Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious script or executable files (.bat, .ps1, .exe, .vbs) within the Windows Startup folder. It triggers when these files are created by processes typically used for automation or development (dotnet, python) or processes utilizing specific semantic/download-related command lines. The rule further correlates this activity with the presence of PowerShell commands indicative of script downloading or code execution (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) by the same device within the same timeframe, suggesting persistent execution of potentially malicious code.
This rule detects LSASS credential dumping attempts by correlating the execution of a dump command (via process command line) with the subsequent creation of a temporary file in the Windows Temp directory. The rule is specifically designed to bypass evasion techniques that introduce randomized delays between the LSASS process access and the file write operation by utilizing a 30-minute join window.
Detects the pidclone-style LSASS credential dumper that clones the target process into a suspended state, mirrors its memory, generates a minidump, and writes an XOR-encrypted copy of the dump to a randomized filename under Windows\Temp
Detects a sequence of events indicative of LSASS memory dumping where a process opens a handle to lsass.exe and subsequently creates a uniquely named temporary file (16-character hexadecimal filename) in the Windows Temp directory within a short timeframe. This behavior is often associated with the obfuscated flushing of a stolen memory dump to disk to evade signature-based detection.
Detects a process initiating a memory dump of lsass.exe (using --dump arguments) followed within 15 minutes by the creation of a hexadecimal-named .tmp file in the Windows\Temp directory. This behavioral pattern is characteristic of credential dumping using reflected cloning or similar techniques, followed by the staging of obfuscated or encrypted minidump data for exfiltration.
This rule detects LSASS credential dumping attempts by correlating the execution of a dump command (via process command line) with the subsequent creation of a temporary file in the Windows Temp directory. The rule is specifically designed to bypass evasion techniques that introduce randomized delays between the LSASS process access and the file write operation by utilizing a 30-minute join window.
Detects the MSI installer (msiexec.exe) creating files within the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, which is characteristic of the staging phase for the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading trio (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, tdwp.dll).
This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious script or executable files (.bat, .ps1, .exe, .vbs) within the Windows Startup folder. It triggers when these files are created by processes typically used for automation or development (dotnet, python) or processes utilizing specific semantic/download-related command lines. The rule further correlates this activity with the presence of PowerShell commands indicative of script downloading or code execution (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) by the same device within the same timeframe, suggesting persistent execution of potentially malicious code.
Detects the execution or presence of a malicious MSI installer file used by the Sauron Loader. This rule identifies files that exhibit the MSI OLE compound file structure in conjunction with specific file paths (C:\ProgramData\keyroll) and the presence of identified malicious components (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, and tdwp.dll), or matches known SHA256 file hashes associated with this loader.
Detects the creation or modification of script files (bat, ps1, vbs, cmd) within the Windows Startup folder initiated by processes commonly associated with AI agents or developer frameworks (e.g., dotnet, python, w3wp). This activity indicates an AI agent environment being exploited to establish persistence, potentially facilitating delayed remote code execution upon user logon.
Detects instances where a browser or agentic-browser process initiates a file download and subsequently executes that same file within a five-minute window, without the intervention of a user-driven process like explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of automated 'agentic' browser activity, potentially signifying hijacked web instructions or malicious automated tool execution flows.
Detects the presence of known Vidar infostealer samples by matching file hashes against a list of identified malicious artifacts. The rule monitors for file creation events, process execution (both as the primary process and as an initiating process), and network activity originating from these known malicious files.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
This rule detects a malicious execution chain starting with an MSI file being launched by explorer.exe from user-downloaded folders. The installer spawns chrome.exe, drops a specific loader file (e.g., PavokwiLoader.exe or Loader.exe) into the %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\modules\ directory, and establishes persistence via the HKCU 'Load' registry value pointing to that location.
This rule detects the creation or modification of browser native messaging host configuration files (e.g., com.lunex.explorer.json) combined with the simultaneous or subsequent termination of common web browsers. This pattern is indicative of potential browser hijacking, where an adversary sets up a malicious native messaging host to facilitate persistence or intercept browser communications and subsequently restarts or terminates the browser process to reload the configuration.
Detects evidence of the CARBONATO post-exploitation pattern, specifically identifying the installation of a Hermes Agent by monitoring the creation of a 'SOUL.md' persona file within a '.hermes' folder, followed by correlated outbound network traffic to a specific LLM gateway or known Vercel proxy infrastructure used for command relay.
Detects the staging of a potential RatHat malware component by observing a native Go binary being moved into /data/local/tmp via ADB shell (uid 2000), followed by an associated service binding to local port 7912 within a 5-minute window. This sequence is characteristic of the deployment process for this specific Android threat.
Detects unauthorized file creation within the /root/.hermes/loot/ directory and specific path combinations associated with the CARBONATO botnet's Hermes Agent. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting, specifically the exfiltration of AI API keys for various LLM providers.
Detects the creation of specific forensic log files (browser_decryption.log, sends.log) within the %TEMP% directory. These files are indicators of the data collection stage performed by the Rapuncel infostealer prior to archiving and exfiltration.
Detects the presence of known RatHat Go-based command agents (liblocal-service.so) or frpc reverse-proxy clients (libmedia_codec.so) when staged within temporary directories such as /data/local/tmp on Android devices, often following manual ADB shell interaction.
Detects NeedyMantis first-stage loader activity where a legitimate application (e.g., Poedit, curl, Vim, TightVNC) is executed to load an update or support DLL from a non-standard staging path (e.g., %ProgramData% subdirectories), followed by the presence of a co-located encrypted second-stage archive.
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