Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,543 detections
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Correlates internet-origin executable creation with subsequent execution by Windows shell processes using matching device, file path and SHA1 hash within a five-minute timeframe.
Detects indicators of ToolShell web shell creation (spinstall0.aspx) and ASP.NET machine key harvesting activities (reading web.config or accessing validationkey/decryptionkey materials via w3wp child processes or file access audits) on SharePoint servers.
Detects the download of potentially suspicious executables, scripts, or archives originating from code hosting platforms like GitHub, GitLab, and various mirrors where files have low prevalence and lack valid signatures.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects unauthorized access to virtual hard disk (VMDK) files by non-standard processes followed by the creation or modification of sensitive offline credential artifacts such as ntds.dit or SYSTEM hives on the same host within a 2-hour window, indicating potential offline credential theft.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects potential persistence establishment where an AOMEI-related process writes a DLL file to disk, followed by the creation or modification of a Windows service pointing to that same DLL within a 15-minute window.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
Detects a specific sequence of behavior associated with Gryxa data collection and exfiltration. A single process queries system state or logs (scheduled tasks, WMI, event logs), creates an archive file (.zip, .7z, .rar), and establishes an outbound public network connection shortly thereafter.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence where a FortiSIEM-related process writes or modifies a shell script in a cron or phoenix directory, followed closely within 2 minutes by a child process spawned by cron executing that same written script file.
Detects when a USB mass storage device is connected to a host and is followed shortly thereafter by a large volume of file creations or modifications on a removable drive, which may indicate data exfiltration or staging.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects a PHP file being written into a WordPress content directory
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
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