Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of a file within the /etc/cron.d/ directory, followed shortly by a Bash process invocation using /dev/tcp redirection. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to achieve persistence via cron and establish reverse shells, bypassing potential limitations of default system shells that do not support /dev/tcp syntax.
Detects a post-compromise pattern on a WordPress site where an attacker, after an initial login, rapidly accesses multiple sensitive administrative pages (plugins.php, profile.php, etc.) within a short window, suggesting nonce harvesting. This activity is correlated with the subsequent creation of a suspected webshell file named 's.php'.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
Detects the Redis server process writing or modifying files within cron configuration directories. This is a common persistence technique used by attackers to gain recurring execution after exploiting vulnerable or misconfigured Redis instances.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of common JSP web shell filenames (x.jsp, u.jsp, u2.jsp) within known web application directories (e.g., webapps, Peoplesoft, WebLogic). This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish a web shell for persistent access or command execution on a vulnerable web server.
This rule monitors for the creation of known Neo-reGeorg web shell files ('tunnel.jsp', 'tunnel.jspx') within common web server directory paths, such as 'webapps', 'applications', 'wlserver', 'PSHTTP', 'PORTAL', or 'webserv'. Neo-reGeorg is a popular tunneling web shell used by adversaries to facilitate persistent access and proxy traffic into a compromised environment.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
Detects execution of shell commands (cmd, powershell) by processes associated with AvisLoader (e.g., 78324.exe, VLCAssistant.exe, auto.exe), followed by the creation or modification of files in suspicious user-writable directories (e.g., appdata, temp) within a 10-minute window, suggesting potential C2 activity and secondary payload staging.
Detects anomalous file staging activity combined with keyword-matched file access or suspicious Steam application launches, characteristic of the Rapuncel (BoryptGrab) malware's credential and crypto-wallet harvesting routine.
Detects evidence of the Rapuncel infostealer attempting to compromise Chrome or Edge browsers. The rule identifies suspicious image loads into browser processes linked to known malicious hashes or the creation of specific browser decryption log files used by the malware to defeat App-Bound encryption.
Detects evidence of the Rapuncel infostealer attempting to compromise Chrome or Edge browsers. The rule identifies suspicious image loads into browser processes linked to known malicious hashes or the creation of specific browser decryption log files used by the malware to defeat App-Bound encryption.
Detects a specific behavioral chain associated with the CHOSEN BRICK implant. This rule identifies when a suspected malicious process writes image/screenshot files (.png, .jpg, .bmp) to disk, followed by a network connection to the Telegram Bot API within a 15-minute window, suggesting potential data exfiltration.
Detects suspicious file create or write operations within the domain SYSVOL Policies directory. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers attempting to deploy malicious payloads, such as ransom notes or configuration changes, via Group Policy Objects (GPO). The rule monitors Windows Event ID 4663 to identify unauthorized modification attempts by non-system accounts.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects anomalous AI-assisted activity where multiple processes (specifically AI developer tools) appear to be chaining operations by writing to and reading from shared local directories (e.g., 'handoff', 'artifacts') followed by network requests to known AI service APIs. This pattern may indicate automated task chaining or unauthorized exfiltration of context/code to AI platforms.
Detects anomalous AI-assisted activity where multiple processes (specifically AI developer tools) appear to be chaining operations by writing to and reading from shared local directories (e.g., 'handoff', 'artifacts') followed by network requests to known AI service APIs. This pattern may indicate automated task chaining or unauthorized exfiltration of context/code to AI platforms.
Detects anomalous AI-assisted activity where multiple processes (specifically AI developer tools) appear to be chaining operations by writing to and reading from shared local directories (e.g., 'handoff', 'artifacts') followed by network requests to known AI service APIs. This pattern may indicate automated task chaining or unauthorized exfiltration of context/code to AI platforms.
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