Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects anomalous file activity associated with the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), characterized by the creation of numbered binary chunks (.bin) followed by the creation of a status log file (pcxboot_l.txt) and the subsequent deletion of the binary chunks. This behavior is indicative of an in-memory Java payload loader pattern used to evade detection.
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from the PaperCut 'pc-app.exe' process. It monitors for the creation or execution of a file named 'mscopilot.exe' within the non-standard directory 'C:\Microsoft.Office365\'. The rule matches based on a known malicious SHA1 hash or the specific file-write-then-execute behavior within a one-hour window, indicating potential AdaptixC2 loader activity.
Detects potential poisoning of an AI agent's RAG knowledge base or vector store through suspicious bulk ingestion or injection of imperative instruction-style content. The rule correlates these ingestion events with subsequent anomalous tool usage patterns by the same agent session, indicating a possible prompt injection or data manipulation attack aimed at altering agent behavior.
Detects potential poisoning of an AI agent's RAG knowledge base or vector store through suspicious bulk ingestion or injection of imperative instruction-style content. The rule correlates these ingestion events with subsequent anomalous tool usage patterns by the same agent session, indicating a possible prompt injection or data manipulation attack aimed at altering agent behavior.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects the unauthorized creation of script or executable files in the Windows Startup directory by .NET or Python runtime processes, specifically targeting the exploitation pattern of CVE-2026-25592. This vulnerability allows an AI agent host to bypass sandbox isolation and write files to the host filesystem, potentially establishing persistence.
Detects coordinated activity indicative of destructive malware propagation similar to NotPetya. The rule identifies a three-stage sequence on a single host: execution of a DLL via rundll32.exe, followed by file writes to administrative network shares (C$/ADMIN$), and remote process creation via WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe), correlated with a high volume of SMB connections.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious binaries masquerading as legitimate Windows utilities (e.g., Windows Update, Defender, or Phone Link) from within a ScreenConnect temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary uses remote access tools to stage and execute malicious payloads on a victim's system.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving LNK files being modified, created, or renamed in common locations (Desktop, Quick Launch, Start Menu) correlated with the creation of files ending in '.backup' within 30 minutes. It also independently detects the presence or execution of 'VLCAssistant.exe', which may indicate unauthorized launcher activity or masquerading.
Detects a specific pattern associated with AvisLoader or similar malware: a device establishes a network connection to known Cloudflare Tunnel infrastructure domains (trycloudflare.com or workers.dev), followed by the creation and execution of an executable file (.exe, .dll, or .scr) in user-writable directories such as Downloads, AppData, or Temp within a 15-minute window.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process modifies a Windows Registry Run key to ensure execution at logon, followed shortly by the same executable file being copied into the current user's startup folder. This pattern is often used by malware to establish persistence.
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
Detects UAT-11587 diplomatic-lure LNK file exploiting ZDI-CAN-25373 whitespace padding to conceal a PowerShell command that extracts CanonStager (cnmpaui.exe/dll) from TAR archives into %TEMP%
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
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