Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
Detects an exploitation chain originating from a Chrome browser process, characterized by the execution of an anomalous child process followed by the creation of an executable file named 'chrome_cleanup.exe' within a short time window. This sequence is indicative of multi-stage exploitation, involving remote code execution via browser vulnerability and subsequent privilege escalation.
Detects the Sauron Loader execution chain, which involves a specific process (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, or tdwp.dll) performing a network request (beacon), followed by the creation of a new file (executable, script, or library), and the subsequent execution of that same file. This pattern is characteristic of operator-issued download-and-run tasking.
Detects the execution chain of the Sauron Loader malware. The rule identifies the side-loading of 'rnp.dll' by 'rnpkeys.exe' originating from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, followed by the loading of 'tdwp.dll' which facilitates in-memory decryption and execution. Persistence is confirmed by the creation or update of a scheduled task named 'keyroll'.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation of a 'manifest.json' file within directory paths containing 'extensions' by a process other than standard web browsers. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized manual installation or modification of browser extensions, which may be used for persistence or to facilitate credential/session theft.
Detects the execution of a Control Panel (.cpl) item using control.exe or rundll32.exe. The rule specifically looks for CPL files that were recently written to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads) and correlates this execution with subsequent suspicious behaviors, such as spawning Python processes, outbound network connections, or registry modifications consistent with key storage or payload persistence.
Detects a multi-stage loader execution chain, potentially named GHAPPIER, by identifying sequential stages of execution. These stages include initial marker file checks, shell-based command dispatching via curl/wget, renaming and execution of secondary payloads, Node.js-based runtime staging, and the eventual creation of implant artifacts in common paths such as VSCode extensions or hidden directories.
Detects the presence of Node.js runtime files (node.exe, index.js) or script-based agents (vbs, ps1) located within user-profile paths (AppData) that mimic legitimate Windows system folders. This pattern is characteristic of masquerading techniques used to stage or run malicious agents under the guise of system components.
Detects the staging of ChainScript files into specific, masquerading subdirectories within user AppData folders that mimic legitimate Windows system paths. This activity is indicative of the _scatter.ps1 script redistributing components such as the Node.js runtime, agent configuration, and helper utilities before execution.
This rule detects the creation of a file within the SysWOW64 directory followed by an immediate modification or creation of a Windows Run registry key within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where a malicious file is dropped to a system directory and registered for execution at system startup or user logon.
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe or .dll) within the 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\' directory by processes other than trusted Windows OS installation or servicing components. This activity is indicative of potential malware staging, side-loading, or persistence mechanisms where an adversary drops malicious payloads into a trusted system directory to evade detection.
Detects a potential AI agent data poisoning event where a file is downloaded from an untrusted source (browser or sync client) and subsequently read within one hour by a process associated with AI agent activity (e.g., semantic_kernel, SKAgent). This pattern is often used to inject malicious context or prompt injection vectors into RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems.
Detects persistence and execution abuse within hidden IDE/AI assistant workspace directories (e.g., .vscode, .cursor, .claude). The rule monitors for the creation or modification of configuration files used for automated task execution and identifies process execution patterns originating from these directories that invoke downloaders (curl, wget) or decoders (base64) to fetch or execute payloads.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of .lnk shortcut files within the Windows Startup folders (both current user and roaming appdata). It then correlates this activity with the execution of AutoIt3.exe or processes identified as 'AutoIt' that are running scripts with .a3x or .au3 extensions, which are commonly used for persistence and execution of malicious automation scripts.
Detects the installation of a specific malicious Firefox browser extension identified by its unique internal ID 'pdf-para-texto@extensao.local' or by its name 'PDF Identity Verifier'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using browser extensions for persistence or credential theft.
Detects the creation of a malicious GitHub Actions workflow file named 'runtime-update.yml', a known tactic used by the Sckit supply-chain worm. The worm injects this workflow to automate persistence and further propagation of the Go-based implant within CI/CD pipelines.
Detects the creation of a 'ca-roots.pem' file within a hidden '.sckit' directory on Linux systems. This behavior is associated with the 'sckit' supply-chain malware (e.g., delivered via malicious npm packages like @memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin), which uses this bundled certificate to enable HTTPS Command and Control (C2) communication in environments where standard system CA stores are unavailable.
Detects persistence attempts on Windows by monitoring for modifications to common Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the creation of executable files within the user startup directory. The rule excludes common legitimate processes like msiexec.exe, trustedinstaller.exe, and explorer.exe to minimize false positives.
Detects persistence modification via Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the addition of suspicious files to the Windows Startup folder. The rule specifically monitors for registry values pointing to common volatile directories, script extensions, or suspicious command-line interpreters. It also flags new executables or scripts being written directly into startup directory paths. This rule covers both direct registry manipulation and startup folder placement, often associated with malware or adversary persistence mechanisms.
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