Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the initialization of known-malicious Terraform providers (dockerd) followed within one hour by the execution of a 'go run' process from the .terraform directory. This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary leverages a typosquatted or malicious Terraform provider to facilitate the execution of a secondary payload.
Detects the initialization of known-malicious Terraform providers (dockerd) followed within one hour by the execution of a 'go run' process from the .terraform directory. This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary leverages a typosquatted or malicious Terraform provider to facilitate the execution of a secondary payload.
Detects a specific staging and execution pattern where a payload file with a 6-16 character random filename is written to a temporary directory and subsequently executed by a common Windows handler process (such as rundll32, regsvr32, or powershell) within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of the Sauron Loader task-execution workflow.
Detects a specific staging and execution pattern where a payload file with a 6-16 character random filename is written to a temporary directory and subsequently executed by a common Windows handler process (such as rundll32, regsvr32, or powershell) within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of the Sauron Loader task-execution workflow.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware pattern where a payload is downloaded or retrieved and written to a randomly named file within a temporary directory, followed by the immediate execution of that staged file. This behavior is indicative of C2 tasking involving payload staging.
Detects the execution of staged payloads from the Windows %TEMP% directory. This rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with loader-style C2 execution, including direct execution of randomly named files, proxy execution via rundll32 or regsvr32, silent MSI installations, and the execution of payloads extracted from archives in temporary locations.
Detects the execution of staged payloads from the Windows %TEMP% directory. This rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with loader-style C2 execution, including direct execution of randomly named files, proxy execution via rundll32 or regsvr32, silent MSI installations, and the execution of payloads extracted from archives in temporary locations.
Detects process and file creation activity matching known MovieReaper loader and downstream module file hashes (MD5/SHA256). C2 IP/domain network indicators for this campaign require a separate network_connection-category rule, since Sigma logsource categories cannot be mixed within a single rule.
Detects the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (clr.dll) and System.Management.Automation.dll into a process that is not a recognized PowerShell binary (e.g., powershell.exe, pwsh.exe). This behavior is associated with the 'PSInline' technique used by SloppyRAT, where PowerShell capabilities are invoked directly via COM objects to execute commands in memory. The rule further correlates this activity with the creation of files with a .png extension in temporary directories, which is consistent with the exfiltration staging behavior of the malware.
Detects bulk file creation of XML files associated with Dahua credential exports, likely generated by a Python script, which is indicative of credential harvesting or staging for exfiltration.
Detects instances where the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) creates, modifies, or renames specific suspicious files ('My_Resume.pdf', 'Documents_Details.pdf') within the 'ProgramData' directory, often associated with execution of batch files or file copy operations that may indicate staging of malicious payloads.
Detects file creation events involving the 'SmartUploader' configuration file or process execution events referencing the tool, which may indicate unauthorized data collection or staging activity.
Detects the creation of files within the 'AppData\Local\SystemFolder32' directory. This path is non-standard and is frequently used by malware or unauthorized scripts to conceal malicious payloads or persistence mechanisms while masquerading as legitimate system components.
Detects the creation of files within the 'SystemFolder32' or 'System Folder32' directory under the user's Local AppData path, a known behavioral pattern for payload staging used by the Transparent Tribe threat actor.
Detects the creation of hard links using 'mklink /H' targeting specific paths in ProgramData or linking to specific executable paths in AppData. This behavior is often indicative of adversaries attempting to perform file system manipulation for persistence, defense evasion, or masquerading.
Detects the creation of files with the name 'README_KRSID.Txt', which is a hallmark behavior of the KRSID ransomware strain used to leave ransom notes on compromised systems.
Detects the creation of specific file paths and files associated with the PSNATCH file stealer tool, specifically monitoring for the presence of SmartUploader application directories and its associated upload index files. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging collected data on a local system for subsequent exfiltration.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
Detects the creation of a 'config.ini' file within the 'UBP-Asset' directory, correlated with subsequent FTP network activity from known associated binaries (UBPUpdater.exe, UBPPatch.Psh, cmd.exe, or UBP.exe). This behavioral pattern is indicative of Quasar RAT being delivered or updated through a fraudulent install path.
Detects automated searching (via grep, findstr, or select-string) for sensitive strings (e.g., API keys, private keys, wallet data) across multiple occurrences on a single host, or the creation of suspicious sensitive files (e.g., .env, credentials, wallet.dat) on devices where such automated sweeping activity has been observed. This pattern indicates an adversary staging data for exfiltration.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
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