Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED malware loader, including the execution of malicious .jse scripts, PowerShell-based obfuscated payload decoding using 'ProgramData' as a staging path, and the subsequent execution of the 'zlrenu8.exe' payload. The rule specifically targets the multi-stage infection chain where scripts are used to perform anti-analysis and sandbox evasion before launching the primary malicious component.
Detects malicious dropper behavior involving batch files spawning hidden PowerShell processes to download components (flt.bin, FLTLIB.dll, scr.mui, fltMC.exe) to temporary directories. The rule further tracks the execution of the dropped fltMC.exe and the creation of the associated DLL/binary files, which is indicative of JFMBackdoor DLL side-loading.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the 'C:\ProgramData\Windows Multimedia' directory, a path associated with JFMBackdoor's screen capture output. The rule specifically monitors for this activity when initiated by 'fltMC.exe', which is known to be used by this malware for DLL side-loading.
Detects execution and staging activity associated with the NUKESPED (zlrenu8.exe) backdoor. The rule monitors for direct process execution from ProgramData, malicious DLL registration using rundll32, the creation of staged payload files in ProgramData, and suspicious memory operations (VirtualProtect) by the backdoor process, which are indicative of reflective loading or shellcode execution.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group's NUKESPED JSE loader, including the use of wscript/cscript to execute .jse files, drop encoded payloads via ADODB.Stream, and spawn hidden PowerShell processes for decoding stages (targeting .a9oc files in ProgramData). The rule also detects the creation and execution of the NUKESPED secondary payload zlrenu8.exe.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED campaign, specifically the execution of .jse droppers from the Downloads directory using Windows Script Host (wscript.exe/cscript.exe), execution of known malicious files by SHA256 hash, and the presence or creation of the associated zlrenu8.exe payload.
Detects the activity of the Prinz Eugen ransomware, specifically tracking the execution of 'servertool.exe' as it creates temporary files with the '.prinzeugen.tmp' extension and subsequently renames them to finalize file encryption.
Detects a potential storage container hijacking attack in Azure, where a container is deleted in one subscription and subsequently recreated with the same name in a different subscription within the same tenant. This sequence can be used to redirect data streams or intercept access to containerized resources.
Detects unauthorized file access to browser extension directories and credential stores (History, Login Data) by a suspicious Node.js process named 'protocal.cjs'. This activity is characteristic of the 'easy-day-js' supply chain compromise, where a malicious backdoor attempts to exfiltrate browser-stored credentials and history from Chrome, Edge, and Brave browsers.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with HijackLoader delivered via ErrTraffic ClickFix lures. The rule identifies a sequence where a web browser spawns a PowerShell process that subsequently creates a large archive file (binary bloating), followed by the execution of suspicious processes (often associated with process injection/hollowing) from the extracted context.
Detects file operations (creation, modification, deletion, renaming) involving common SSH key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519) or files located within .ssh directories, initiated by processes typically associated with AI/LLM tools (chatgpt, perplexity, etc.) or generic process names. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate or manipulate authentication credentials by unauthorized applications.
This rule detects the creation of a '_vault.zip' archive, which is characteristic of the VVS Stealer malware, followed by network activity to Discord from the same process within a 15-minute window. VVS Stealer uses these archives to store stolen browser data (passwords, cookies, history, autofill) before exfiltrating it, often via Discord webhooks.
Detects the execution of OXLOADER (aBsvwbdas.exe) which drops a maliciously crafted .ocx file (a copy of dui70.dll) into the %TEMP% directory. This behavior is indicative of module stomping to facilitate the in-memory execution of CASTLESTEALER via techniques like DonutLoader and RunPE.
Detects the creation or download of 'injection-obf.js', an obfuscated JavaScript payload associated with VVS Stealer for Discord injection. The rule captures details like source URL, referrer, and responsible process to aid in containment and scoping.
This rule detects the creation or execution of files that match specific suspicious filenames associated with known malicious activity. It monitors both process creation (Event ID 1) and file creation (Event ID 11) events, targeting filenames such as 'MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive.exe', 'StockMarketView.exe', and various DLL files (e.g., 'ms-lib-math-core.dll'). These files are often masquerading as legitimate system or application components to evade detection.
Detects instances where node.exe or npm.exe processes spawn PowerShell to execute download-related cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, IEX) or encoded commands, followed by the execution of a process from user-writable directories (TEMP or AppData) within a one-minute window, a pattern associated with PostCSS typosquatting supply chain attacks.
Detects the TuglaInsaatci steganographic loader technique where a randomly-named executable is dropped directly into the user's AppData\Roaming directory and subsequently launched within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a self-copying persistence mechanism frequently used in campaigns like FortiBleed.
Detects indicators of persistence activity associated with the MYRA RAT. This includes unauthorized modifications to shared library preload mechanisms (/etc/ld.so.preload), creation of malicious shared objects in systemd user paths by common interpreter/shell processes, suspicious modification of cron job files by those same processes, and the execution of the 'systemd-userdbd' process from non-standard, unauthorized filesystem locations.
Identifies the browser process saving a .zip file whose name explicitly spoofs an application update, matching the SocGholish social engineering lure.
This rule detects the creation or execution of files that match specific suspicious filenames associated with known malicious activity. It monitors both process creation (Event ID 1) and file creation (Event ID 11) events, targeting filenames such as 'MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive.exe', 'StockMarketView.exe', and various DLL files (e.g., 'ms-lib-math-core.dll'). These files are often masquerading as legitimate system or application components to evade detection.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows utility 'Fondue.exe' (Features on Demand) loads the control panel library 'APPWIZ.cpl' from non-standard locations such as C:\Users\Public or AppData directories. It also identifies the staging phase where 'APPWIZ.cpl' is written to 'C:\Users\Public', which is indicative of a DLL side-loading attack sequence, often associated with the Elephant malware dropper.
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