Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when specific legitimate Windows applications or LOLBINs (Living Off the Land Binaries) create script files on disk. This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity where adversaries leverage trusted processes to drop and execute malicious scripts, bypassing security controls.
Detects the creation or modification of PowerShell profile scripts (profile.ps1) in various common locations. Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, or modules to gain persistence or elevate privileges, as the profile script runs automatically when PowerShell starts.
This rule detects a specific UAC bypass technique (UACMe method 39) that leverages .NET Code Profiler and DLL hijacking against mmc.exe. It specifically looks for the creation of a DLL named 'pe386.dll' within a user's temporary AppData directory, which is characteristic of this bypass method.
Detects the creation of Virtual Hard Disk (.vhd or .vhdx) files by common browser processes. This activity can be indicative of malware delivery, as adversaries may use VHD files to encapsulate payloads and bypass security controls, particularly Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections.
Detects the creation of ".xml" and ".txt" files in folders within the "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft" directory by specific uncommon processes. This behavior is associated with Devil Bait malware samples and stages as described by the NCSC.
Detects the creation of a file named "dllhost.exe" in the "C:\users\public\Documents\" directory, which has been observed as an indicator for the COLDSTEEL RAT malware.
Detects the creation of shell scripts (files ending with .csh or .sh) within the '/etc/profile.d/' directory. This directory is used to store shell scripts that are executed when a user logs in, making it a common target for adversaries to establish persistence or elevate privileges.
Detects the use of the 'wget' utility to download and create files within common temporary directories like '/tmp' or '/var/tmp' on Linux systems. This activity can be indicative of an adversary performing ingress tool transfer or staging malicious files.
This rule detects the creation of '.cmdline' files, which are artifacts generated during dynamic C# compilation. Adversaries may use dynamic C# compilation to unpack and execute payloads without writing the compiled executable to disk, making it a defense evasion technique. The rule specifically looks for the creation of these files as an indicator of such activity, particularly when initiated by processes not typically associated with C# compilation.
This rule detects the creation of files with specific naming conventions that are indicative of tools exploiting the HiveNightmare (CVE-2021-36934) vulnerability to export the Security Account Manager (SAM) database. The rule looks for various file names and patterns used by different implementations of HiveNightmare exploitation tools, including those written in Go, C++, PowerShell, and C#.
Detects the creation of a file named 'debug.bin' in the '\Temp\' directory, which is the default output filename used by the SafetyKatz tool for dumping LSASS memory. This activity is indicative of an attempt to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process.
This rule detects the creation of suspicious file types (e.g., executables, scripts, archives) within the `C:\PerfLogs\` directory. This directory is typically used for performance logs and primarily contains `.etl` files. The presence of other executable or script file types in this location is highly unusual and can indicate malicious activity, such as staging for execution, persistence, or data exfiltration.
Detects when legitimate Windows applications, including Microsoft Office programs and various Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs), create archive files (ZIP, RAR, 7Z, diagcab, appx). This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, such as staging data for exfiltration or dropping malicious payloads, as these applications typically should not be creating archives.
This rule detects the creation of the Process Monitor (procmon) driver file (.sys) by any process other than the legitimate Process Monitor executable itself (procmon.exe or procmon64.exe). This behavior can indicate an attempt to load a malicious or unauthorized driver, potentially for privilege escalation or persistence, by masquerading as a legitimate system utility.
Detects the creation or modification of 'WsmPty.xsl' or 'WsmTxt.xsl' files outside of the standard Windows system directories. This activity is indicative of an application whitelisting bypass technique involving 'winrm.vbs' and 'cscript.exe' to execute attacker-controlled XSL files.
Detects the creation of a specific '.url' file named 'file001.url' within the 'Recent' folder of Microsoft Office. This activity has been observed in potential exploitation attempts related to CVE-2023-36884, where adversaries drop such files to achieve persistence or execute malicious code.
This rule detects the creation of files with a '.dll' extension that have names matching known Windows system DLLs (e.g., 'secur32.dll', 'tdh.dll') but are created in unusual or non-standard system directories. The rule specifically excludes common legitimate system directories like 'System32' and 'SysWOW64' to reduce false positives. This behavior can indicate an attempt at DLL sideloading or other defense evasion techniques where an attacker places a malicious DLL with a legitimate system DLL name in a location that a legitimate application might load it from.
Detects the creation of the default CSExec service executable file, 'csexecsvc.exe', which indicates the installation and potential execution of the CSExec service. CSExec is a tool similar to PsExec, used for remote command execution.
Detects the creation of a file named "ErrorHandler.cmd" in the "C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\" directory. This file can be used as a persistence mechanism because its content is executed whenever certain tools under "C:\WINDOWS\System32\oobe\" (e.g., Setup.exe) fail to run.
Detects the creation of files with the '.pub' extension (Microsoft Publisher documents) in suspicious or uncommon locations such as temporary directories or public user folders. This activity could indicate an attacker abusing Publisher documents for malicious purposes, potentially as part of defense evasion or initial access.
This rule detects the creation of Microsoft Office files (Word documents, Excel spreadsheets) within the default startup folders for Microsoft Word and Excel. This technique can be used by adversaries to establish persistence, as these files will automatically execute or load when the respective Office application is launched. The rule specifically looks for file creations in paths containing '\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP' or '\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART', and also considers paths containing both '\Office' and '\Program Files' along with '\STARTUP' or '\XLSTART'. It filters out legitimate creations by the Office applications themselves (WINWORD.exe, EXCEL.exe) to reduce false positives.
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