svchost.exe or services.exe), often indicative of a scheduled task or service-based persistence mechanism.
Detects suspicious file drops by DllHost.exe into staging directories (e.g., C:\Users\Public\ or C:\ProgramData\) occurring shortly after the execution of wsl.exe, where the DllHost process itself exhibits no network activity in the host telemetry. This behavior is indicative of an attacker leveraging the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) to download payloads or tools that bypass standard Windows network monitoring, leaving behind an artifact dropped by a COM surrogate.
Detects DLL side-loading activity associated with the JFMBackdoor malware. The rule identifies the execution of the legitimate Windows filter manager control utility (fltMC.exe) from suspicious locations (TEMP/tmp directories) and the creation of companion payloads (FLTLIB.dll, flt.bin, or scr.mui) in those same directories, which are characteristic of the JFMBackdoor dropper chain.
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