Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
Detects potential poisoning of an AI agent's RAG knowledge base or vector store through suspicious bulk ingestion or injection of imperative instruction-style content. The rule correlates these ingestion events with subsequent anomalous tool usage patterns by the same agent session, indicating a possible prompt injection or data manipulation attack aimed at altering agent behavior.
Detects the initialization of cloud synchronization tools like rclone or MEGAsync, accompanied by the creation of configuration files and subsequent high-volume network activity directed toward common cloud storage providers, indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for persistence mechanisms by detecting modifications to Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the creation of files within the Windows Startup folder. It specifically flags instances where the executable or script being registered resides in high-risk directories such as Temp, AppData, or Downloads, and correlates these events with recent process execution to confirm the persistence activity.
KQL Query
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects the presence of the Amatera secondary-payload archive component, which consists of a legitimate signed Chrome executable (platform_experience_helper.exe) paired with a malicious NativeAOT-compiled Secur32.dll designed for DLL side-loading. The malicious DLL is identified by its interaction with the GetUserNameExW Windows API.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious activity involving the bulk reading or downloading of sensitive AI-related artifacts (model files, datasets), followed by the staging of these files into a compressed archive, and finally an outbound network transfer to an external IP address. This behavior pattern is indicative of data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects the creation or writing of disk image files (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx) followed by the execution of suspicious file types (.lnk, .exe, .js, .vbs, .cmd, .bat, .scr) by explorer.exe within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using container files to bypass security controls or execute malicious payloads from mounted images.
Detects a coordinated attack sequence where a browser process is terminated, followed immediately by the execution of an unsigned Python interpreter from a suspicious location (temp/downloads folder), which is then followed by the installation of an unsigned browser extension. This pattern mimics ClickFix and browser-based RAT lure campaigns.
Detects the creation of files on a host system that match naming conventions consistent with Rhysida ransomware notes. These files (e.g., README, HOW_TO_RECOVER) indicate a post-encryption state where the adversary has demanded payment. The detection joins events to highlight multiple occurrences of these note-like files on a single device.
Detects the creation of files on disk by a browser process where the Zone.Identifier metadata indicates the origin was a blob:, data:, or about:blank URI. This behavior is indicative of HTML smuggling, where malicious payloads are reconstructed client-side from within an HTML document, bypassing network-based security controls.
Detects malicious prompt injection attempts within an LLM conversation session. The rule monitors for ingested content containing common instruction-override keywords (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'system prompt override'), followed immediately by the agent process executing unauthorized actions such as process launch, network connections, or file creation within the same session/user context.
Detects instances where a process not associated with standard web browsers accesses, copies, or modifies sensitive browser files such as cookies, local storage, or session tokens. This behavior is highly indicative of information-stealer malware (e.g., Vidar, Lumma, RedLine) attempting to exfiltrate session data for account hijacking.
This rule detects a multi-stage phishing attack sequence: it correlates the receipt of an invoice-themed email containing an anonymous SharePoint link with the subsequent local creation of a Windows Internet Shortcut (.url) file, followed by a Microsoft OAuth device-code authentication sign-in attempt by the user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary tricking a user into downloading a malicious shortcut that facilitates OAuth device code phishing.
Detects the on-disk presence of a malicious Firefox browser extension, 'pdf-para-texto@extensao.local', used for credential or data harvesting. The rule monitors for the creation of its manifest file or XPI package in specific directories, indicating the staging or installation of the malicious extension.
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
This rule detects multiple suspicious file write operations on a Linux host, specifically targeting directories often used for persistence such as /etc/apt/apt.conf.d, /etc/profile.d, and /etc/cron.d. The rule flags hosts where at least two of these specific persistence techniques are utilized within a 24-hour window, which is indicative of an automated, redundant persistence strategy often employed by cryptocurrency miners like XMRig.
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